Права человека в материковом Китае периодически пересматриваются Комитетом ООН по правам человека (КПЧ ООН) [1], по которому правительство Китайской Народной Республики и различные иностранные правительства и правозащитные организации часто расходятся во мнениях. Власти КНР , их сторонники и другие сторонники утверждают, что существующая политика и меры принуждения достаточны для защиты от нарушений прав человека . Однако другие страны и их органы власти (например, Государственный департамент США , Министерство иностранных дел Канады и др.), Международные неправительственные организации(НПО), такие как « Права человека в Китае» и «Международная амнистия» , а также граждане, юристы и диссиденты внутри страны заявляют, что власти материкового Китая регулярно санкционируют или организуют такие нарушения.
Цзян Тяньюн - последний адвокат, известный тем, что защищает заключенных в тюрьму критиков правительства . В ходе репрессий 709, начавшейся в 2015 году, были арестованы и / или задержаны более 200 юристов, помощников по правовым вопросам и активистов, включая Цзяна . [2]
Независимые НПО, такие как Amnesty International и Human Rights Watch , а также зарубежные правительственные учреждения, такие как Государственный департамент США, регулярно представляют доказательства нарушения КНР свободы слова , передвижения и религии своих граждан и других лиц, находящихся под ее юрисдикцией . Власти КНР заявляют, что права человека определяют по-разному, включая экономические, социальные и политические права, все в связи с « национальной культурой » и уровнем развития страны. [3] Власти КНР, ссылаясь на это определение, заявляют, что права человека улучшаются. [4] Однако они не используют определение, используемое в большинстве стран и организаций . Политики КНР неоднократно утверждали, что, согласно Конституции КНР , « Четыре кардинальных принципа » имеют приоритет над правом гражданства . Официальные лица КНР интерпретируют примат Четырёх кардинальных принципов как правовую основу для ареста людей, которые, по утверждениям правительства, стремятся свергнуть эти принципы. С другой стороны, гражданам Китая, которые, по мнению властей, соблюдают эти принципы, власти КНР разрешают пользоваться и осуществлять все права, вытекающие из гражданства КНР, при условии, что они не нарушают законы КНР каким-либо иным образом. .
Многочисленные правозащитные группы предали гласности проблемы прав человека в материковом Китае, которые, по их мнению, правительство неправильно решает, в том числе: смертная казнь ( смертная казнь ), политика одного ребенка (в которой Китай сделал исключения для этнических меньшинств до ее отмены). в 2015 г.), политический и правовой статус Тибета и пренебрежение свободой прессы в материковом Китае . Другие проблемы, вызывающие озабоченность, включают отсутствие юридического признания прав человека и отсутствие независимой судебной системы , верховенства закона и надлежащей правовой процедуры . Другие проблемы, поднятые в отношении прав человека, включают серьезное отсутствие прав трудящихся (в частности, систему хукоу , которая ограничивает свободу передвижения рабочих-мигрантов ), отсутствие независимых профсоюзов (которые с тех пор меняются [5] ) и обвинения. дискриминации сельских рабочих и этнических меньшинств , а также отсутствие религиозной свободы - правозащитные группы подчеркнули репрессии против христиан , [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] тибетских буддистов , уйгурских мусульман , и религиозные группы Фалуньгун . Некоторые китайские группы активистов пытаются расширить эти свободы, в том числе «Права человека в Китае», « Китайские правозащитники» и « Китайская группа юристов по правам человека» . Однако китайские адвокаты по правам человека, которые берут на себя дела, связанные с этими вопросами, часто сталкиваются с преследованием, лишением статуса адвоката и арестом. [12] [13]
