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Народно-освободительная армия ( НОА ) является регулярными вооруженными силами из Народной Республики Китая (КНР) и вооруженное крыло основания КНР и правящая политическая партия, Коммунистическая партия Китая (КПК). [5] Помимо Центральной военной комиссии (ЦВК) и нескольких второстепенных подразделений, непосредственно подчиненных ей, у НОАК есть пять основных видов обслуживания: Сухопутные силы , ВМС , ВВС , Ракетные силы и Силы стратегической поддержки.. Большинство воинских частей по всей стране отнесено к одному из пяти командования театра военных действий по географическому положению. НОАК - крупнейшая военная сила в мире и второй по величине оборонный бюджет в мире. Это также одна из самых быстро модернизируемых вооруженных сил в мире, которую называют потенциальной военной сверхдержавой со значительной региональной обороной и растущими возможностями проецирования глобальной мощи. [6] [7] [1] [8] [9] [10] [11] Согласно Credit Suisse в 2015 году НОАК является третьей по величине военной силой в мире. [12]

Закон КНР прямо подтверждает лидерство партии над вооруженными силами Китайской Народной Республики и определяет ЦВК (Центральную военную комиссию) в качестве общенационального военного командования Китайской Народной Республики. Партия CMC действует под названием Государственного CMC для юридических и правительственных функций и как церемониальное Министерство национальной обороны для дипломатических функций. НОАК обязана следовать принципу абсолютного гражданского контроля коммунистической партии над вооруженными силами в соответствии с доктриной « партия командует оружием » (Dǎng zhǐhuī qiāng-党 指挥 枪), взятой из речи Мао Цзэдуна.во время экстренного собрания высшего партийного руководства 7 августа 1927 г. в начале гражданской войны в Китае . Его главнокомандующий является председателем Центральной военной комиссии (обычно также генеральным секретарем Коммунистической партии Китая ). [13] С 1949 года Китай использовал девять различных военных стратегий, которые НОАК называет «стратегическими ориентирами». Наиболее важные из них приходились на 1956, 1980 и 1993 годы. [14] Во время чрезвычайного положения в стране Народная вооруженная полиция и Китайское ополчение действуют как резерв и элемент поддержки Сухопутных войск Народно-освободительной армии.

Миссия [ править ]

Бывший верховный лидер Ху Цзиньтао сформулировал задачи НОАК следующим образом: [15]

  • Страхование руководства партии
  • Защита суверенитета, территориальной целостности, внутренней безопасности и национального развития Китайской Народной Республики
  • Защита интересов страны
  • И поддержание и сохранение мира во всем мире

История [ править ]

Вторая китайско-японская война [ править ]

Народно-освободительная армия была основана 1 августа 1927 года во время восстания в Наньчане, когда войска Гоминьдана (Гоминьдана) восстали под предводительством Чжу Дэ , Хэ Луна , Е Цзяньин и Чжоу Эньлая после резни в Шанхае 1927 года, устроенной Чан Кайши . Тогда они были известны как Китайская Рабоче-Крестьянская Красная Армия или просто Красная Армия. Между 1934 и 1935, Красная Армия пережила несколько кампаний привели против Чан Кай-ши и занимается в Лонг - марте .

Во время Второй китайско-японской войны с 1937 по 1945 годы коммунистические вооруженные силы были номинально интегрированы в Национальную революционную армию Китайской Республики, образовав два основных подразделения, известные как Восьмая армия путей и Новая четвертая армия . В это время эти две военные группы в основном использовали партизанскую тактику., как правило, избегая крупномасштабных сражений с японцами, за некоторыми исключениями, в то же время укрепляя свои позиции, поглощая националистические войска и военизированные силы, находящиеся в тылу японцев, в свои силы. После капитуляции японцев в 1945 году Коммунистическая партия объединила Восьмую армию и Новую четвертую армию, переименовав новую многомиллионную армию в «Народно-освободительную армию». В конце концов они выиграли Гражданскую войну в Китае , создав Китайскую Народную Республику.в 1949 году. Затем в НОАК произошла масштабная реорганизация с созданием в ноябре 1949 года структуры руководства ВВС, за которой в апреле следующего года последовало руководство военно-морским флотом. В 1950 г. были созданы структуры управления артиллерией, бронетанковыми войсками, войсками противовоздушной обороны, силами общественной безопасности и военно-рабочими отрядами. Силы защиты от химического оружия, железнодорожные силы, силы связи и стратегические силы, а также другие отдельные силы (такие как инженерные и строительные, материально-технические и медицинские службы) были созданы позже, все это зависело от руководства войск. Коммунистическая партия и Всекитайское собрание народных представителей через Центральную военную комиссию (и до 1975 года Совет национальной обороны).

1950-е, 1960-е и 1970-е годы [ править ]

Войска НОАК входят в Пекин в 1949 году во время гражданской войны в Китае
Китайские войска собрались на Т-34/85 или среднем танке Тип 58, покинувшем Северную Корею в 1958 году, через 5 лет после того, как Корейская война закончилась перемирием (прекращением огня) в 1953 году. На баннере на заднем плане картины изображен лозунг. (на китайском языке), в котором говорится: «Дружба и единство народов Северной Кореи и Китая всегда тверды и сильны!»
Маршал Линь Бяо осматривает солдат во время парада в честь 10-й годовщины военного парада в 1959 году.

В 1950-х годах НОАК с помощью Советского Союза начала трансформироваться из крестьянской армии в современную. [16] С 1949 года Китай использовал девять различных военных стратегий, которые НОАК называет «стратегическими ориентирами». Наиболее важные из них произошли в 1956, 1980 и 1993 годах. [14] Частью этого процесса была реорганизация, в результате которой в 1955 году было создано тринадцать военных регионов. В НОАК также входило много бывших частей и генералов Национальной революционной армии , которые перешли на сторону НОАК. Ма Хунбинь и его сын Ма Дуньцзин были единственными двумя мусульманскими генералами, которые возглавляли мусульманское подразделение, 81-й корпус, когда-либо служившие в НОАК. Хан Ювен, генерал-салар-мусульманин, также перешел на сторону НОАК. В ноябре 1950 года некоторые подразделения НОАК под названием Народная добровольческая армия вмешались в корейскую войну, когда силы Организации Объединенных Наций под командованием генерала Дугласа Макартура подошли к реке Ялу . Под тяжестью этого наступления китайские войска вытеснили силы Макартура из Северной Кореи и захватили Сеул , но впоследствии были отброшены к югу от Пхеньяна к северу от 38-й параллели . Война также послужила катализатором быстрой модернизации НОАК . В 1962 году сухопутные войска НОАК также сражались с Индией в китайско-индийской войне , достигнув всех целей.

До Культурной революции командиры военных округов, как правило, оставались на своих постах в течение длительного периода времени. По мере того как НОАК стала играть более активную роль в политике, это стало восприниматься как своего рода угроза партийному (или, по крайней мере, гражданскому) контролю над вооруженными силами. Самыми продолжительными военными командирами были Сюй Шию в военном округе Нанкин (1954–74), Ян Дэчжи в военном округе Цзинань (1958–74), Чэнь Силянь в военном округе Шэньян (1959–73) и Хань Сяньчу.в военном округе Фучжоу (1960–74). Создание профессиональных вооруженных сил, оснащенных современным оружием и доктриной, было последней из четырех модернизаций, объявленных Чжоу Эньлаем и поддержанных Дэн Сяопином . В соответствии с мандатом Дэна по реформированию, с 1978 года НОАК демобилизовала миллионы мужчин и женщин и внедрила современные методы в таких областях, как вербовка и рабочая сила, стратегия , образование и обучение . В 1979 году НОАК воевала с Вьетнамом из-за пограничной стычки в китайско-вьетнамской войне, в которой обе стороны заявили о своей победе.

