Из Википедии, бесплатной энциклопедии
Перейти к навигации Перейти к поиску

Программы условных денежных трансфертов ( ОДП ) направлены на сокращение бедности , ставя программы социального обеспечения в зависимость от действий получателей. Правительство (или благотворительная организация) переводит деньги только тем лицам, которые соответствуют определенным критериям. Эти критерии могут включать зачисление детей в государственные школы, регулярные осмотры в кабинете врача, вакцинацию и тому подобное. ОДТ призваны помочь нынешнему поколению, живущему в бедности, а также разорвать порочный круг бедности для следующего за счет развития человеческого капитала. Условные денежные переводы могут помочь снизить феминизацию бедности .

Страны [ править ]

Условные денежные переводы использовались во многих странах:

  • Аргентина : Всеобщее пособие на ребенка , введенное в 2009 году. Право на участие в программе было сосредоточено на семьях, не имеющих формальной работы и зарабатывающих меньше минимальной заработной платы, которые обеспечивали их детям посещение школы, вакцинацию и прохождение медицинского осмотра. [1] К 2013 году им было охвачено более двух миллионов бедных семей [2], а к 2015 году им было охвачено 29 процентов всех аргентинских детей. [1]
  • Бангладеш : Проект помощи женщинам в средней школе, учрежденный в 1994 году. Эта программа ОДП, обусловленная только посещением школы и оставлением девочек незамужними, предусматривает оплату обучения и стипендии. [3]
  • Бразилия : Bolsa Família (ранее Bolsa Escola ) началась в 1990-х годах и быстро расширилась в 2001 и 2002 годах. Она обеспечивает ежемесячные денежные выплаты бедным домохозяйствам, если их дети школьного возраста (в возрасте от 6 до 15 лет) посещают школу, и если их младшие дети (до 6 лет) получили прививки. [4] [5]
  • Камбоджа : Проект поддержки сектора образования Камбоджи, учрежденный в 2005 году, зависит от посещаемости и сохранения проходных оценок. [6]
  • Чили : Chile Solidario , основанная в 2002 году [7], требует от семьи подписания контракта для выполнения 53 указанных минимальных условий, которые считаются необходимыми для преодоления крайней бедности. Взамен они получают от государства психологическую поддержку, гарантийные обязательства, гарантированные денежные субсидии и льготный доступ к программам повышения квалификации, работы и социального обеспечения. [8]
  • Колумбия : Familias ан Acción , [7] основана в 2002 году, является программа обусловленных денежных трансфертов, очень похож на мексиканский Progresa / Oportunidades, состоящий из денежных переводов бедных семей условными на детей , посещающих школу , и в соответствии с основными требованиями профилактического здравоохранения. [9]
  • Египет : Программа Минхет Эль-Осра, начатая в 2009 году, в настоящее время пилотируется в городских трущобах в Каире, Айн-эс-Сира и 65 деревнях в сельских районах Верхнего Египта Министерством социальной солидарности Египта.
  • Гватемала : Mi Familia Progresa, учрежденная 16 апреля 2008 г., представляет собой программу условных денежных трансфертов, предназначенную для оказания финансовой поддержки семьям, живущим в бедности и крайней бедности и имеющим детей в возрасте от 0 до 15 лет и / или беременных женщин или кормящих матерей. которые проживают в основном в сельской местности и окраинах периферии городских центров (городов). [10]
  • Гондурас : Программа семейных пособий (PRAF II), созданная в 1998 году, была основана на программе PRAF I, созданной в 1990 году. [11] Программа семейных пособий, PRAF, была основана в 1990 году как программа социальной компенсации правительства Республики Гондурас. . [12] [13]
  • Индонезия : Программа Keluarga Harapan и Программа Nasional Pemberdayaan Masyarakat-Generasi Sehat dan Cerdas, обе созданы в 2007 году. Программа Keluarga Harapan - это программа ОДП для домашних хозяйств, а Программа Nasional Pemberdayaan Masyarakat - программа ОДП на уровне общины. Они сосредоточены на сокращении бедности, материнской и детской смертности и обеспечении всеобщего охвата базовым образованием. [14]
  • Ямайка : Программа развития посредством здравоохранения и образования (PATH), администрируемая Министерством труда и социального обеспечения [7], представляет собой программу условных денежных переводов (ОДП). Он предоставляет денежные переводы бедным семьям, которые должны соблюдать условия, способствующие развитию человеческого капитала их членов. PATH был создан в 2001 году в рамках широкомасштабной реформы системы социального обеспечения, проведенной правительством Ямайки. [15]
  • Мексика : Oportunidades - основная программа правительства Мексики по борьбе с бедностью. (Первоначальное название программы было Progresa; оно было изменено в 2002 году.) Программа Oportunidades направлена ​​на оказание помощи бедным семьям в сельских и городских сообществах в инвестировании в человеческий капитал - улучшение образования, здоровья и питания своих детей. [16] [17] [18] Программа Progresa была одной из первых крупномасштабных программ условных денежных переводов. [19] [20]
  • Никарагуа : Сеть социальной защиты, созданная в 2000 году и реализованная Фондом чрезвычайной социальной помощи (FISE) [7], была закрыта в 2005 году [21].
  • Панама : Red de Oportunidades - это программа, реализуемая правительством Панамы для населения в возрасте до 18 лет с целью предоставления им доступа к услугам здравоохранения и образования. [22]
  • Перу : Juntos была основана в 2005 году. Программа обеспечивает ежемесячные выплаты дивидендов матерям (замужним или одиноким), живущим в крайней бедности. Матери могут иметь право на участие в программе только в том случае, если они отправляют своих детей в школу и проводят с ними регулярные медицинские осмотры. [23]
  • Филиппины : Департамент социального обеспечения и развития - Программа Pantawid Pamilyang Pilipino - это стратегия социального развития национального правительства, которая предоставляет условные денежные гранты крайне бедным домохозяйствам для улучшения их здоровья, питания и образования, особенно детей в возрасте от 0 до 14 лет. [24]
  • Турция : artlı Nakit Transferi (ŞNT), artlı Eğitim Yardımları (ŞEY) ve artlı Sağlık Yardımları (ŞSY), созданная в 2003 году, и все еще реализуется Генеральным управлением социальной помощи (GDSA: Sosyal Yardüdürl, под эгидой Mardüdürl. Министерство семьи и социальной политики; Aile ve Sosyal Politikalar Bakanlığı).
  • Соединенные Штаты Америки : возможность Нью-Йорка. ONYC завершился 31 августа 2010 года. Программа основывалась на концептуальной основе и успехе программ международных условных денежных переводов (ОДП) и была первой крупной инициативой ОДП, реализованной в Соединенных Штатах. Основная цель программы Opportunity NYC Family Rewards состояла в том, чтобы проверить влияние денежных стимулов на образование детей, здоровье семьи и результаты трудовых ресурсов взрослых. [25]