Согласно отчету Amnesty International за 2016/2017 гг., Правительство продолжало разрабатывать и принимать ряд новых законов о национальной безопасности, которые представляли серьезную угрозу защите прав человека. Всенародные репрессии против адвокатов и активистов-правозащитников продолжались в течение года. Активисты и правозащитники продолжали систематически подвергаться мониторингу, преследованию , запугиванию, арестам и задержанию . [14] Далее в отчете говорится, что полиция задерживает все большее количество правозащитников за пределами официальных мест содержания под стражей, иногда без доступа к адвокату в течение длительного времени, подвергая задержанных риску пыток и других видов жестокого обращения. Книготорговцы, издатели , активисты и журналист , пропавшие без вести в соседних странах в 2015 и 2016 годах, оказались под стражей в Китае, что вызвало обеспокоенность по поводу действий правоохранительных органов Китая за пределами их юрисдикции . [14] В июне 2020 года почти 50 независимых экспертов ООН выразили широкую озабоченность по поводу подавления « основных свобод » китайским правительством. Они подчеркнули коллективные репрессии в отношении населения, особенно религиозных и этнических меньшинств, вплоть до задержания адвокатов, органов прокуратуры и правозащитников . Они также осудили «безнаказанность за чрезмерное применение силы полицией, предполагаемое использование химических агентов против протестующих, предполагаемые сексуальные домогательства и нападения на протестующих женщин в полицейских участках, а также предполагаемое преследование медицинских работников». [15]
Правовая система
После правовых реформ конца 1970-х и 1980-х годов Коммунистическая партия Китая (КПК) официально перешла на язык верховенства закона и установила современную судебную систему . В ходе этого процесса были приняты тысячи новых законов и постановлений и начато обучение большего числа профессиональных юристов . [12] Концепция «верховенства закона» была подчеркнута в конституции , и правящая партия начала кампании по продвижению идеи о том, что граждане защищены законом. В то же время, однако, фундаментальное противоречие существует в самой конституции, в которой Коммунистическая партия настаивает на том, что ее власть важнее закона. [16] Таким образом, конституция закрепляет верховенство закона, но одновременно подчеркивает принцип , что « руководство о коммунистической партии » держит первенство над законом. Даже некоторые китайцы имеют лишь смутное представление о приоритете руководства КПК над конституционной и правовой властью.
Судебная власть не является независимой от Коммунистической партии, и судьи сталкиваются с политическим давлением; во многих случаях исход дела диктуется частными партийными комитетами. [17] Таким образом, КПК эффективно контролирует судебную систему через свое влияние. [12] Это влияние произвела систему , часто описываемую как «правила по закону» (аллюзия к власти КПК), а не правило о праве. [18] Более того, правовая система не обеспечивает защиты гражданских прав и часто не поддерживает надлежащую правовую процедуру. [19] Это противоположно системе сдержек и противовесов или разделению властей .
По оценкам зарубежных экспертов, в 2000 году в материковом Китае находилось в тюрьмах от 1,5 до 4 миллионов человек. КНР не позволяет посторонним проверять пенитенциарную систему. [20]
Гражданские свободы
Свобода слова
Хотя конституция 1982 года гарантирует свободу слова [21], китайское правительство часто использует статьи своей правовой системы о « подрыве государственной власти » и «защите государственной тайны », чтобы сажать в тюрьму тех, кто критикует правительство. [22]
Во время летних Олимпийских игр 2008 года правительство пообещало выдать разрешения, позволяющие людям проводить акции протеста в специально отведенных «парках протеста» в Пекине. [23] Однако большинство заявлений было отозвано, приостановлено или наложено вето [24], и полиция задержала некоторых из подавших заявления. [25]