Во время советско-китайского раскола напряженные отношения между Китаем и Советским Союзом привели к кровавым пограничным столкновениям и взаимной поддержке противников друг друга. Китай и Афганистан имели нейтральные отношения друг с другом во время правления короля. Когда просоветские афганские коммунисты захватили власть в Афганистане в 1978 году, отношения между Китаем и афганскими коммунистами быстро стали враждебными. Афганские просоветские коммунисты поддерживали врагов Китая во Вьетнаме и обвиняли Китай в поддержке афганских антикоммунистических боевиков. Китай ответил на советское вторжение в Афганистан , поддержав афганских моджахедов и увеличив их военное присутствие возле Афганистана в Синьцзяне. Китай приобрел военную технику у Соединенных Штатов, чтобы защититься от советского нападения.[17]

Сухопутные войска Народно-освободительной армии тренировали и поддерживали афганских моджахедов во время советско-афганской войны, перенеся свои тренировочные лагеря для моджахедов из Пакистана в сам Китай. Китайцы передали моджахедам зенитные ракеты, ракетные установки и пулеметы на сотни миллионов долларов. Во время тренировок вместе с моджахедами присутствовали также китайские военные советники и армейские войска. [18]

С 1980 г. [ править ]

В 1981 году НОАК провела крупнейшие военные учения в Северном Китае с момента основания Китайской Народной Республики. В 1980-х годах Китай значительно сократил свои вооруженные силы, чтобы высвободить ресурсы для экономического развития , что привело к относительному сокращению ресурсов, выделяемых НОАК. После этого подавления НОАК из протестов на площади Тяньаньмэнь в 1989 годуИдеологическая корректность была временно возрождена как доминирующая тема в китайском военном деле. Реформа и модернизация сегодня вновь стали главными целями НОАК, хотя политическая лояльность вооруженных сил КПК остается главной проблемой. Еще одним поводом для беспокойства политического руководства было участие НОАК в гражданской экономической деятельности. Считалось, что эти действия повлияли на готовность НОАК и вынудили политическое руководство попытаться лишить НОАК ее невоенных деловых интересов.

Начиная с 1980-х годов, НОАК пыталась превратиться из наземной державы, сосредоточенной на огромных наземных силах, в меньшую, более мобильную, высокотехнологичную, способную проводить операции за пределами своих границ. Мотивом для этого было то, что массовое вторжение России на сушу больше не рассматривалось как серьезная угроза, а новые угрозы Китаю рассматриваются как провозглашение независимости Тайванем , возможно, с помощью Соединенных Штатов, или конфронтация из-за на острова Спратли . В 1985 году под руководством ЦК КПК.и CMC, НОАК перешла от постоянной готовности «наносить ранний удар, наносить сильный удар и вести ядерную войну» к развитию вооруженных сил в эпоху мира. НОАК переориентировалась на модернизацию, повышение боеспособности и стала силой мирового класса. Дэн Сяопин подчеркнул, что НОАК необходимо уделять больше внимания качеству, а не количеству. Решение правительства Китая в 1985 году сократить численность вооруженных сил на один миллион было завершено к 1987 году. Укомплектование военным руководством было сокращено примерно на 50 процентов. В течение девятого пятилетнего плана (1996–2000 гг.) НОАК была сокращена еще на 500 000 человек. Также ожидалось, что к 2005 году численность НОАК будет сокращена еще на 200 000 человек. НОАК сосредоточила свои усилия на усилении механизации и информатизации, чтобы иметь возможность вести войну высокой интенсивности. [19]

Почетный караул НОАК в Пекине, 2007 г.

Бывший председатель CMC Цзян Цзэминь в 1990 году призвал военных «соответствовать политическим стандартам, быть компетентным в военном отношении, иметь хороший стиль работы, строго соблюдать дисциплину и оказывать энергичную материально-техническую поддержку» ( китайский :合格 、 军事 过硬 、 作风 优良 、纪律 严明 、 保障 有力; пиньинь : zhèngzhì hégé, jūnshì guòyìng, zuòfēng yōuliáng, jìlǜ yánmíng, bǎozhàng yǒulì ). [20] Война в Персидском заливе 1991 года.дало китайскому руководству четкое осознание того, что НОАК была чрезмерно крупной, почти устаревшей силой. Возможность милитаризованной Японии также постоянно беспокоила китайское руководство с конца 1990-х годов. Кроме того, военное руководство Китая реагировало и извлекало уроки из успехов и неудач американских вооруженных сил во время войны в Косово , вторжения в Афганистан в 2001 году , вторжения в Ирак в 2003 году и восстания в Ираке . Все эти уроки вдохновили Китай на преобразование НОАК из армии, основанной на количестве, в систему, основанную на качестве. Председатель Цзян Цзэминь официально совершил « революцию в военном деле».«(RMA) - часть официальной национальной военной стратегии 1993 года по модернизации вооруженных сил Китая . Цель RMA - превратить НОАК в силу, способную побеждать в том, что она называет« локальными войнами в условиях высоких технологий », а не массовая наземная война с преобладанием численности. Китайские военные планировщики призывают к коротким решающим кампаниям, ограниченным как по своему географическому охвату, так и по своим политическим целям. В отличие от прошлого, больше внимания уделяется разведке , мобильности и большой досягаемости. Это новое видение переместило ресурсы в сторону военно-морского флота и авиации. НОАК также активно готовится к космической войне и кибервойне .

За последние 10–20 лет НОАК приобрела в России некоторые современные системы вооружения, в том числе эсминцы класса «Современный» , самолеты Су-27 и Су-30 , а также дизель-электрические подводные лодки класса «Кило» . Он также приступил к производству нескольких новых классов эсминцев и фрегатов, в том числе эсминца с управляемыми ракетами типа 052D . Кроме того, НОАК разработали собственный истребитель Chengdu J-10 и новый истребитель-невидимку Chengdu J-20 . НОАК запустила новый класс Jin атомные подводные лодки 3 декабря 2004 года, способные запускать ядерные боеголовки, которые могут поражать цели через Тихий океан, и имеют два авианосца: один введен в строй в 2012 году, а второй запущен в 2017 году.

В 2015 году НОАК сформировала новые подразделения, включая Сухопутные войска НОАК, Ракетные войска НОАК и Силы стратегической поддержки НОАК. [21]

1 августа 2017 года НОАК отметила 90-летие со дня своего основания, перед большой годовщиной она провела свой самый большой парад и первый за пределами Пекина, который проводился на учебной базе Чжурихэ в Северном командовании театра военных действий (в автономном районе Внутренняя Монголия). , впервые это было сделано в ознаменование Дня НОАК, поскольку прошлые парады уже были 1 октября, в Национальный день КНР.

Операции по поддержанию мира [ править ]

Китайская Народная Республика направила НОАК в различные горячие точки в рамках роли Китая как видного члена Организации Объединенных Наций. Такие устройства обычно включают в себя инженер и материально - техническое обеспечение подразделения и члены военизированной Народной вооруженной полиции и были развернуты в рамках операций по поддержанию мира в Ливане , [22] Республика Конго , [23] Судан , [24] Берег Слоновой Кости , [25 ] Гаити , [26], а в последнее время - Мали и Южный Судан .


Известные кампании [ править ]

  • 1927–1950: Гражданская война в Китае
  • 1937–1945: Вторая китайско-японская война
  • 1949: Инцидент Янцзы против британских военных кораблей на реке Янцзы.
  • 1949: Включение Синьцзяна в Китайскую Народную Республику
  • 1950: Включение Тибета в Китайскую Народную Республику
  • 1950–1953: Корейская война под знаменем Китайской народной добровольческой армии .
  • 1954–1955: Первый кризис Тайваньского пролива .
  • 1955–1970: Вьетнамская война .
  • 1958: Второй кризис Тайваньского пролива у Кемой и Мацу .
  • 1962 год: китайско-индийская война .
  • 1967: Приграничные стычки с Индией.
  • 1969: советско-советский пограничный конфликт .
  • 1974: Битва за Парасельские острова с Южным Вьетнамом .
  • 1979: Китайско-вьетнамская война .
  • 1979–1990: китайско-вьетнамские конфликты 1979–1990 гг .
  • 1988: Схватка у Южного Рифа Джонсона с Вьетнамом.
  • 1989: Введение военного положения в Пекине во время протестов на площади Тяньаньмэнь в 1989 году .
  • 1990: Бунт в Барен Тауншип .
  • 1995–1996: Третий кризис Тайваньского пролива .
  • 1997: Контроль НОАК над военной обороной Гонконга
  • 1999: Контроль НОАК над военной обороной Макао
  • 2007 – настоящее время: миротворческие операции ВСООНЛ в Ливане.
  • 2009 – настоящее время: операции по борьбе с пиратством в Аденском заливе.
  • 2014: Поисково-спасательные работы для рейса MH370
  • 2014: Операции ООН по поддержанию мира в Мали
  • 2015: миротворческие операции МООНЮС в Южном Судане

Организация [ править ]

Национальное военное командование [ править ]

Государственная военная система поддерживает принцип абсолютного руководства КПК над вооруженными силами. Партия и государство совместно учредили ВМК, который выполняет задачу высшего военного руководства вооруженными силами. 1954 Конституциязаявил, что президент государства руководит вооруженными силами и назначил президента государства председателем комиссии по обороне. Комиссия по обороне является консультативным органом и не имеет реальной власти над вооруженными силами. 28 сентября 1954 года Центральный комитет Коммунистической партии Китая восстановил ЦКК в качестве руководящего органа НОАК. С этого времени была создана нынешняя система совместной системы партийного и государственного руководства вооруженными силами. Центральный Комитет Коммунистической партии руководит всеми военными делами. Президент государства направляет государственные вооруженные силы и развитие вооруженных сил, которым руководит Государственный совет.