Эффективность [ править ]

Немногие инициативы в области развития были оценены так же строго, как программы ОДП. [26] Реализация программ условных денежных трансфертов сопровождалась систематическими усилиями по измерению их эффективности и пониманию их более широкого воздействия на поведение домохозяйств [27], что явилось заметным отходом от ограниченного внимания, которое уделялось тщательной оценке воздействия в прошлом. Результаты оценки доступны для PROGRESA в Мексике [28], PETI в Бразилии и Atencion a Crisis в Никарагуа. [29] Эти оценки показывают, что условные денежные переводы могут обеспечить эффективные стимулы для инвестирования в человеческий капитал бедных. Анализ 2015 г., проведенный сотрудниками аргентинскогоНациональный совет по научно-техническим исследованиям подсчитал, что благодаря программе универсального распределения на ребенка посещаемость школы детьми в возрасте от 15 до 17 лет увеличилась на 3,9 процента. [1]

ОДТ повлияли не только на общий уровень потребления, но и на структуру потребления. Существует множество свидетельств того, что домохозяйства, получающие ОДТ, тратят больше на продукты питания и в продовольственную корзину на более качественные источники питательных веществ, чем домохозяйства, которые не получают пособие, но имеют сопоставимый общий уровень дохода или потребления. [30]

В Бангладеш, Пакистане и Турции, где показатели охвата школьным образованием девочек были ниже, чем мальчиков, ОДТ помогли сократить этот гендерный разрыв. [31]

ОДТ привели к значительному сокращению бедности среди получателей, особенно когда перевод был достаточным, четко нацеленным и структурированным таким образом, чтобы не мешать получателям предпринимать другие действия, чтобы избежать бедности. Поскольку ОДТ обеспечивают стабильный доход, они помогают защитить бедные домохозяйства от наихудших последствий безработицы, катастрофических заболеваний и других внезапных потрясений в доходах. А осуществление денежных переводов женщинам, как это делают практически все ОДТ, могло усилить их позиции на переговорах. [31]

В США в 2011 году в докладе Института исследований бедности был сделан вывод:

«Со временем мы обнаруживаем, что расходы сместились в сторону инвалидов и пожилых людей, а не тех, у кого самый низкий доход, в сторону людей с более высоким доходом, в результате чего уровень глубокой бедности после перевода для некоторых групп увеличился. Мы пришли к выводу, что система пособий в США является патерналистской и ориентирована на поддержку работающих и групп с особыми потребностями и предполагаемыми достоинствами ». [32]

Латинская Америка [ править ]

Многие страны Латинской Америки в настоящее время используют программы ОДТ в качестве основного инструмента своей социальной политики, поскольку они доказали свою эффективность в оказании помощи бедным семьям. К 2011 году ОДТ распространились на 18 стран региона и охватили 129 миллионов бенефициаров. [33] Хотя условия и суммы денег могут варьироваться от страны к стране, от 5 до 33 долларов на ребенка, [34]в целом эти программы предоставляют деньги бедным семьям при условии, что эти трансферты используются в качестве инвестиций в человеческий капитал их детей, таких как регулярное посещение школы и базовая профилактическая медицинская помощь. Целью этих программ является решение проблемы передачи бедности из поколения в поколение и содействие социальной интеграции путем нацеливания на бедных, сосредоточения внимания на детях, предоставления пособий женщинам и изменения отношений социальной ответственности между бенефициарами, поставщиками услуг и правительствами. [35] В настоящее время большинство этих схем трансфертов приносят пользу примерно 110 миллионам человек в регионе, и они считаются относительно дешевыми и обходятся примерно в 0,5% их ВВП. [36]

Программы условных денежных трансфертов могут быть очень эффективными в сокращении бедности в краткосрочной перспективе, поскольку они помогли увеличить доход и потребление в бедных семьях. Они также эффективно работали над увеличением охвата школьным образованием и посещаемости, особенно в средней школе. Было признано существенное улучшение здоровья и питания детей, пользующихся этими программами. [37] Однако исследования ПРООН показали, что условные денежные переводы не означали ни значительного повышения качества образования и обучения, ни значительного повышения заработной платы после того, как получатели попали в рабочую силу.