Ссылки на определенные спорные события и политические движения, а также доступ к веб-страницам, которые власти КНР считают «опасными» или «угрожающими государственной безопасности», блокируются в Интернете в КНР ; материалы, оспариваемые властями КНР или критикующие их, отсутствуют во многих публикациях и находятся под контролем КПК на территории материкового Китая. [26] Законы Китайской Народной Республики запрещают пропаганду отделения любой части заявленной ею территории от материкового Китая или публичный вызов господству КПК над правительством Китая. [ необходимая цитата ] Несанкционированная акция протеста семи иностранных активистов во время Олимпиады в Музее национальностей Китая , протестующих за свободный Тибет и блокирующих вход, была разрешена [27], а протестующие депортированы. [28]
Зарубежные поисковые системы в Интернете, включая Microsoft Bing , Yahoo! , и Google China подверглись критике за содействие этим методам. Yahoo! , в частности, заявила, что не будет защищать частную жизнь своих китайских клиентов от властей. [29]
В 2005 году после Yahoo! Китай предоставил правительству Китая свои личные электронные письма и IP-адреса , репортер Ши Тао был приговорен к десяти годам тюремного заключения за публикацию внутреннего документа коммунистической партии на зарубежном китайском демократическом сайте. [30] Президент Skype Джош Сильверман сказал, что «всем известно», что TOM Online «установила процедуры для ... блокировки мгновенных сообщений, содержащих определенные слова, которые китайские власти сочли оскорбительными». [31] В июне 2020 года Европейский Союз потребовал немедленного освобождения Юй Вэньшэна , который после двух лет заключения был осужден по обвинению в «подстрекательстве к подрыву государственной власти», за написание открытого письма с требованием конституционных реформ. [32]
24 июля 2020 года КПК изгнала откровенного и влиятельного магната недвижимости Жэнь Чжицяна , который осудил авторитарного лидера страны, генерального секретаря КПК Си Цзиньпина . Он пропал без вести в марте после критики Си, а позже его дело было передано в судебную систему для уголовного расследования. [33]
29 июля 2020 года правительство Китая начало применять новый Закон о национальной безопасности для подавления мирных высказываний, ограничения академической свободы и оказания сдерживающего воздействия на основные свободы в Гонконге . [34]
11 августа 2020 года Хьюман Райтс Вотч потребовала от китайских властей на основании закона о безопасности немедленно освободить 10 сторонников демократии и активистов, арестованных 10 августа, и снять все расплывчатые обвинения в «национальной безопасности». [35]
В июне 2020 года Цай Ся , бывший профессор Центральной партийной школы КПК , раскритиковал Си Цзиньпина, генерального секретаря КПК, назвал его «боссом мафии», а правящую Коммунистическую партию - «политическим зомби». В 20-минутной аудиозаписи на сайтах социальных сетей она сказала, что все являются рабами Си, и что нет никаких прав человека и верховенства закона, Она предложила Си уйти в отставку. [36] 17 августа 2020 года Цай Ся исключили из Центральной партийной школы КПК, и ей отменили пенсию. [37]
Сообщается, что во время кризиса с коронавирусом 2020 года КНР подавила новости о вирусе, а также попыталась преуменьшить значение смертей и не сообщать о них. Поступают сообщения о задержаниях, нападениях, пытках и исчезновениях информаторов, включая активистов, врачей, юристов, студентов и бизнесменов, которые создавали и загружали видео о переполненных больницах и большом количестве смертей. [38]
Некоторыми из этих информаторов были:
- Ли Вэньлян , китайский врач, работавший в центральной больнице Уханя, предупреждал о новой болезни другие больницы и врачей. Его арестовали и обвинили в «ложных комментариях», которые «серьезно нарушили общественный порядок». [39] [40]
- Фан Бин , китайский бизнесмен, гражданский журналист и осведомитель, транслировавший изображения Ухани во время кризиса с коронавирусом. Он пропал без вести с 9 февраля 2020 года. [38] [41]
- Чэнь Цюши , китайский юрист, активист и гражданский журналист, освещавший протесты в Гонконге 2019–2020 годов и пандемию COVID-19, пропал без вести с 6 февраля 2020 года [38].