Чтобы обеспечить абсолютное руководство Коммунистической партии над вооруженными силами, партийные комитеты всех уровней в вооруженных силах реализуют принципы демократического централизма. Кроме того, подразделения уровня дивизии и выше создают политических комиссаров и политические организации, обеспечивая соответствие отраслевых организаций. Эти системы объединяли партийную организацию с военной организацией для достижения лидерства в партии и административного руководства. Это рассматривается как ключевая гарантия абсолютного лидерства партии над военными.

В октябре 2014 года газета « Народно-освободительная армия» напомнила читателям о Конгрессе гутов , который провозгласил основной принцип партии, контролирующей вооруженные силы, и призвал к бдительности, поскольку «[чужие враждебные силы] проповедуют национализацию и деполитизацию вооруженных сил, пытаясь запутать наши умы и вытащить наших военных из-под партийного флага ». [27]

CMC торжественно размещается на территории Министерства национальной обороны («Здание 1 августа»).

Лидерство [ править ]

Руководство КПК - фундаментальный принцип китайской системы военного управления. НОАК подчиняется не Государственному совету, а двум Центральным военным комиссиям, одна из которых принадлежит государству, а другая - партии.

На практике две центральные военные комиссии обычно не противоречат друг другу, поскольку их состав обычно идентичен. Часто единственная разница в членстве между ними возникает в течение нескольких месяцев каждые пять лет, в период между партийным съездом, когда меняется членский состав партии CMC, и следующим последующим Всекитайским собранием народных представителей , когда меняется CMC штата. CMC выполняет свои обязанности в соответствии с Конституцией и Законом о национальной обороне. [28]

Руководство каждым типом вооруженных сил находится под руководством и управлением соответствующей части Центральной военной комиссии ЦК КПК. Силы каждого военного рода или силы, такие как подчиненные силы, академии и школы, научно-исследовательские и инженерные учреждения и организации материально-технического обеспечения, также находятся под руководством CMC. Эта договоренность была особенно полезной, поскольку Китай за последние несколько десятилетий все больше переходил к военным организациям, состоящим из сил более чем одной военной ветви. В сентябре 1982 года для удовлетворения потребностей в модернизации и улучшения координации в командовании силами, включая несколько родов войск, и для усиления единого командования вооруженными силами,CMC приказал упразднить руководящую организацию различных родов войск. Сегодня НОАК имеет органы управления ВВС, ВМФ и второй артиллерии.

В 1986 году Управление Народных вооруженных сил, за исключением некоторых приграничных районов, было передано под совместное руководство НОАК и местных властей. Хотя местные партийные организации обратили пристальное внимание на Управление Народных вооруженных сил, в результате некоторых практических проблем КВС решил, что с 1 апреля 1996 года Управление Народных вооруженных сил снова перейдет в юрисдикцию НОАК.

Согласно Конституции Китайской Народной Республики , CMC состоит из следующих лиц: председатель, заместители председателя и члены. Председатель ЦВС несет полную ответственность за совершение.

Центральная военная комиссия Коммунистической партии Китая и Центральная военная комиссия Китайской Народной Республики
Председатель
  • Си Цзиньпин (также генеральный секретарь , президент и главнокомандующий Объединенного боевого командования)
Заместители председателя
  • Генерал ВВС Сюй Цилян
  • Генерал Чжан Юся
Члены
  • Министр национальной обороны - генерал Вэй Фэнхэ
  • Начальник Объединенного штаба - генерал Ли Цзочэн
  • Директор Департамента политической работы - адмирал Мяо Хуа
  • Секретарь Центральной комиссии по проверке дисциплины - генерал Чжан Шэнминь

Центральная военная комиссия [ править ]

В декабре 1982 года пятый Всекитайское собрание народных представителей внесло поправки в конституцию штата, указав, что Центральная военная комиссия штата руководит всеми вооруженными силами штата. Председатель государственного CMC выбирается и снимается с должности полным NPC, в то время как другие члены выбираются постоянным комитетом NPC. Тем не менее, CMC Центрального комитета Коммунистической партии Китая оставался партийной организацией, которая непосредственно командует вооруженными силами и всеми другими вооруженными силами.

На практике партия CMC, после консультации с демократическими партиями, предлагает имена государственных CMC членов NPC, чтобы эти люди после прохождения юридических процедур могли быть избраны NPC в Центральную военную комиссию штата. Иными словами, КМС Центрального Комитета и Государственный комитет министров - это одна группа и одна организация. Однако с организационной точки зрения эти два ОМК подчинены двум разным системам - партийной системе и государственной системе. Таким образом, вооруженные силы находятся под абсолютным руководством Коммунистической партии, а также являются вооруженными силами государства. Это уникальная система совместного руководства, которая отражает происхождение НОАК как военного отделения Коммунистической партии. Она стала национальной армией только тогда, когда народs Китайская Республика была основана в 1949 году.

По соглашению председатель и заместитель председателя Центральной военной комиссии являются гражданскими членами Коммунистической партии Китая, но они не обязательно являются главами гражданского правительства. И Цзян Цзэминь, и Дэн Сяопин сохранили пост председателя даже после того, как отказались от своих других должностей. Все остальные члены CMC - действующие военные в форме. В отличие от других стран, министр национальной обороны не является главой вооруженных сил, но обычно является заместителем председателя CMC.

В 2012 году, пытаясь снизить уровень коррупции в высших эшелонах руководства китайских вооруженных сил, комиссия запретила подачу алкоголя на военных приемных. [29]

Военные реформы 2016 г. [ править ]

1 января 2016 года CMC выпустил руководство [30] по углублению национальной обороны и военной реформы, примерно через месяц после того, как председатель CMC Си Цзиньпин призвал к капитальному ремонту системы военного управления и командования на ключевом заседании, заложившем основу для одного из самая масштабная военная реформа с момента основания страны.

11 января 2016 года в ходе одной из самых радикальных военных реформ с момента основания Народной Республики НОАК была реорганизована и был создан объединенный штаб, непосредственно связанный с ОВК, высшей руководящей организацией в вооруженных силах. Предыдущие четыре генеральных штаба НОАК были расформированы и полностью реформированы. Вместо этого они были разделены на 15 функциональных отделов - значительное расширение по сравнению с областью Главного управления, которое теперь является единым отделом в рамках Центральной военной комиссии.

  1. Главный офис (办公厅)
  2. Объединенный штаб (联合 参谋部)
  3. Отдел политической работы (政治 工作 部)
  4. Отдел логистической поддержки (后勤 保障 部)
  5. Отдел разработки оборудования (装备 发展 部)
  6. Отдел обучения и администрации (训练 管理 部)
  7. Департамент мобилизации национальной обороны (国防 动员 部)
  8. Комиссия по проверке дисциплины (纪律 检查 委员会)
  9. Комиссия по политике и правовым вопросам (政法 委员会)
  10. Комиссия по науке и технологиям (科学 技术 委员会)
  11. Управление стратегического планирования (战略 规划 办公室)
  12. Управление по реформе и организационной структуре (改革 和 编制 办公室)
  13. Управление международного военного сотрудничества (国际 军事 合作 办公室)
  14. Аудиторское бюро (审计署)
  15. Агентство по администрированию офисов (机关 事务 管理 总局)

В число 15 департаментов входят три комиссии. Комиссия по проверке дисциплины CMC отвечает за искоренение коррупции.

Команды театра [ править ]

Пять театральных команд НОАК [32]

До 2016 года территория Китая была разделена на семь военных округов , но в начале 2016 года они были реорганизованы в пять командований театра военных действий. Это отражает изменение их концепции операций с преимущественно наземной на мобильную и скоординированную передвижение всех служб. [33] Пять новых театральных команд:

  • Восточное командование театра
  • Западное командование театра
  • Северное Театральное Командование
  • Южное Театральное Командование
  • Центральное Театральное Командование

Гарнизоны НОАК в Гонконге и Макао подчиняются Командованию Южного театра военных действий.