Большинство программ ОДТ очень целенаправленно и эффективно охватывают бедные и изолированные группы, особенно крайне бедных, живущих за пределами досягаемости программ социальной защиты, связанных с занятостью в формальном секторе. В среднем 80% пособий получают 40% самых бедных семей. [35] Эти программы также способствовали обеспечению гендерного равенства, поскольку они предоставляют больше средств девочкам, поскольку они часто бросают учебу раньше, что привело к увеличению их приема в среднюю школу и их посещаемости. В долгосрочной перспективе эти инвестиции могут также привести к значительным изменениям в расширении прав и возможностей женщин и их включении в экономические сети. [35]

Африка [ править ]

While most conditional cash transfer programs are in Latin America, a significant amount of research has been conducted regarding the implementation of these programs in Africa. In addition, programs are looking to the Latin America for examples on how to implement these programs. While there are a few unconditional cash transfer programs in Africa being tested, two conditional cash transfer programs in Africa are currently being implemented. For CCTs to be successful, they require sufficient infrastructure. Poor education and health systems limit the benefits of CCT programs. Impacts should be seen in regard to the effectiveness of health and education institutions of the country.

South Africa[edit]

In South Africa unconditional cash transfer and social assistance spending amounts to approximately US$20-billion per annum or 15.2% of its total Governmental expenditure (while the country has a GDP of only USD368-billion).[38][39][40][41] The number of individual programme beneficiaries totalled 17.5-million in 2018 (76.1% of its total labour force),[42] compared to Bolsa Família in Brazil which has 12-million families as beneficiary[43]

The impact on the country's labour force participation has been found to be "ambiguous and dependent on a number of factors", according to the Southern African Labour and Development Research Unit, while "education and health-care conditions attached to many transfers can also increase human capital formation and therefore create a long-term positive impact on labour market participation".[44]

Morocco[edit]

Since 2007 a pilot conditional cash transfer program has been researching its effectiveness in Morocco, organized by the World Bank. The program targets poor regions of Morocco with high dropout rates and should cover 160,000 households by 2010.[45] The pilot program is a comparative test that has four treatment groups. One group is receiving unconditional cash transfers, regardless of child school attendance. The next three are given conditional cash transfers to families of children grades 3-6 based on the child's attendance at school.

The three treatment groups vary in how attendance is monitored, ranging from monitoring attendance based on teacher’s report, all the way to a sophisticated system involving monitoring through biometric fingerprint machines.[45]

In addition, within each classroom, which parent (the mother or father) is randomized to see if the family benefits more from having the money targeted to one or the other. This study will bring research that assesses the importance of conditionality, monitoring, and targeting within a conditional cash transfer program.[45]

Europe[edit]

Conditional cash transfer programs are not used widely in Europe. In the UK, in 2011 CentreForum proposed an additional child benefit dependent on parenting activities.[46]

Turkey[edit]

In Turkey, CCT program has still been implemented by GDSA since 2003 with education and health components in which almost 6 billion Turkish Liras (app. 2 billion Euros) have been spent to about 3.5 million beneficiary households. In order to be paid regularly in CCT program, students (ages 5–20) have to attend to their school regularly and children (ages 0–6) have to be taken to health centres regularly. All the conditions are being monitored by GDSA from the databases of Ministry of Health and Ministry of Education by the means of an interactive web-based MIS.

The conditional education grants are provided to children of the target group on school enrollment condition, from the first grade through the end of the twelfth grade. Once qualified as beneficiaries, children should maintain at least 80 per cent attendance rate to continue to receive the grant.

Individual payment amounts differ according to components. Girls are paid higher amounts than boys in education component to encourage poor families to send their daughters to school. Besides, due to increasing drop-out rates in higher grades, secondary school (9th-12th grades) students are paid higher amounts than primary school ones in order to ensure the effect of the program on decreasing the drop-out rates.[47]

The project named "Strengthening the Impact of the Conditional Cash Transfer Programme in Turkey for Increasing High School Attendance" (Liseye Devam Senden, Destek Bizden) has been started up in December 2014 by GDSA through EU co-finance. The project has been integrated to Turkey's CCT implementation and designed for high school CCT beneficiaries in order to ensure them to get a degree and decrease early school leaving rates which also is one of the most important topics for 2020 European Union targets for a sustainable growth.[47]

In the scope of the project, extra incentives were added into CCT education programme aiming to support high school education attendance which would provide stronger reinforcement for the CCT families. Grants (€60 in 2014 and €70 in 2015 for each eligible student) is provided for parents (preferably mothers) of high school (9th, 10th and 11th grades and 12th for 2015) CCT beneficiaries suffering from lack of financial resources to cover educational expenditures especially in the beginning of each year.[48]