- Ли Цзехуа , гражданский журналист Китая, рэпер и ютубер, который пытался найти пропавшего адвоката и гражданского журналиста Чэнь Цюши. Он пропал без вести с 26 февраля 2020 года. [42] [43]
- Чэнь Мэй и Цай Вэй, активисты, которые публиковали подвергнутые цензуре статьи о вспышке коронавируса в онлайн-архиве, не контактируют с 19 апреля 2020 г. [44]
- Доктор Ли-Мэн Янь , вирусолог из Гонконга и информатор, вынуждена была бежать в США после того, как обнаружила, что китайские власти скрывают крупномасштабные попытки скрыть пандемию. Она сказала, что если она расскажет свою историю сокрытия в Китае, она «исчезнет и убьет». [45]
Свобода прессы
Критики утверждают, что КПК не выполнила свои обещания о свободе СМИ материкового Китая . Freedom House последовательно оценивает Китай как « несвободный » [46] [47] в своем ежегодном обзоре свободы прессы, включая отчет за 2014 год. Журналист КНР Хэ Цинлянь говорит, что СМИ КНР контролируются директивами отдела пропаганды Коммунистической партии и подвергаются интенсивному мониторингу, который грозит наказанием нарушителям, а не цензурой перед публикацией. [48] В 2008 году репортер ITV News Джон Рэй был арестован во время освещения акции протеста «Свободный Тибет». [27] [49] Освещение в международных средствах массовой информации тибетских протестов всего за несколько месяцев до Олимпийских игр в Пекине в 2008 году вызвало бурную реакцию внутри Китая. Практикующие китайские СМИ воспользовались возможностью, чтобы поспорить с пропагандистскими властями за большую свободу СМИ: [50] один журналист спросил: «Если даже китайским журналистам не разрешено сообщать о проблемах в Тибете, как иностранные журналисты могут узнать о взглядах Китая на События?' [51] Иностранные журналисты также сообщили, что их доступ к некоторым веб-сайтам, в том числе сайтам правозащитных организаций, был ограничен. [52] [53] Президент Международного олимпийского комитета Жак Рогге заявил в конце Олимпийских игр 2008 года, что «правила [регулирующие свободу иностранных СМИ во время Олимпийских игр] могут быть несовершенными, но они кардинально меняют ситуацию по сравнению с ситуацией ранее. . Мы надеемся, что они продолжатся ». [54] Клуб иностранных корреспондентов Китая (FCCC) выступил с заявлением во время Олимпийских игр, что «несмотря на долгожданный прогресс с точки зрения доступности и количества пресс-конференций на олимпийских объектах, FCCC обеспокоен применением насилия и запугивания. и домогательства снаружи. Клуб подтвердил более 30 случаев сообщения о вмешательстве с момента официального открытия Олимпийского медиацентра 25 июля и проверяет не менее 20 других сообщений о происшествиях ». [55]
Поскольку китайское государство продолжает осуществлять значительный контроль над СМИ, общественная поддержка отечественных репортажей стала неожиданностью для многих наблюдателей. [50] Не так много известно ни о том, в какой степени китайские граждане верят официальным заявлениям КПК, ни о том, какие средства массовой информации они считают заслуживающими доверия и почему. Пока что исследования СМИ в Китае были сосредоточены на изменении отношений между СМИ и государством в эпоху реформ. [50] Также мало известно о том, как меняющаяся медиа-среда Китая повлияла на способность правительства убеждать медиа-аудиторию. [50] Исследование политического доверия показывает, что влияние средств массовой информации в одних случаях положительно коррелирует с поддержкой правительства, а в других - отрицательно. Исследование было приведено в качестве доказательства того, что китайская общественность верит пропаганде, передаваемой им через средства массовой информации, но также и того, что они ей не верят. [56] [57] Эти противоречивые результаты могут быть объяснены осознанием того, что обычные граждане считают источники средств массовой информации заслуживающими доверия в большей или меньшей степени, в зависимости от степени реформирования средств массовой информации. [50]
В 2012 году Верховный комиссар ООН по правам человека призвал правительство Китая снять ограничения на доступ СМИ в регион и разрешить независимым и беспристрастным наблюдателям посещать Тибет и оценивать его условия. [58] Китайское правительство не изменило своей позиции.