Военные реформы также привели к серьезным изменениям в сферах ответственности. Вместо того, чтобы отдельно командовать своими войсками, подразделения обслуживания теперь в первую очередь отвечают за административные задачи (например, оснащение и содержание войск). Командование театра теперь имеет командные полномочия. Теоретически это должно способствовать осуществлению совместных операций во всех обслуживающих отраслях. [34]

Координация с гражданскими группами национальной безопасности, такими как Министерство иностранных дел, осуществляется главным образом руководящими группами Коммунистической партии Китая. Особенно важны ведущие группы по иностранным делам, в том числе и по Тайваню.

Звания [ править ]

Офицеры [ править ]

Other ranks[edit]

Service Branches[edit]

The PLA encompasses five main service branches: the Ground Force, the Navy, the Air Force, the Rocket Force, and the Strategic Support Force. Following the 200,000 troop reduction announced in 2003, the total strength of the PLA has been reduced from 2.5 million to just under 2.3 million. Further reforms will see an additional 300,000 personnel reduction from its current strength of 2.28 million personnel. The reductions will come mainly from non-combat ground forces, which will allow more funds to be diverted to naval, air, and strategic missile forces. This shows China's shift from ground force prioritisation to emphasising air and naval power with high-tech equipment for offensive roles over disputed coastal territories.[35]

In recent years, the PLA has paid close attention to the performance of US forces in Afghanistan and Iraq. As well as learning from the success of the US military in network-centric warfare, joint operations, C4ISR, and hi-tech weaponry, the PLA is also studying unconventional tactics that could be used to exploit the vulnerabilities of a more technologically advanced enemy. This has been reflected in the two parallel guidelines for the PLA ground forces development. While speeding up the process of introducing new technology into the force and retiring the older equipment, the PLA has also placed an emphasis on asymmetric warfare, including exploring new methods of using existing equipment to defeat a technologically superior enemy.

In addition to the four main service branches, the PLA is supported by two paramilitary organisations: the People's Armed Police (including the China Coast Guard) and the Militia (including the maritime militia).

Ground Force (PLAGF)[edit]

A Type 99A main battle tank in service with the PLAGF

The PLA is estimated to have a ground force composing of 975,000 personnel, approximately half of the PLA's total manpower of around 2 million.[36] The ground forces are divided among the five theatre commands as named above. In times of crisis, the ground Force is reinforced by numerous reserve and paramilitary units. The PLAGF reserve component is composed of 510,000 personnel divided into 30 infantry and 12 anti-aircraft artillery (AAA) divisions. In recent years two amphibious mechanised divisions were also established in Nanjing and Guangzhou military regions. At least 40 percent of PLA divisions and brigades are now mechanised or armoured, twice the percentage before 2015.

While much of the PLA Ground Force was being reduced over the past few years, technology-intensive elements such as special operations forces (SOF), army aviation, surface-to-air missiles (SAMs), and electronic warfare units have all experienced rapid expansion. The latest operational doctrine of the PLA ground forces highlights the importance of information technology, electronic and information warfare, and long-range precision strikes in future warfare. The older generation telephone/radio-based command, control, and communications (C3) systems are being replaced by an integrated battlefield information networks featuring local/wide-area networks (LAN/WAN), satellite communications, unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV)-based surveillance and reconnaissance systems, and mobile command and control centres.[37]

On 1 January 2016, as part of military reforms, China created for the first time a separate headquarters for the ground forces.[38] China's ground forces have never had their own headquarters until now. Previously, the People's Liberation Army's Four General Departments served as the de facto army headquarters, functioning together as the equivalent of a joint staff, to which the navy, air force and the newly renamed Rocket Force would report. The Commander of the PLA Ground Force is Han Weiguo. The Political Commissar is Liu Lei.

Navy (PLAN)[edit]

PLAN destroyer conducting maritime interdiction operations at RIMPAC 2016

Until the early 1990s, the navy performed a subordinate role to the PLA Land Forces. Since then it has undergone rapid modernisation. The 250,000 strong People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) is organised into three major fleets: the North Sea Fleet headquartered at Qingdao, the East Sea Fleet headquartered at Ningbo, and the South Sea Fleet headquartered in Zhanjiang. Each fleet consists of a number of surface ship, submarine, naval air force, coastal defence, and marine units.[39]

The navy includes a 25,000 strong Marine Corps (organised into seven brigades), a 26,000 strong Naval Aviation Force operating several hundred attack helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft.[40] As part of its overall programme of naval modernisation, the PLAN is in the stage of developing a blue water navy. In November 2012, then Party General Secretary Hu Jintao reported to the Chinese Communist Party 18th National Congress his desire to "enhance our capacity for exploiting marine resource and build China into a strong maritime power".[41]

Air Force (PLAAF)[edit]

Chengdu J-20 5th generation stealth fighter

The 395,000 strong People's Liberation Army Air Force is organised into five Theater Command Air Forces (TCAF) and 24 air divisions.[42] The largest operational units within the Aviation Corps is the air division, which has 2 to 3 aviation regiments, each with 20 to 36 aircraft. The surface-to-air missile (SAM) Corps is organised into SAM divisions and brigades. There are also three airborne divisions manned by the PLAAF. J-XX and XXJ are names applied by Western intelligence agencies to describe programs by the People's Republic of China to develop one or more fifth-generation fighter aircraft.[43][44]

Rocket Force (PLARF)[edit]

DF-21Ds at the 2015 Victory Parade

The People's Liberation Army Rocket Force (PLARF) is the main strategic missile force of the PLA and consists of at least 120,000 personnel.[45] It controls China's nuclear and conventional strategic missiles. China's total nuclear arsenal size is estimated to be between 100 and 400 thermonuclear warheads.

Strategic Support Force (PLASSF)[edit]

Founded on 31 December 2015 as part of the first wave of reforms of the PLA, the People's Liberation Army Strategic Support Force was established as the newest and latest branch of the PLA. Personnel numbers are estimated at 175,000.[46] Initial announcements regarding the Strategic Support Force did not provide much detail, but Yang Yujun of the Chinese Ministry of Defense described it as an integration of all current combat support forces including but limited to: space, cyber, electronic and intelligence branches. Additionally, commentators have speculated that the new service branch will include high-tech operations forces such as space, cyberspace and electronic warfare operations units, independent of other branches of the military.[47] Yin Zhuo, rear admiral of the People's Liberation Army Navy and member of the eleventh Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) said that "the major mission of the PLA Strategic Support Force is the provision of support to the combat operations so that the PLA can gain regional advantages in the aerospace, space, network and electromagnetic space warfare and ensure integrated operations in the conduction of US joint warfare style operations."[48]

Conscription and terms of service[edit]

Technically, military service with the PLA is obligatory for all Chinese citizens. In practice, mandatory military service has not been implemented since 1949 as the People's Liberation Army has been able to recruit sufficient numbers voluntarily.[49] All 18-year-old males have to register themselves with the government authorities, in a way similar to the Selective Service System of the United States. In practice, registering does not mean that the person doing so must join the People's Liberation Army.[citation needed]

Article 55 of the Constitution of the People's Republic of China prescribes conscription by stating: "It is a sacred duty of every citizen of the People's Republic of China to defend his or her motherland and resist invasion. It is an honoured obligation of the citizens of the People's Republic of China to perform military service and to join the militia forces."[50] The 1984 Military Service Law spells out the legal basis of conscription, describing military service as a duty for "all citizens without distinction of race... and religious creed". This law has not been amended since it came into effect. Technically, those 18–22 years of age enter selective compulsory military service, with a 24-month service obligation. In reality, numbers of registering personals are enough to support all military posts in China, creating "volunteer conscription".[51]

Residents of the Special administrative regions, Hong Kong and Macau, are exempted from joining the military.

Military Intelligence[edit]

Joint Staff Department[edit]

The Joint Staff Department carries out staff and operational functions for the PLA and had major responsibility for implementing military modernisation plans. Headed by chief of general staff, the department serves as the headquarters for the entire PLA and contained directorates for the five armed services: Ground Forces, Air Force, Navy, Rocket Forces and Support Forces. The Joint Staff Department included functionally organised subdepartments for operations, training, intelligence, mobilisation, surveying, communications and politics, the departments for artillery, armoured units, quartermaster units and joint forces engineering units were later dissolved, with the former two forming now part of the Ground Forces, the engineering formations now split amongst the service branches and the quartermaster formations today form part of the Joint Logistics Forces.