Medical applications[edit]

Modest financial incentives delivered in routine clinical practice have been found to significantly improve adherence to, and completion of, vaccination programmes.[49][50]

Obstacles and failed programs[edit]

Although the benefits of conditional cash transfer programs across the world have been widely noted, there remains a series of obstacles to their success that have caused some programs to be stunted or terminated completely.[51]

External factors[edit]

According to a comprehensive study done by senior research analysts Laura Rawlings and Gloria Rubio of the World Bank, the beginning stages of program implementation present the challenge of creating a reliable implementation schedule.[52] On many occasions, changes in political leadership, natural disasters, or changes in program administration have delayed the implementation schedule and lead to decreased efficiency or program termination.[52]

An example of the negative outcomes of one such delay is provided by the UN Development Programme's in-depth study of the short-lived Nicaragua's Social Protection Network. According to the study, the movement of the program administration to the country's Ministry of the Family caused a delay in efficiency and resources that, among other factors, led to the program's termination.[53] Delays can also be caused by difficulties in developing the program management information system (MIS).[54]

One such delay in Mexico's Oportunidades program caused 27% of its targeted population not to receive any transfers after two years of implementation.[54]

In addition to unscheduled delays, other external factors that can hinder a CCT's success pertain to unexpected financial crisis.[55] According to a comprehensive assessment provided by the World Bank, the structure of conditional cash transfer programs has not yet been adjusted to retain success in the event of a large financial crisis.[55]

Primarily, conditional cash transfer programs are not flexible enough to extend benefits to households that fall into the program's targeted population only during economic downturns. Thus, those not normally covered by the program's benefits may be harder hit than those who are but will not be able to be assisted.[55]

Exclusion[edit]

Another common obstacle to success in most CCTs is exclusion of needy homes in the targeting process. In an assessment by the World Bank, much exclusion was due to remote communities' inability to access schools or clinics. Many such communities fall into developing countries' most poverty-stricken populations but cannot follow through with conditionalities since the transportation costs to attend schools or hospital visits outweigh the benefits.[56] Furthermore, an evaluation of Mexico's Progresa-Oportunidades program addresses the issue that those in poverty with debilitating illnesses can be excluded from CCTs due to their physical inability to accomplish the conditionalities.[57]

Exclusion has been noted by both the World Bank study and the Progresa-Oportunidades evaluation evident in community-based targeting and self-targeting approaches. In the case of self-targeting, used by Mexico's Progresa-Oportunidades, working women may be excluded from the program because they are unable to miss work to register or accomplish all conditions.[58] In the case of community-based targeting, the World Bank study notes that the extremely poor who may live in generally middle-class communities will be excluded.[59]

Distrust[edit]

Targeted populations' distrust of the program due to lack of adequate information has been noted by at least three case studies to be a leading factor in the CCT programs’ downfalls. The extensive study by the UN Development Programme on Nicaragua's Social Protection Network (RPS) reveals that the level of distrust of the program was so high that a domestic publicity campaign could have possibly saved the RPS from extinction.[60] This high level of domestic distrust was due, in part, to efforts to politicize the program.[61]

One report addressed in the UN Development Programme's study stated that RPS employees were approached by members of the government, who demanded that half their salaries be donated to the party in power. Although the RPS was successful in avoiding the threats, it was later revealed that the RPS was the only Nicaraguan institution of its kind not making government contributions.[61]

This same level of distrust is reflected in a study on the feasibility of a Haitian CCT made by the International Food Policy Research Institute. In the focus group they interviewed, almost all subjects expressed a "profound lack of faith" in the Haitian government. Instead, they preferred that the conditional cash transfer programs be implemented by community committees or NGOs.[62]

However, this distrust in governments' ability to fairly implement CCTs fairly is not strictly limited to developing countries. In an article in The New York Times addressing the termination of the pilot CCT, Opportunity NYC, the committee leader of one of its lending institutions stated that people were distrustful and confused by the program's intricacies. New York City's deputy mayor for health and human services added that many busy and stressed households were not being able to handle the many conditions they had to complete since they were not efficiently educated about the program.[63]

Unconditional versus conditional cash transfers[edit]

See also: Unconditional cash transfer

There is currently much discussion about whether conditionality, or conditions for the cash transfer, is necessary or important to a cash transfer program. Research, such as the pilot conditional cash transfer program in Indonesia called Generasi, examined the importance of conditionality.[64] One report looks at data from Mexico's Oportunidades/Progresa program, which looks at families who accidentally did not receive forms that monitor school attendance and therefore received unconditional cash transfers. It then compares them with those households that did receive the forms. It was shown that conditionality had the strongest impact on children's attendance to secondary school, as enrollment rates in secondary school were higher for those that received the forms.[65]

Another report on an experiment in Malawi is researching the importance of conditionality among families with school-age girls. The program was conducted, with data collected between October 2007 and June 2010.[66] It was found that the treatment arm providing conditional cash transfer programs had higher enrollment rates, as well as higher scores in independently administered tests of cognitive ability, mathematics and English reading comprehension. However, the UCT treatment arm had a much lower incidence of pregnancy and marriage among schoolage girls.