В марте 2020 года Китай выслал сотрудников The New York Times , The Washington Post и The Wall Street Journal в ответ на отношение США к государственным китайским СМИ как к служащим правительства Китая, требуя одобрения, аналогичного дипломатическим служащим. [59]
Информационный гипер-контроль
Мировой индекс свободы прессы 2020 года, составленный организацией «Репортеры без границ» (RSF), показывает, что Китай является крупнейшим в мире тюремщиком журналистов. Материковый Китай, который пытается установить «новый мировой медийный порядок», сохраняет свою систему информационного гиперконтроля, негативные последствия которого для всего мира проявились во время кризиса общественного здравоохранения, вызванного коронавирусом. В нем говорится, что КНР никогда не прекращает совершенствовать свою систему информационного гипер-контроля и преследования диссидентских журналистов и блогеров, и что дополнительные доказательства этого появились в феврале 2020 года, когда она арестовала двух своих граждан за то, что они взяли на себя ответственность за освещение коронавируса. кризис. Крупнейший в мире тюремщик журналистов, Китай в настоящее время содержит около 100 человек, подавляющее большинство из которых - уйгуры. [60]
Свобода Интернета
В материковом Китае существует более шестидесяти правил Интернета, которые служат для мониторинга и контроля публикаций в Интернете. Эти политики реализуются провинциальными филиалами государственных интернет-провайдеров, компаний и организаций. [61] [62] Аппарат контроля над Интернетом КНР и / или КПК считается более обширным и продвинутым, чем в любой другой стране мира. Golden Shield включает в себя возможность отслеживать онлайн чат услуг и почты, идентифицирующий IP - адрес и все предыдущего сообщения человека, а затем в состоянии зафиксировать на человек место, потому что человек, как правило , использует компьютер дома или на работе - что позволяет произвести арест. [63] Amnesty International отмечает, что в Китае «зарегистрировано самое большое количество заключенных в тюрьмы журналистов и кибер-диссидентов в мире» [64], а парижские организации « Репортеры без границ» заявили в 2010 и 2012 годах, что «Китай - самая большая тюрьма в мире для пользователей сети. . " [65] [66]
Например, в 2013 году, через 24 года после протестов на площади Тяньаньмэнь в 1989 году , поисковые запросы по слову «площадь Тяньаньмэнь» все еще подвергались цензуре со стороны китайских властей. [67] Согласно отчету Amnesty International, контроль в Интернете , средствах массовой информации и научных кругах был значительно усилен. Усилилось подавление религиозной деятельности, не находящейся под прямым контролем государства. [68]
Система Хукоу
Коммунистическая партия пришла к власти в конце 1940 - х и ввела командную экономику . В 1958 году Мао Цзэдун , председатель Коммунистической партии Китая , создал систему разрешений на жительство, определяющую, где люди могут работать, и классифицировал рабочих как сельских или городских. [69] [70] [71] В этой системе рабочий, который намеревался переехать из сельской местности в город, чтобы заняться несельскохозяйственной работой, должен был бы подавать заявление на разрешение сделать это через соответствующие бюрократические учреждения. . Однако есть неуверенность в том, насколько строго соблюдается эта система. Люди, работавшие за пределами региона, в котором они были зарегистрированы, не имели права на получение зерновых пайков, жилья, предоставляемого работодателем, или медицинского обслуживания. [70] Существовал контроль над образованием, трудоустройством, браком и другими сферами жизни. [69] Одной из причин, по которой была названа эта система, было желание предотвратить возможный хаос, который может быть вызван предсказуемой крупномасштабной урбанизацией. [72] Как часть политики « одна страна, две системы», предложенная Дэн Сяопином и принятая правительствами Великобритании и Португалии, особые административные районы (САР) Гонконга и Макао сохранили отдельный пограничный контроль и иммиграционную политику с остальная часть КНР. Граждане Китая должны были получить разрешение от правительства, прежде чем им разрешили путешествовать в Гонконг или Макао , но это требование было официально отменено для каждого SAR после соответствующей передачи. С тех пор ограничения, введенные правительствами ЮАР, стали основными факторами, ограничивающими поездки.