Navy Headquarters controls the North Sea Fleet, East Sea Fleet, and South Sea Fleet. Air Force Headquarters generally exercised control through the commanders of the five theater commands. Nuclear forces were directly subordinate to the Joint Staff Department through the Rocket Forces commander and political commissar. Conventional main, regional, and militia units were controlled administratively by the theater commanders, but the Joint Staff Department in Beijing could assume direct operational control of any main-force unit at will. Thus, broadly speaking, the Joint Staff Department exercises operational control of the main forces, and the theater commanders controlled as always the regional forces and, indirectly, the militia. The post of principal intelligence official in the top leadership of the Chinese military has been taken up by a number of people of several generations, from Li Kenong in the 1950s to Xiong Guangkai in the late 1990s; and their public capacity has always been assistant to the deputy chief of staff or assistant to the chief of staff.

Ever since the CCP officially established the system of "theater commands" for its army in the 2010s as a successor to the "major military regions" policy of the 1950s, the intelligence agencies inside the Army have, after going through several major evolutions, developed into the present three major military intelligence setups:

  1. The central level is composed of the Second and Third Departments under the Joint Staff Headquarters and the Liaison Department under the Political Work Department.
  2. At the Theater Command level intelligence activities consist of the Second Bureau established at the same level as the Operation Department under the headquarters, and the Liaison Department established under the Political Work Department.
  3. The third system includes a number of communications stations directly established in the garrison areas of all the theater commands by the Third Department of the Joint Staff Headquarters.

The Second Bureau under the headquarters and the Liaison Department under the Political Work Departments of the theater commands are only subjected to the "professional leadership" of their "counterpart" units under the Central Military Commission and are still considered the direct subordinate units of the major military region organizationally. Those entities whose names include the word "institute", all research institutes under the charge of the Second and the Third Departments of the Joint Staff Headquarters, including other research organs inside the Army, are at least of the establishment size of the full regimental level. Among the deputy commanders of a major Theater command in China, there is always one who is assigned to take charge of intelligence work, and the intelligence agencies under his charge are directly affiliated to the headquarters and the political department of the corresponding theater command.

The Conference on Strengthening Intelligence Work held from 3 September 1996 – 18 September 1996 at the Xishan Command Center of the Ministry of State Security and the General Staff Department. Chi Haotian delivered a report entitled "Strengthen Intelligence Work in a New International Environment To Serve the Cause of Socialist Construction." The report emphasised the need to strengthen the following four aspects of intelligence work:

  • Efforts must be made to strengthen understanding of the special nature and role of intelligence work, as well as understanding of the close relationship between strengthening intelligence work on the one hand, and of the Four Modernizations of the motherland, the reunification of the motherland, and opposition to hegemony and power politics on the other.
  • The United States and the West have all along been engaged in infiltration, intervention, sabotage, and intelligence gathering against China on the political, economic, military, and ideological fronts. The response must strengthen the struggle against their infiltration, intervention, sabotage, and intelligence gathering.
  • Consolidating intelligence departments and training a new generation of intelligence personnel who are politically reliable, honest and upright in their ways, and capable of mastering professional skills, the art of struggle, and advanced technologies.
  • Strengthening the work of organising intelligence in two international industrial, commercial, and financial ports—Hong Kong and Macau.

Although the four aspects emphasised by Chi Haotian appeared to be defensive measures, they were in fact both defensive and offensive in nature.

Second Department[edit]

The Second Department of the Joint Staff Headquarters is responsible for collecting military intelligence. Activities include military attachés at Chinese embassies abroad, clandestine special agents sent to foreign countries to collect military information, and the analysis of information publicly published in foreign countries. This section of the PLA Joint Staff Headquarters act in similar capacity to its civilian counterpart the Ministry of State Security.

The Second Department oversees military human intelligence (HUMINT) collection, widely exploits open source (OSINT) materials, fuses HUMINT, signals intelligence (SIGINT), and imagery intelligence data, and disseminates finished intelligence products to the CMC and other consumers. Preliminary fusion is carried out by the Second Department's Analysis Bureau which mans the National Watch Center, the focal point for national-level indications and warning. In-depth analysis is carried out by regional bureaus. Although traditionally the Second Department of the Joint Staff Department was responsible for military intelligence, it is beginning to increasingly focus on scientific and technological intelligence in the military field, following the example of Russian agencies in stepping up the work of collecting scientific and technological information.

The research institute under the Second Department of the Joint Staff Headquarters is publicly known as the Institute for International Strategic Studies; its internal classified publication "Foreign Military Trends" ("外军动态", Wai Jun Dongtai) is published every 10 days and transmitted to units at the division level.

The PLA Institute of International Relations at Nanjing comes under the Second Department of the Joint Staff Department and is responsible for training military attachés, assistant military attachés and associate military attachés as well as secret agents to be posted abroad. It also supplies officers to the military intelligence sections of various military regions and group armies. The institute was formed from the PLA "793" Foreign Language Institute, which moved from Zhangjiakou after the Cultural Revolution and split into two institutions at Luoyang and Nanjing.

The Institute of International Relations was known in the 1950s as the School for Foreign Language Cadres of the Central Military Commission, with the current name being used since 1964. The training of intelligence personnel is one of several activities at the institute. While all graduates of the Moscow Institute of International Relations were employed by the KGB, only some graduates of the Beijing Institute of International Relations are employed by the Ministry of State Security. The former Institute of International Relations, since been renamed the Foreign Affairs College, is under the administration of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and is not involved in secret intelligence work. The former Central Military Commission foreign language school had foreign faculty members who were either Communist Party sympathizers or were members of foreign communist parties. But the present Institute of International Relations does not hire foreign teachers, to avoid the danger that its students might be recognised when sent abroad as clandestine agents.

Those engaged in professional work in military academies under the Second Department of the Joint Staff Headquarters usually have a chance to go abroad, either for advanced studies or as military officers working in the military attaché's office of Chinese embassies in foreign countries. People working in the military attaché's office of embassies are usually engaged in collecting military information under the cover of "military diplomacy". As long as they refrain from directly subversive activities, they are considered as well-behaved "military diplomats".

Some bureaus under the Second Department which are responsible for espionage in different regions, of which the First Bureau is responsible for collecting information in the Special Administrative Regions of Hong Kong and Macau, and also in Taiwan. Agents are dispatched by the Second Department to companies and other local corporations to gain cover.

The "Autumn Orchid" intelligence group assigned to Hong Kong and Macau in the mid-1980s mostly operated in the mass media, political, industrial, commercial, and religious circles, as well as in universities and colleges. The "Autumn Orchid" intelligence group was mainly responsible for the following three tasks:

  • Finding out and keeping abreast of the political leanings of officials of the Hong Kong and Macau governments, as well as their views on major issues, through social contact with them and through information provided by them.
  • Keeping abreast of the developments of foreign governments' political organs in Hong Kong, as well as of foreign financial, industrial, and commercial organisations.
  • Finding out and having a good grasp of the local media's sources of information on political, military, economic, and other developments on the mainland, and deliberately releasing false political or military information to the media to test the outside response.

The "Autumn Orchid" intelligence group was awarded a Citation for Merit, Second Class, in December 1994. It was further awarded another Citation for Merit, Second Class, in 1997. Its current status is not publicly known. During the 2008 Chinese New Year celebration CCTV held for Chinese diplomatic establishments, the head of the Second Department of the Joint Headquarters was revealed for the first time to the public: the current head was Major General Yang Hui (杨晖).

Third Department[edit]

The Third Department of the Joint Staff Department is responsible for monitoring the telecommunications of foreign armies and producing finished intelligence based on the military information collected.

The communications stations established by the Third Department of the Joint Staff Headquarters are not subject to the jurisdiction of the provincial military district and the major theater command of where they are based. The communications stations are entirely the agencies of the Third Department of the Joint Staff Headquarters which have no affiliations to the provincial military district and the military region of where they are based. The personnel composition, budgets, and establishment of these communications stations are entirely under the jurisdiction of the Third Department of the General PLA General Staff Headquarters, and are not related at all with local troops.

China maintains the most extensive SIGINT network of all the countries in the Asia-Pacific region. As of the late 1990s, SIGINT systems included several dozen ground stations, half a dozen ships, truck-mounted systems, and airborne systems. Third Department headquarters is in the vicinity of the GSD First Department (Operations Department), AMS, and NDU complex in the hills northwest of the Summer Palace. As of the late 1990s, the Third Department was allegedly manned by approximately 20,000 personnel, with most of their linguists trained at the Luoyang Institute of Foreign Languages.