A strong argument against the conditionality of social cash transfers is proposed by proponents of a rights-based approach to development. From a human rights perspective, cash transfers are a means to ensure the human rights to social protection and an adequate standard of living for all members of society, including first and foremost the fundamental right to food. States have the duty to ensure those rights with a maximum of available resources. While reducing poverty in general, conditional cash transfers have shown to often exclude those who need it the most, violating the human rights principle of non-discrimination and equality.[67]

The following program in Malawi is an example of an unconditional cash transfer:

The Mchinji Pilot Social Cash Transfer Scheme is part of the larger Malawi Social Protection Policy and Framework, and began in April 2006. It is mainly financed by UNICEF and the National AIDS Commission.[68] The objectives of the scheme are to reduce poverty of people in the pilot area who are ultra poor and labor constrained, increase school enrolment and attendance, and to generate information regarding the feasibility of a cash transfer program as part of a Social Protection Programme for Malawi. The goal for this program is to reduce the ultra poverty rate from the 22% rate in 2007 to 10% by 2015.[68]

This program targets those households that are ultra poor (See poverty for definition) and those who are labor constrained, defined as either a household in which no able-bodied members 19-64 can work due to chronic sickness or disability or a household with one-able bodied member that has to care for more than three dependents. About 22% of Malawi as of 2007 was ultra-poor, living on less than 20 cents a day, and of that group 10% are labor constrained.[68]

The program would give anywhere from 600 kwacha ($4 US) monthly for a one-person household to 1800 kwacha ($13 US) monthly for a four or more person family. There is also an extra bonus of 200 kwacha for children enrolled in primary school and 400 kwacha for children enrolled in secondary school.[68]The location for the program is in the Mchinji District, the 14th poorest district out of 28 in Malawi.

It was chosen for its average poverty level of all the districts in Malawi and its proximity to the capital, Lilongwe.[68]

The first comprehensive systematic review of evidence on health effects of cash transfers found that the relative effectiveness of conditional and unconditional cash transfers remains very uncertain. The review found only three studies that compared conditional cash transfers with unconditional ones directly, and it recommended additional randomized controlled trials of conditional compared with unconditional cash transfers.[69]

See also[edit]

  • Means test
  • Cash transfers (Transfer payments)
  • Unconditional basic income

Specific programs:

  • Universal allocation per child
  • Bolsa Família
  • Oportunidades
  • Opportunity NYC
  • Social Protection Network
  • New Incentives[70]

References[edit]