В 2000 году газета The Washington Times сообщила, что, хотя рабочие-мигранты играют важную роль в распространении богатства в китайских деревнях, с ними обращаются «как с гражданами второго сорта в системе, которая является настолько дискриминационной, что ее сравнивают с апартеидом» . [73] Анита Чан также утверждает, что система регистрации домашних хозяйств и разрешения на временное проживание в Китайской Народной Республике создала ситуацию, аналогичную системе сберегательных книжек, которая была внедрена в Южной Африке для контроля предложения и действий дешевой рабочей силы [74 ] из малообеспеченных этнических групп, а также контролировать качество и количество таких работников. В 2000 году Тибетский центр по правам человека и демократии заявил, что людям ханьского происхождения в Тибете гораздо легче получить необходимые разрешения на проживание в городских районах, чем этническим тибетцам. [75]
Отмена этой политики была предложена в 11 провинциях, в основном на развитом восточном побережье. После широко разрекламированного инцидента в 2003 году, когда в провинции Гуандун умер мигрант с университетским образованием, в закон были внесены изменения, чтобы исключить возможность суммарного ареста рабочих-мигрантов. Преподаватель права в Пекине , который разоблачил инцидент сказал , что это означало конец Hukou системы : он считал , что в большинстве небольших городов, система была оставлена, и он «почти потерял свою функцию» в больших городах , таких как Пекин и Шанхай. [76]
Обращение с сельскими тружениками
В ноябре 2005 года Цзян Венран , исполняющий обязанности директора Китайского института при университете Альберты , заявил, что система хукоу является одной из самых строго соблюдаемых структур апартеида в современной мировой истории. [77] Он заявил: «Горожане пользуются рядом социальных, экономических и культурных благ, в то время как с крестьянами, составляющими большинство населения Китая, обращаются как с гражданами второго сорта». [77]
Дискриминация, насаждаемая системой хукоу , стала особенно обременительной в 1980-х годах после того, как сотни миллионов рабочих-мигрантов были вынуждены покинуть государственные корпорации, кооперативы и другие учреждения. [78] Попытки переехать в городские центры рабочих, которые были классифицированы как сельские рабочие, жестко контролировались китайской бюрократией, которая усилила свой контроль, отказав им в доступе к основным товарам и услугам, таким как зерновые пайки, жилье и медицинское обслуживание, [ 78] 70] и регулярное закрытие частных школ для трудящихся-мигрантов. [78] Система хукоу также обеспечивала соблюдение законов о пропусках, которые сравнивают с теми, которые существовали при апартеиде в Южной Африке. [69] [79] [71] [80] [74] [81] [82] [83] Сельские рабочие, которые хотели работать в других провинциях, должны были иметь шесть пропусков, [78] и периодически полиция провели рейды, в ходе которых задержали тех рабочих, которые не имели разрешений, поместили их на короткий срок в центры содержания под стражей, а затем депортировали. [81] Также обнаружено, что сельские рабочие получали меньше минимальной заработной платы вообще ничего. Группе шахтеров в Шуаняшане почти ничего не платили. Вместе с семьями и людьми, о которых им приходилось заботиться, каждый из рабочих протестовал из-за денег, которых они заслуживают. [84] Как и в Южной Африке, ограничения на передвижение рабочих-мигрантов были повсеместными [78], и временные рабочие были вынуждены вести ненадежную жизнь в общежитиях компаний или трущобах , что приводило к жестоким последствиям. [74] Анита Чан далее комментирует, что китайская система регистрации домашних хозяйств и временного вида на жительство создала ситуацию, аналогичную системе сберегательных книжек в апартеиде Южной Африки, которая была разработана для регулирования предложения дешевой рабочей силы.
Китайское министерство общественной безопасности оправдывает эту практику на том основании , что они оказывали содействие полиции в поимке преступников и поддержание общественного порядка, и они также предоставили демографические данные для планирования и программ правительства. [85]
Свобода объединения
Китайская Народная Республика не допускает свободы ассоциаций в целом; в частности, он не допускает свободного выбора членства в профсоюзах и политических партиях. В соответствии со статьями 20 и 23 Всеобщей декларации прав человека (ВДПЧ) каждый работник имеет право вступать в ассоциацию по своему выбору, иметь представление о своих интересах против своего работодателя и принимать коллективные меры, включая право на забастовку . В Китае по образцу Deutsche Arbeitsfront с 1934 по 1945 год в Германии Всекитайская федерация профсоюзов имеет монополию на профсоюзную деятельность: это фактически национализированная организация. Такая динамика нарушает конвенции № 87 и 98 Международной организации труда о свободе ассоциации и ведении коллективных переговоров. Руководство ACFTU не избирается свободно ее членами, и оно не является независимым от государства или работодателей. [ необходима цитата ]
КПК эффективно монополизирует организованную политическую деятельность в Китае. Следовательно, нет возможности подлинной электоральной конкуренции ни на каком уровне власти, ни внутри самой партии. Это нарушает статью 21 (1) Всеобщей декларации прав человека, которая гласит: «Каждый человек имеет право принимать участие в управлении своей страной напрямую или через свободно избранных представителей».