Ever since the 1950s, the Second and Third Departments of the Joint Staff Headquarters have established a number of institutions of secondary and higher learning for bringing up "special talents." The PLA Foreign Language Institute at Luoyang comes under the Third Department of the Joint Staff Department and is responsible for training foreign language officers for the monitoring of foreign military intelligence. The institute was formed from the PLA "793" Foreign Language Institute, which moved from Zhangjiakou after the Cultural Revolution and split into two institutions at Luoyang and Nanjing.

Though the distribution order they received upon graduation indicated the "Joint Staff Headquarters", many of the graduates of these schools found themselves being sent to all parts of the country, including remote and uninhabited backward mountain areas. The reason is that the monitoring and control stations under the Third Department of the PLA General Staff Headquarters are scattered in every corner of the country.

The communications stations located in the Shenzhen base of the PLA Hong Kong Garrison started their work long ago. In normal times, these two communications stations report directly to the Central Military Commission and the Joint Staff Headquarters. Units responsible for co-ordination are the communications stations established in the garrison provinces of the military regions by the Third Department of the PLA General Staff Headquarters.

By taking direct command of military communications stations based in all parts of the country, the CCP Central Military Commission and the Joint Staff Headquarters can not only ensure a successful interception of enemy radio communications, but can also make sure that none of the wire or wireless communications and contacts among major military regions can escape the detection of these communications stations, thus effectively attaining the goal of imposing a direct supervision and control over all the theater commands, all provincial military districts, and all group armies.

Monitoring stations[edit]

China's main SIGINT effort is in the Third Department of the Joint Staff Department of the Central Military Commission, with additional capabilities, primarily domestic, in the Ministry of State Security (MSS). SIGINT stations, therefore, are scattered through the country, for domestic as well as international interception. Prof. Desmond Ball, of the Australian National University, described the largest stations as the main Technical Department SIGINT net control station on the northwest outskirts of Beijing, and the large complex near Lake Kinghathu in the extreme northeast corner of China.

As opposed to other major powers, China focuses its SIGINT activities on its region rather than the world. Ball wrote, in the eighties, that China had several dozen SIGINT stations aimed at the Soviet Union, Japan, Taiwan, Southeast Asia and India, as well as internally. Of the stations apparently targeting Russia, there are sites at Jilemutu and Jixi in the northeast, and at Erlian and Hami near the Mongolian border. Two Russian-facing sites in Xinjiang, at Qitai and Korla may be operated jointly with resources from the US CIA's Office of SIGINT Operations, probably focused on missile and space activity. Other stations aimed at South and Southeast Asia are on a net controlled by Chengdu, Sichuan. There is a large facility at Dayi, and, according to Ball, "numerous" small posts along the Indian border. Other significant facilities are located near Shenyang, near Jinan and in Nanjing and Shanghai. Additional stations are in the Fujian and Guangdong military districts opposite Taiwan.

On Hainan Island, near Vietnam, there is a naval SIGINT facility that monitors the South China sea, and a ground station targeting US and Russian satellites. China also has ship and aircraft platforms in this area, under the South Sea Fleet headquarters at Zhanjiang immediately north of the island. Targeting here seems to have an ELINT as well as COMINT flavor. There are also truck-mounted mobile ground systems, as well as ship, aircraft, and limited satellite capability. There are at least 10 intelligence-gathering auxiliary vessels.

As of the late nineties, the Chinese did not appear to be trying to monitor the United States Pacific Command to the same extent as does Russia. In future, this had depended, in part, on the status of Taiwan.

Fourth Department[edit]

The Fourth Department (ECM and Radar) of the Joint Staff Headquarters Department has the electronic intelligence (ELINT) portfolio within the PLA's SIGINT apparatus. This department is responsible for electronic countermeasures, requiring them to collect and maintain data bases on electronic signals. 25 ELINT receivers are the responsibility of the Southwest Institute of Electronic Equipment (SWIEE). Among the wide range of SWIEE ELINT products is a new KZ900 airborne ELINT pod. The GSD 54th Research Institute supports the ECM Department in development of digital ELINT signal processors to analyse parameters of radar pulses.

Special forces[edit]

A PLA Navy Special Operations Forces marine during a maritime operations exercise in RIMPAC 2014.

China's special ground force is called PLASF (People's Liberation Army Special Operations Forces). Typical units include consist of highly trained soldiers, a team commander, assistant commander, sniper, spotter, machine-gun support, bomber, and a pair of assault groups.[52] China's counter terrorism unit members are drawn from the public security apparatus rather than the military. The name of such units change frequently. As of 2020, it is known as the Immediate Action Unit (IAU).[53]

China has reportedly developed a force capable of carrying out long-range airborne operations, long-range reconnaissance, and amphibious operations. Formed in China's Guangzhou military region and known by the nickname "South Blade", the force supposedly receives army, air force, and naval training, including flight training, and is equipped with "hundreds of high-tech devices", including global-positioning satellite systems. All force members officers are military staff college graduates, and 60 percent are said to have university degrees. Soldiers are reported to be cross-trained in various specialties, and training encompassing a wide range of operating environments. It is far from clear whether this unit is considered operational by the Chinese. It is also not clear how such a force would be employed. Among the missions stated missions include: "responding to contingencies in various regions" and "cooperating with other services in attacks on islands". According to the limited reporting, the organisation appears to be in a phase of testing and development and may constitute an experimental unit. While no size for the force has been revealed, there have been Chinese media claims that "over 4,000 soldiers of the force are all-weather and versatile fighters and parachutists who can fly airplanes and drive terrain vehicles and amphibious boats".[citation needed]

Other branches[edit]

  • The Third Department and the Navy co-operate on shipborne intelligence collection platforms.
  • PLAAF Sixth Research Institute: Air Force SIGINT collection is managed by the PLAAF Sixth Research Institute in Beijing.

Weapons and equipment[edit]

According to the United States Defense Department, China is developing kinetic-energy weapons, high-powered lasers, high-powered microwave weapons, particle-beam weapons, and electromagnetic pulse weapons with its increase of military fundings.[54]

The PLA has said of reports that its modernisation is dependent on sales of advanced technology from American allies, senior leadership have stated "Some have politicized China's normal commercial cooperation with foreign countries, damaging our reputation." These contributions include advanced European diesel engines for Chinese warships, military helicopter designs from Eurocopter, French anti-submarine sonars and helicopters,[55] Australian technology for the Houbei class missile boat,[56] and Israeli supplied American missile, laser and aircraft technology.[57]

According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute's data, China became the world's third largest exporter of major arms in 2010–14, an increase of 143 percent from the period 2005–2009.[58] SIPRI also calculated that China surpassed Russia to become the world's second largest arms exporter by 2020.[59] China's share of global arms exports hence increased from 3 to 5 percent. China supplied major arms to 35 states in 2010–14. A significant percentage (just over 68 percent) of Chinese exports went to three countries: Pakistan, Bangladesh and Myanmar. China also exported major arms to 18 African states. Examples of China's increasing global presence as an arms supplier in 2010–14 included deals with Venezuela for armoured vehicles and transport and trainer aircraft, with Algeria for three frigates, with Indonesia for the supply of hundreds of anti-ship missiles and with Nigeria for the supply of a number of unmanned combat aerial vehicles. Following rapid advances in its arms industry, China has become less dependent on arms imports, which decreased by 42 percent between 2005–2009 and 2010–14. Russia accounted for 61 percent of Chinese arms imports, followed by France with 16 percent and Ukraine with 13 per cent. Helicopters formed a major part of Russian and French deliveries, with the French designs produced under licence in China. Over the years, China has struggled to design and produce effective engines for combat and transport vehicles. It continued to import large numbers of engines from Russia and Ukraine in 2010–14 for indigenously designed combat, advanced trainer and transport aircraft, and for naval ships. It also produced British-, French- and German-designed engines for combat aircraft, naval ships and armoured vehicles, mostly as part of agreements that have been in place for decades.[60]

Cyberwarfare[edit]

There is a belief in the Western military doctrines that the PLA have already begun engaging countries using cyber-warfare.[61][62] There has been a significant increase in the number of presumed Chinese military initiated cyber events from 1999 to the present day.[63]