  1. ^ a b c Edo, María; Marchionni, Mariana; Garganta, Santiago (November 2015). "Conditional Cash Transfer Programs and Enforcement of Compulsory Education Laws. The case of Asignación Universal por Hijo in Argentina" (PDF). Center for Distributive, Labor and Social Studies Working Papers. Center for Distributive, Labor and Social Studies (190). ISSN 1853-0168. Retrieved 13 September 2020.
  2. ^ Rojas, René (Summer 2018). "The Latin American Left's Shifting Tides". Catalyst. 2 (2): 6–71. Retrieved 13 September 2020.
  3. ^ "Safety Nets and Transfers: CCT Program Profile - Bangladesh." World Bank. http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTSOCIALPROTECTION/EXTSAFETYNETSANDTRANSFERS/0,,contentMDK:22060179~pagePK:148956~piPK:216618~theSitePK:282761~isCURL:Y,00.html
  4. ^ Glewwe, Paul; Kassouf, Ana Lucia. "The Impact of the Bolsa Escola/Familia Conditional Cash Transfer Program on Enrollment, Drop Out Rates and Grade Promotion in Brazil." August 2010
  5. ^ "Can Conditional Cash Transfers Reduce Poverty and Crime? Evidence from Brazil". "Archived copy" (PDF). Archived from the original (PDF) on 2013-06-02. Retrieved 2013-07-21. CS1 maint: discouraged parameter (link) CS1 maint: archived copy as title (link)
  6. ^ "Safety Nets and Transfers: CCT Program Profile - Cambodia." World Bank. http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTSOCIALPROTECTION/EXTSAFETYNETSANDTRANSFERS/0,,contentMDK:22060636~pagePK:148956~piPK:216618~theSitePK:282761~isCURL:Y,00.html
  7. ^ a b c d Gustavo Nigenda, Maria Gonzalez-Robledo:Lessons offered by Latin America's cash transfer programs Archived 2009-05-20 at the Wayback Machine, Mexican Health Foundation, Centre for Social and Economic Analysis, 2005, accessed on March 22, 2009
  8. ^ Palma, Julieta; Urzúa, Raúl. "Anti-poverty Policies and Citizenry: the Chile Solidario Experience." UNESCO Management of Social Transformations Policy Papers/12. Department of Public Policy. Institute of Public Affairs. University of Chile.
  9. ^ "Evaluation of Familias en Acción." Institute for Fiscal Studies. "Archived copy". Archived from the original on 2013-05-25. Retrieved 2013-07-21. CS1 maint: discouraged parameter (link) CS1 maint: archived copy as title (link)
  10. ^ "Mi familia Progresa." "Archived copy". Archived from the original on 2010-03-25. Retrieved 2012-03-04. CS1 maint: discouraged parameter (link) CS1 maint: archived copy as title (link)
  11. ^ IFPRI: The cost of poverty alleviation transfer programs, accessed on April 8, 2010
  12. ^ "PROGRAMA DE ASIGNACIÓN FAMILIAR (PRAF)." Gobierno de Unidad Nacional. "Archived copy". Archived from the original on 2012-02-27. Retrieved 2012-03-04. CS1 maint: discouraged parameter (link) CS1 maint: archived copy as title (link) Domingo, 4 de marzo de 2012
  13. ^ Galiani, Sebastian, and Patrick J. McEwan. "The heterogeneous impact of conditional cash transfers." Working Paper, Washington University in St. Louis, November 2011. "Archived copy". Archived from the original on 2012-09-08. Retrieved 2012-04-10. CS1 maint: discouraged parameter (link) CS1 maint: archived copy as title (link)
  14. ^ Damayanti, Arie (LPEM FEUI, Jakarta), Moeis, Jossy P. (LPEM FEUI, Jakarta), Sparrow, Robert (ISS, The Hague), Herawati, Yulia (World Bank Office, Jakarta). "Program Keluarga Harapan and PNPM-Generasi Baseline Survey – Preliminary Findings." World Bank. January 24, 2008
  15. ^ Ayala, Francisco. "The Programme for Advancement through Health and Education (PATH), Jamaica Inter-Regional Inequality Facility Policy Briefs 4, February 2006." Overseas Development Institute.
  16. ^ "Mexico’s Oportunidades Program." SHANGHAI POVERTY CONFERENCE: CASE STUDY SUMMARY. World Bank. http://info.worldbank.org/etools/docs/reducingpoverty/case/119/summary/Mexico-Oportunidades%20Summary.pdf
  17. ^ Attanasio, Orazio P., Costas Meghir, and Ana Santiago. 2011. "Education Choices in Mexico: Using a Structural Model and a Randomized Experiment to Evaluate PROGRESA." Review of Economic Studies 79: 37-66. http://www.povertyactionlab.org/evaluation/impact-financial-incentives-school-participation-mexico
  18. ^ Angelucci, Manuela, Giacomo de Giorgi, Marcos A. Rangel, and Imran Rasul. 2010. "Family Networks and School Enrolment: Evidence from a Randomized Social Experiment." Journal of Public Health Economics 94:197-221. http://www.povertyactionlab.org/evaluation/family-networks-and-schooling-outcomes-mexico
  19. ^ Skoufias, Emmanuel; Parker, Susan W; Behrman, Jere R; Pessino, Carola (2001). "Conditional Cash Transfers and Their Impact on Child Work and Schooling: Evidence from the PROGRESA Program in Mexico [with Comments]" (PDF). Economía. 2 (1): 45–96. doi:10.1353/eco.2001.0016. JSTOR 20065413. S2CID 153828176.
  20. ^ http://web.worldbank.org/archive/website00819C/WEB/PDF/CASE_-62.PDF
  21. ^ Moore, Charity. “Nicaragua’s Red de Proteccion Social: An Exemplary but Short-lived Conditional Cash Transfer Program.” International Policy Center for Inclusive Growth, no.17, (2009): 1-42.
  22. ^ "Opportunities Network: Impact on Child Labor." Republic of Panama. MINISTRY OF SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT. October 2007. "Busco Trabajo" (PDF). Archived from the original (PDF) on 2010-04-01. Retrieved 2012-03-04. CS1 maint: discouraged parameter (link)
  23. ^ "Juntos Program and Corda Technologies Improve the Lives of Peruvian Children and Their Families." Government of Peru Juntos Program. "Archived copy" (PDF). Archived from the original (PDF) on 2011-06-28. Retrieved 2012-03-04. CS1 maint: discouraged parameter (link) CS1 maint: archived copy as title (link)
  24. ^ "Pantawid Pamilyang Pilipino Program." Department of Social Welfare and Development. http://pantawid.dswd.gov.ph/index.php/home Archived 2012-02-28 at the Wayback Machine
  25. ^ "Opportunity NYC: Family Rewards." http://www.opportunitynyc.net/ Archived 2012-03-01 at the Wayback Machine
  26. ^ Rawlings, Laura B.; Rubio, Gloria M. "Evaluating the Impact of Conditional Cash Transfer Programs: Lessons from Latin America." World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 3119, August 2003.
  27. ^ http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTCCT/Resources/5757608-1234228266004/PRR-CCT_web_noembargo.pdf
  28. ^ Fernald, Lia C.H., Paul J. Gertler, and Lynnette M. Neufeld. 2008. "Role of cash in conditional cash transfer programmes for child health, growth, and development: an analysis of Mexico’s Oportunidades." Lancet 327:828-37. http://www.povertyactionlab.org/evaluation/role-conditional-cash-transfers-early-childhood-development-mexico
  29. ^ Macours, Karen, Patrick Premand, and Reno Vakis. "Transfers, Diversification and Household Risk Strategies: Experimental Evidence with Lessons for Climate Change Adaptation." Working Paper, Paris School of Economics, November 2011. http://www.povertyactionlab.org/evaluation/household-risk-strategies-and-conditional-cash-transfers-nicaragua
  30. ^ Rutter, Jill. “Making the case for rigorous, evidence-based policymaking” The Guardian. February 16, 2012. "Archived copy". Archived from the original on 2012-09-07. Retrieved 2012-04-12. CS1 maint: discouraged parameter (link) CS1 maint: archived copy as title (link)