Религиозная свобода
Во время Культурной революции (1966–1976), особенно во время кампании « Уничтожение четырех древностей» , правительство председателя Мао Цзэдуна и его идеологические союзники преследовали, отвергали и решительно не одобряли религиозные дела всех типов . Многие религиозные сооружения были разграблены или разрушены. С тех пор были предприняты усилия по ремонту, реконструкции и защите исторических и культурных религиозных объектов. [86] В своем Международном отчете о свободе вероисповедания за 2013 год Госдепартамент США раскритиковал КНР следующим образом:
Уважение и защита правительством права на свободу вероисповедания далеко не соответствовали его международным обязательствам в области прав человека. (...) Власти преследовали, задерживали, арестовывали или приговаривали к тюремному заключению ряд религиозных приверженцев за деятельность, которая, как сообщается, была связана с их религиозными убеждениями и практиками. Эта деятельность включала сборы для религиозных отправлений, выражение религиозных убеждений публично и в частном порядке и публикацию религиозных текстов. Также поступали сообщения о физическом насилии и пытках в заключении. [87]
Конституция 1982 года предоставляет гражданам право исповедовать любую религию, а также право воздерживаться от этого:
Граждане Китайской Народной Республики пользуются свободой вероисповедания. Никакая государственная организация, общественная организация или отдельное лицо не может принуждать граждан исповедовать или не верить в какую-либо религию; они также не могут дискриминировать граждан, которые исповедуют или не верят в какую-либо религию. Государство защищает нормальную религиозную деятельность. Никто не может использовать религию для занятия деятельностью, которая нарушает общественный порядок, наносит ущерб здоровью граждан или вмешивается в систему образования государства. Религиозные организации и религиозные дела не подлежат иностранному господству. [88]
Члены коммунистической партии официально обязаны быть атеистами [89], но это правило не соблюдается регулярно, и многие члены партии в частном порядке занимаются религиозной деятельностью. [90] Глобальные исследования, проведенные Pew Research Center в 2014 и 2017 годах, оценили ограничения китайского правительства на религию как одни из самых высоких в мире, несмотря на низкий или средний рейтинг социальных враждебных действий на религиозной почве в стране. [91] [92]
христианство
Китайское правительство пытается сохранить жесткий контроль над всей организованной религией, включая христианство. Единственными легальными христианскими группами являются Патриотическое движение трех сторонников и Китайская патриотическая католическая ассоциация , последняя из которых была осуждена Папой. [93] Обе эти группы находятся под контролем Коммунистической партии . Члены нелегальной подпольной католической церкви и члены протестантских домашних церквей подвергаются судебному преследованию со стороны властей КНР. [94] [95]
В 2007 году Китайская патриотическая католическая ассоциация избрала католического епископа Пекина вместо умершего Фу Тиешаня. [96] Стандартная католическая практика - епископ назначается Папой; [97] Католическая церковь не признает легитимности епископов, избранных Ассоциацией, но не назначенных Папой. [93] По словам Папы Бенедикта XVI, католическая церковь, в частности, рассматривается в Китае как иностранная держава. Его ситуация в чем-то аналогична ситуации с католической церковью в постреформационной Англии, в которой официальная церковь также контролировалась государством. [94] [98]
В начале января 2018 года китайские власти в провинции Шаньси снесли церковь, что вызвало волну страха среди христиан. [99] [100] В отчетах стран с наиболее сильными антихристианскими преследованиями Китай был назван организацией Open Doors в 2019 году 27-й страной с наибольшей жестокостью [91] [92], а в 2020 году - 23-й по степени жестокости. [101]
Тибетский буддизм
Далай - лама является весьма влиятельной фигурой в тибетском буддизме , который традиционно жил в Тибете. Из-за того, что китайское правительство контролирует территорию Тибета, нынешний Далай-лама проживает в Дхарамшале, Химачал-Прадеш , в Республике Индия. В постановлении, обнародованном 3 августа 2007 года , китайское правительство объявило, что после 1 сентября 2007 года «[ни один] живой Будда [не может перевоплощаться] без одобрения правительства, со времен династии Цин, когда была установлена система живых Будд». [102] [ нужен лучший источник ] Назначенный правительством КНР Панчен-лама заклеймен [103] теми, кто считает попытки КНР контролировать организованную религию противоречащими Всеобщей декларации прав человека и другим этическим принципам.