Cyberwarfare has gained recognition as a valuable technique because it is an asymmetric technique that is a part of Chinese Information Operations. As is written by two PLAGF Colonels, Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui in the book 'Unrestricted Warfare', "Methods that are not characterised by the use of the force of arms, nor by the use of military power, nor even by the presence of casualties and bloodshed, are just as likely to facilitate the successful realisation of the war's goals, if not more so.[64]

While China has long been suspected of cyber spying, on 24 May 2011 the PLA announced the existence of having 'cyber capabilities'.[65]

In February 2013, the media named "Comment Crew" as a hacker military faction for China's People's Liberation Army.[66] In May 2014, a Federal Grand Jury in the United States indicted five Unit 61398 officers on criminal charges related to cyber attacks on private companies based in the United States after alleged investigations by the FBI who exposed their identities in collaboration with US intelligence agencies such as the CIA.[67][68]

In February 2020, the United States government indicted members of China's People's Liberation Army for the 2017 Equifax data breach, which involved hacking into Equifax and plundering sensitive data as part of a massive heist that also included stealing trade secrets, though the Chinese Communist Party denied these claims.[69][70]

Nuclear capabilities[edit]

Range of medium and intercontinental ballistic missiles (2006)

In 1955, China decided to proceed with a nuclear weapons program. The decision was made after the United States threatened the use of nuclear weapons against China should it take action against Quemoy and Matsu, coupled with the lack of interest of the Soviet Union for using its nuclear weapons in defence of China.

After their first nuclear test (China claims minimal Soviet assistance before 1960) on 16 October 1964, China was the first state to pledge no-first-use of nuclear weapons. On 1 July 1966, the Second Artillery Corps, as named by Premier Zhou Enlai, was formed. In 1967, China tested a fully functional hydrogen bomb, only 32 months after China had made its first fission device. China thus produced the shortest fission-to-fusion development known in history.

China became a major international arms exporter during the 1980s. Beijing joined the Middle East arms control talks, which began in July 1991 to establish global guidelines for conventional arms transfers, and later announced that it would no longer participate because of the US decision to sell 150 F-16A/B aircraft to Taiwan on 2 September 1992.

It joined the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in 1984 and pledged to abstain from further atmospheric testing of nuclear weapons in 1986. China acceded to the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1992 and supported its indefinite and unconditional extension in 1995. Nuclear weapons tests by China ceased in 1996, when it signed the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and agreed to seek an international ban on the production of fissile nuclear weapons material.

In 1996, China committed to provide assistance to unsafeguarded nuclear facilities. China attended the May 1997 meeting of the NPT Exporters (Zangger) Committee as an observer and became a full member in October 1997. The Zangger Committee is a group which meets to list items that should be subject to IAEA inspections if exported by countries, which have, as China has, signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty. In September 1997, China issued detailed nuclear export control regulations. China began implementing regulations establishing controls over nuclear-related dual-use items in 1998. China also has decided not to engage in new nuclear co-operation with Iran (even under safeguards), and will complete existing co-operation, which is not of proliferation concern, within a relatively short period. Based on significant, tangible progress with China on nuclear nonproliferation, President Clinton in 1998 took steps to bring into force the 1985 US–China Agreement on Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation.

Beijing has deployed a modest ballistic missile force, including land and sea-based intermediate-range and intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). It was estimated in 2007 that China has about 100–160 liquid fuelled ICBMs capable of striking the United States with approximately 100–150 IRBMs able to strike Russia or Eastern Europe, as well as several hundred tactical SRBMs with ranges between 300 and 600 km.[71]Currently, the Chinese nuclear stockpile is estimated to be between 50 and 75 land and sea based ICBMs.[72]

China's nuclear program follows a doctrine of minimal deterrence, which involves having the minimum force needed to deter an aggressor from launching a first strike. The current efforts of China appear to be aimed at maintaining a survivable nuclear force by, for example, using solid-fuelled ICBMs in silos rather than liquid-fuelled missiles. China's 2006 published deterrence policy states that they will "uphold the principles of counterattack in self-defense and limited development of nuclear weapons", but "has never entered, and will never enter into a nuclear arms race with any country". It goes on to describe that China will never undertake a first strike, or use nuclear weapons against a non-nuclear state or zone.[71] US strategists, however, suggest that the Chinese position may be ambiguous, and nuclear weapons may be used both to deter conventional strikes/invasions on the Chinese mainland, or as an international political tool – limiting the extent to which other nations can coerce China politically, an inherent, often inadvertent phenomenon in international relations as regards any state with nuclear capabilities.[73]

Space[edit]

The PLA has deployed a number of space-based systems for military purposes, including the imagery intelligence satellite systems like the ZiYan series,[74] and the militarily designated JianBing series, synthetic aperture satellites (SAR) such as JianBing-5, BeiDou satellite navigation network, and secured communication satellites with FENGHUO-1.[75]

The PLA is responsible for the Chinese space program. To date, all the participants have been selected from members of the PLA Air Force. China became the third country in the world to have sent a man into space by its own means with the flight of Yang Liwei aboard the Shenzhou 5 spacecraft on 15 October 2003 and the flight of Fei Junlong and Nie Haisheng aboard Shenzhou 6 on 12 October 2005 and Zhai Zhigang, Liu Boming, and Jing Haipeng aboard Shenzhou 7 on 25 September 2008.

The PLA started the development of an anti-ballistic and anti-satellite system in the 1960s, code named Project 640, including ground-based lasers and anti-satellite missiles. On 11 January 2007, China conducted a successful test of an anti-satellite missile, with an SC-19 class KKV.[76] Its anti ballistic missile test was also successful.

The PLA has tested two types of hypersonic space vehicles, the Shenglong Spaceplane and a new one built by Chengdu Aircraft Corporation. Only a few pictures have appeared since it was revealed in late 2007. Earlier, images of the High-enthalpy Shock Waves Laboratory wind tunnel of the CAS Key Laboratory of high-temperature gas dynamics (LHD) were published in the Chinese media. Tests with speeds up to Mach 20 were reached around 2001.[77][78]

Budget and Expenditure[edit]

Military spending for the People's Liberation Army has grown about 10 percent annually over the last 15 years.[87] The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, SIPRI, estimated China's military expenditure for 2013 to US$188.5bn.[88] China's military budget for 2014 according to IHS Jane's, a defence industry consulting and analysis company, will be US$148bn,[89] which is the second largest in the world. The United States military budget for 2014 in comparison, is US$574.9bn,[90] which is down from a high of US$664.3bn in 2012. According to SIPRI, China became the world's third largest exporter of major arms in 2010–2014, an increase of 143 per cent from the period 2005–2009. China supplied major arms to 35 states in 2010–2014. A significant percentage (just over 68 per cent) of Chinese exports went to three countries: Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Myanmar. China also exported major arms to 18 African states. Examples of China's increasing global presence as an arms supplier in 2010–2014 included deals with Venezuela for armoured vehicles and transport and trainer aircraft, with Algeria for three frigates, with Indonesia for the supply of hundreds of anti-ship missiles and with Nigeria for the supply of a number of unmanned combat aerial vehicles. Following rapid advances in its domestic arms industry, China has become less dependent on arms imports, which decreased by 42 per cent between 2005–2009 and 2010–2014.[60] China's rise in military spending come at a time when there are tensions along the South China Sea with territorial disputes involving the Philippines, Vietnam, and Taiwan, as well as escalating tensions between China and Japan involving the disputed Diaoyu (Chinese spelling) and Senkaku (Japanese spelling) islands. Former-United States Secretary of Defense Robert Gates has urged China to be more transparent about its military capabilities and intentions.[91][92] The years 2018 and 2019 both saw significant budget increases as well. China announced 2018's budget as 1.11 trillion yuan (US$165.5bn), an 8.1% increase on 2017, and 2019's budget as 1.19 trillion yuan (US$177.61bn), an increase of 7.5 per cent on 2018.[93][94]

Budget figures are published on the website of the State Council via a document named 'Central and Local Budgets' followed by the preceding year of the publication.

A pie chart showing global military expenditures by country for 2019, in US$ billions, according to SIPRI

Commercial Activities[edit]

PLA Factory No. 6907, Wuhan. The white characters on the blue sign roughly translate to: "Secret/Classified Area, Do Not Enter Unless Invited."