  31. ^ a b Fiszbein, Ariel; Schady, Norbert; Ferreira, Francisco H.G.; Grosh, Margaret; Kelleher,Nial; Olinto, Pedro; Skoufias, Emmanuel. "CONDITIONAL CASH TRANSFERS REDUCING PRESENT AND FUTURE POVERTY." World Bank. http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTCCT/Resources/5757608-1234228266004/PRR-CCT_web_noembargo.pdf
  32. ^ An Assessment of the Effectiveness of Anti-Poverty Programs in the United States, Ben-Shalom, Moffitt, Scholz, Mai 2011
  33. ^ Stampini, M. and L. Tornarolli. 2012. “The growth of conditional cash transfers in Latin America and the Caribbean: did they go too far?” IDB Policy Brief n. 185, and IZA policy paper n. 49.
  34. ^ Societies on the Move (September 11, 2010). The Economist. 396(8699), pp. 11-15
  35. ^ a b c De la Brière, Bénédicte and Rawlings, Laura B. (2006). Examining Conditional Cash Transfer Programs: A Role for Increased Social Inclusion? Social Safety Net Primer Papers. The World Bank
  36. ^ Societies on the Move (2010, September 11). The Economist. 396(8699), pp. 11-15
  37. ^ Actuar Sobre el Futuro: Romper la Transmisión Intergeneracional de la Igualdad (2010). Regional Human Development Report for Latin America and the Caribbean. UNDP
  38. ^ "SA Government 2019 National Budget Review". SA Government.http://www.treasury.gov.za/documents/national%20budget/2019/review/KeyBudgetStatistics.pdf
  39. ^ "World Bank". https://data.worldbank.org/country/south-africa
  40. ^ "Social Security Agency". https://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/progdesc/ssptw/2016-2017/africa/south-africa.html
  41. ^ "Brookings Institution". https://www.brookings.edu/blog/africa-in-focus/2014/01/27/south-africas-welfare-success-story-ii-poverty-reducing-social-grants/
  42. ^ "South African Government". https://www.sassa.gov.za/Statistics/Documents/Fact%20Sheet%20-%20Issue%20No.14%20%E2%80%93%20February%202018.pdf"
  43. ^ Duffy, Gary (25 May 2010). "Family friendly: Brazil's scheme to tackle poverty". BBC News.
  44. ^ "SALDRU". http://www.opensaldru.uct.ac.za/handle/11090/670
  45. ^ a b c "Morocco: Conditional Cash Transfers and Education." Middle East and North Africa - Morocco: Conditional Cash Transfers and Education. World Bank, 2007. Web. [1].
  46. ^ "Archived copy" (PDF). Archived from the original (PDF) on 2012-05-03. Retrieved 2012-12-19.CS1 maint: archived copy as title (link)
  47. ^ a b "The European Semester". Retrieved 30 September 2015. CS1 maint: discouraged parameter (link)
  48. ^ "What is on the Agenda?". Retrieved 30 September 2015. CS1 maint: discouraged parameter (link)
  49. ^ McLellan, A Thomas (2014). "Should at-risk patients be paid to receive interventions?". The Lancet. 384 (9938): 113–4. doi:10.1016/S0140-6736(14)60490-6. PMID 24725466.
  50. ^ Weaver, Tim; Metrebian, Nicola; Hellier, Jennifer; Pilling, Stephen; Charles, Vikki; Little, Nicholas; Poovendran, Dilkushi; Mitcheson, Luke; Ryan, Frank; Bowden-Jones, Owen; Dunn, John; Glasper, Anthony; Finch, Emily; Strang, John (2014). "Use of contingency management incentives to improve completion of hepatitis B vaccination in people undergoing treatment for heroin dependence: A cluster randomised trial". The Lancet. 384 (9938): 153–63. doi:10.1016/S0140-6736(14)60196-3. PMID 24725468.
  51. ^ Rawlings, Laura and Gloria Rubio. Evaluating the Impact of CCT Programs: Lessons from Latin America. World Bank Working Paper Research Policy, no. 3119 (August 2003): 1-25.
  52. ^ a b Rawlings, Laura and Gloria Rubio. "Evaluating the Impact of CCT Programs: Lessons from Latin America." World Bank Working Paper Research Policy, no. 3119 (August 2003): 23
  53. ^ Moore, Charity. "Nicaragua’s Red de Proteccion Social: An Exemplary but Short-lived Conditional Cash Transfer Program." International Policy Center for Inclusive Growth, no.17, (2009): 1-42.
  54. ^ a b Rawlings, Laura and Gloria Rubio. "Evaluating the Impact of CCT Programs: Lessons from Latin America." World Bank Working Paper Research Policy, no. 3119 (August 2003): 20.
  55. ^ a b c Fizbein, Ariel and Norbert Shaby. "Conditional Cash Transfers: Reducing Present and Future Poverty." The World Bank. (2009): 125.
  56. ^ Fizbein, Ariel and Norbert Shaby. "Conditional Cash Transfers: Reducing Present and Future Poverty." The World Bank. (2009): 1- 245
  57. ^ Latapi, Augustín and Mercedes González de la Rocha. "Girls, Mothers,and Poverty Reduction in Mexico: Evaluating Progresa-Oportunidades" in Shahra Razavi (ed.), "The Gendered Impacts of Liberalization: Towards 'Embedded Liberalism?' London and New York: Routledge: 267- 289.
  58. ^ Latapi, Augustín and Mercedes González de la Rocha. "Girls, Mothers,and Poverty Reduction in Mexico: Evaluating Progresa- Oportunidades" in Shahra Razavi (ed.), "The Gendered Impacts of Liberalization: Towards 'Embedded Liberalism?'" London and New York: Routledge: 267- 289.
  59. ^ Fizbein, Ariel and Norbert Shaby. "Conditional Cash Transfers: Reducing Present and Future Poverty." The World Bank. (2009): 1- 245.
  60. ^ Moore, Charity. "Nicaragua's Red de Proteccion Social: An Exemplary but Short-lived Conditional Cash Transfer Program." International Policy Center for Inclusive Growth, no.17, (2009): 1-42.
  61. ^ a b Moore, Charity. "Nicaragua's Red de Proteccion Social: An Exemplary but Short-lived Conditional Cash Transfer Program." International Policy Center for Inclusive Growth, no.17, (2009): 40.
  62. ^ Cohen, Mark and Dora Weissman. "Implementing a Conditional Cash Transfer Program In Haiti: Opportunities and Challenges." The International Food Policy Research Center. 2007
  63. ^ Bosman, Julie. "City will stop paying poor for good behavior." The New York Times. March 30, 2010
  64. ^ Olken, Benjamin A., Junko Onishi, Susan Wong. "Should Aid Reward Performance? Evidence from a Field Experiment on Health and Education in Indonesia." Working Paper, MIT, August 2011. http://www.povertyactionlab.org/evaluation/project-generasi-conditional-community-block-grants-indonesia
  65. ^ De Brauw, Alan; Hoddinott, John (2011). "Must conditional cash transfer programs be conditioned to be effective? The impact of conditioning transfers on school enrollment in Mexico" (PDF). Journal of Development Economics. 96 (2): 359–70. doi:10.1016/j.jdeveco.2010.08.014. SSRN 1011901. CS1 maint: discouraged parameter (link)
  66. ^ Baird, Sarah, Craig McIntosh, and Berk Ozler. Cash or Condition? Evidence from a Cash Transfer Experiment. Working paper no. 5259. Vol. 45. World Bank, 2010. Print. Impact Evaluation Ser.
  67. ^ Künnemann, Ralf and Ralf Leonhard. A Human Rights View of Social Cash Transfers for Achieving the Millennium Development Goals. Brot für die Welt, Evangelischer Entwicklungsdienst, 2008.
  68. ^ a b c d e Schubert, Bernd, and Mayke Huijbregts. The Malawi Social Cash Transfer Pilot Scheme, Preliminary Lessons Learned. Tech. New York: UNICEF, 2006. Print. Social Protection Initiatives for Children, Women and Families: An Analysis of Recent Experiences.
  69. ^ Pega, Frank; Liu, Sze; Walter, Stefan; Pabayo, Roman; Saith, Ruhi; Lhachimi, Stefan (2017). "Unconditional cash transfers for reducing poverty and vulnerabilities: effect on use of health services and health outcomes in low- and middle-income countries". Cochrane Database of Systematic Reviews. 11: CD011135. doi:10.1002/14651858.CD011135.pub2. PMC 6486161. PMID 29139110.
  70. ^ "New Incentives | Model" http://newincentives.org/model/