Historical[edit]

Until the mid-1990s the PLA had extensive commercial enterprise holdings in non-military areas, particularly real estate. Almost all of these holdings were supposedly spun off in the mid-1990s. In most cases, the management of the companies remained unchanged, with the PLA officers running the companies simply retiring from the PLA to run the newly formed private holding companies.[95]

The history of PLA involvement in commercial enterprises began in the 1950s and 1960s. Because of the socialist state-owned system and from a desire for military self-sufficiency, the PLA created a network of enterprises such as farms, guest houses, and factories intended to financially support its own needs. One unintended side effect of the Deng-era economic reforms was that many of these enterprises became very profitable. For example, a military guest house intended for soldier recreation could be easily converted into a profitable hotel for civilian use. There were two main factors which increased PLA commercial involvement in the 1990s. One was that running profitable companies decreased the need for the state to fund the military from the government budget. The second was that in an environment where legal rules were unclear and political connections were important, PLA influence was very useful.[citation needed]

By the early 1990s party officials and high military officials were becoming increasingly alarmed at the military's commercial involvement for a number of reasons. The military's involvement in commerce was seen to adversely affect military readiness and spread corruption. Further, there was great concern that having an independent source of funding would lead to decreased loyalty to the party. The result of this was an effort to spin off the PLA's commercial enterprises into private companies managed by former PLA officers, and to reform military procurement from a system in which the PLA directly controls its sources of supply to a contracting system more akin to those of Western countries. The separation of the PLA from its commercial interests was largely complete by the year 2000. It was met with very little resistance, as the spinoff was arranged in such a way that few lost out.[95]

Anthem and Insignia[edit]

The Central Military Band of the People's Liberation Army of China at the Great Hall of the People. The band is a common performer of the military anthem of the PLA at ceremonial protocol events.

The military anthem of the PLA is the Military Anthem of the People's Liberation Army (simplified Chinese: 中国人民解放军军歌; traditional Chinese: 中國人民解放軍軍歌; pinyin: Zhōngguó Rénmín Jiěfàngjūn Jūngē) (Chinese People's Liberation Army Song). The Central Military Commission (CMC) adopted the song as the official anthem on 25 July 1988. The lyrics of the anthem were written by composer Gong Mu (real name: Zhang Yongnian; Chinese: 张永年) and the music was composed by Korea born Chinese composer Zheng Lücheng.

The PLA's insignia consists of a roundel with a red star bearing the two Chinese characters "八一"(literally "eight-one"), referring to the Nanchang uprising (A pivotal moment in Chinese history in which the Chinese Communist Party decided to take up armed struggle against the Nationalist Kuomintang party in response to the Shanghai massacre ordered by nationalist generalissimo and KMT party leader and founding father of Taiwan Chiang Kai Shek) which began on 1 August 1927 (The first day of the eighth month). The inclusion of the two characters "八一" (Eight-One) being symbolic of the party's revolutionary history carrying strong emotional connotations of the political power which it shed blood to obtain.

Flags[edit]

The flag of the Chinese People's Liberation Army is the war flag of the People's Liberation Army; the layout of the flag has a golden star at the top left corner and "八一" to the right of the star, placed on a red field. Each service branch also have their own individual flags: The top 58 of the flags is the same as the PLA flag; the bottom 38 are occupied by the colors of the branches.[96] The flag of the Ground Forces has a forest green bar at the bottom, the naval ensign has stripes of blue and white at the bottom, the Air Force uses a sky blue bar and the Rocket Force uses a yellow bar at the bottom. The forest green represents the earth, the blue and white stripes represent the seas, the sky blue represents the air and the yellow represents the flare of missile launching.[97][98]

  • PLA

  • Ground Force

  • Navy

  • Air Force

  • Rocket Force

See also[edit]

  • 2015 People's Republic of China military reform
  • Chinese espionage in the United States
  • Chinese information operations and information warfare
  • Military Power of the People's Republic of China
  • Republic of China Armed Forces
  • Timeline of the Cox Report controversy
  • Titan Rain
  • Type 07

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Further reading[edit]

History[edit]

  • Dreyer, Edward L. (1995) China at War 1901–1949 (reprint Routledge, 2014)
  • Fravel, M. Taylor. Active Defense: China's Military Strategy since 1949 (Princeton UP, 2019). excerpt
  • Fravel, M. Taylor. "Shifts in Warfare and Party Unity: Explaining China's Changes in Military Strategy." International Security 42.3 (2018): 37–83. online
  • Jowett, Philip. (2013) China's Wars: Rousing the Dragon 1894–1949 (Bloomsbury Publishing, 2013).
  • Li, Xiaobing. (2007) A History of the Modern Chinese Army excerpt
  • Li, Xiaobing. (2012) China at War: An Encyclopedia excerpt
  • William W. Whitson, with Chen-hsia Huang. (1973) The Chinese high command; a history of Communist military politics, 1927–71. Foreword by Lucian W. Pye.

Recent[edit]

  • You, Ji. China's Military Transformation (Polity Press, 2016). 256 pp. online review
  • Wang, P. (2016). Military corruption in China: the role of guanxi in the buying and selling of military positions. The China Quarterly, 228, 970–991.
  • Fisher, Richard (2010). China's Military Modernization: Building for Regional and Global Reach. Stanford Security Studies. ISBN 0-8047-7195-2
  • James C. Mulvenon, Andrew N. D. Yang. The People's Liberation Army as Organization Reference Volume v1.0, RAND.
  • Chinese Military Power Council on Foreign Relations Press, May 2003.
  • Roy Kamphausen, Andrew Scobell. Right Sizing the People's Liberation Army Exploring the Contours of China's Military. The Strategic Studies Institute of the US Army War College, September 2007.
  • Chinese Intelligence Agencies Intelligence Resource Program, Federation of American Scientists.
  • International Institute for Strategic Studies (3 February 2010). Hackett, James (ed.). The Military Balance 2010. London, England: Routledge. ISBN 978-1-85743-557-3.
  • Mandated by the FY2000 National Defense Authorization Act, this annual report discusses China's military and security strategies, technological advancements in its capabilities, military doctrine, and security issues in the Taiwan Strait.
    • The Military Power of the People's Republic of China Annual Report to Congress 2004, Office of the Secretary of Defense.
    • The Military Power of the People's Republic of China Annual Report to Congress 2005, Office of the Secretary of Defense.
    • The Military Power of the People's Republic of China Annual Report to Congress 2006, Office of the Secretary of Defense.
    • The Military Power of the People's Republic of China Annual Report to Congress 2007, Office of the Secretary of Defense.
    • The Military Power of the People's Republic of China Annual Report to Congress 2008, Office of the Secretary of Defense.
    • The Military Power of the People's Republic of China Annual Report to Congress 2009, Office of the Secretary of Defense.
    • The Military Power of the People's Republic of China Annual Report to Congress 2010, Office of the Secretary of Defense.
    • The Military Power of the People's Republic of China Annual Report to Congress 2011, Office of the Secretary of Defense.
    • The Military Power of the People's Republic of China Annual Report to Congress 2012, Office of the Secretary of Defense.
    • The Military Power of the People's Republic of China Annual Report to Congress 2013, Office of the Secretary of Defense.
    • The Military Power of the People's Republic of China Annual Report to Congress 2014, Office of the Secretary of Defense.
    • Annual Report to Congress 2015
    • Annual Report to Congress 2016
  • Andy Bunk. Forgotten A look at the changing roles of the Chinese militia system in the Communist era from its inception to the present.
  • Scott Cooper. China's Path to Power Capability guidance, net assessments and strategic policy development.
  • Andrew Scobell and Roy D. Kamphausen, editors. Right Sizing the People's Liberation Army: Exploring the Contours of China's Military (Strategic Studies Institute and The National Bureau of Asian Research, September 2007)
  • Roy D. Kamphausen, Andrew Scobell and Travis Tanner, editors. The "People" in the PLA: Recruitment, Training, and Education in China's Military (Strategic Studies Institute and The National Bureau of Asian Research, September 2008)
  • Roy Kamphausen, David Lai, Andrew Scobell, editors. Beyond the Strait: PLA Missions other than Taiwan (Strategic Studies Institute and The National Bureau of Asian Research, April 2009)
  • Kamphausen, Lai, and Scobell (ed.s). 'The PLA at Home and Abroad: Assessing the Operational Capabilities of China's Military,' Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, June 2010
  • Matthew Boswell. Media Relations in China's Military: The Case of the Ministry of National Defense Information Office (Asia Policy, July 2009)
  • International Institute for Strategic Studies (7 March 2012). Hackett, James (ed.). The Military Balance 2012. London, England: Routledge. ISBN 978-1857436426.

External links[edit]

  • Ministry of National Defense The People's Republic of China
  • PLA Daily News sponsored by the PLA. (in Chinese)