62. ^ Parenting matters: early years and social mobility. Centreforum. Chris Paterson, 2011. https://web.archive.org/web/20120503014654/http://www.centreforum.org/assets/pubs/parenting-matters.pdf

Further reading[edit]

  • "Redesigning Conditional Cash Transfers" J-PAL Briefcase(2012)
  • Fiszbein, A. and Schady, N. (2009) Conditional Cash Transfers: Reducing Present and Future Poverty World Bank Publications, ISBN 978-0-8213-7352-1
  • Hanlon, Joseph, Armando Barrientos and David Hulme (2010). Just Give Money to the Poor: The Development Revolution from the Global South. Sterling, VA: Kumarian Press.
  • Rawlings, L. and G. Rubio (2005). "Evaluating the Impact of Conditional Cash Transfer Programs: Lessons from Latin America" The World Bank Research Observer 2005 20(1):29-55

External links[edit]

  • The Role of Conditional Cash Transfers in Equitable Development
  • Conditional Cash Transfer Programs: Are They Really Magic Bullets?
  • Give the poor money: Conditional-cash transfers are good. They could be even better The Economist, 29 July 2010
  • Weddle, Ryan World Bank's Conditional Cash Transfer Programs Show Signs of Success Devex, 11 February 2009
  • Opportunity NYC at Rockefeller Foundation