Примеры политического контроля над религией в 1998 году включают: [104]
- квоты на количество монахов для сокращения духовного населения
- насильственное осуждение Далай-ламы как духовного лидера
- изгнание несанкционированных монахов из монастырей
- принудительное чтение патриотических сценариев в поддержку Китая
- ограничение религиозного обучения до 18 лет
КНР задержала монахов, празднующих получение Далай-ламой золотой медали Конгресса США [105] . [106] В ноябре 2012 года Комиссар ООН по правам человека призвал КНР рассмотреть утверждения о нарушениях прав в Тибете; нарушения привели к тревожной эскалации «отчаянных» форм протеста в регионе, включая самосожжения. [58] сообщает Amnesty International сообщает , что Синьцзян - Уйгурский автономный район и в тибетском -populated области. [68]
Уйгуры
Статья 36 Конституции КНР обеспечивает конституционную защиту свободы религии граждан, и официальная этническая политика страны также подтверждает защиту свободы религии этнических меньшинств, но на практике уйгурское население, преимущественно проживающее в Синьцзян-Уйгурском автономном районе , является подлежат строгому контролю за практикой ислама. [107]
Примеры этих ограничений теперь включают:
- Официальные религиозные обряды должны проводиться в одобренных правительством мечетях.
- Уйгурам младше 18 лет не разрешается входить в мечети и молиться в школе.
- Изучение религиозных текстов разрешено только в определенных государственных школах.
- Правительственные информаторы регулярно посещают религиозные собрания в мечетях.
- Женщинам не разрешается носить платки и вуали, а мужчинам не разрешается носить бороды.
- Использование традиционных исламских имен (например, Абдул) запрещено.
Since the September 11th attacks in 2001, the Chinese government began to label violence in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region as terrorism, unlike in previous years. Chinese counter-terror legislation now makes explicit links between religion and extremism and has led to regulations that explicitly ban religious expression among Uyghurs in particular.[108]
Since Communist Party General Secretary Xi Jinping came to power in 2012, reports have surfaced that around a million Muslims (Chinese citizens and some Central Asian nationals) were detained in internment camps throughout Xinjiang without trial or access to a lawyer.[109] In these camps they were 're-educated' to disavow their Islamic beliefs and habitats while praising the Communist Party. The camps have expanded rapidly, with almost no judicial process or legal paperwork.[109] Chinese officials are quoted in state media as saying that these measures are to fight separatism and Islamic extremism.[110][111]
Since 2017, the Chinese government has pursued a policy which has led to more than one million Muslims (the majority of them Uyghurs) being held in secretive detention camps without any legal process.[112][113] Critics of the policy have described it as the sinicization of Xinjiang and called it an ethnocide or cultural genocide,[112][114][115][116][117][118] with many activists, NGOs, human rights experts, government officials, and the U.S. government calling it a genocide.[119][120][121][122][123][124][125][126]
New bans and regulations were implemented on April 1, 2017. Abnormally long beards and wearing veils in public were both banned.[127] Not watching state-run television or listening to radio broadcasts, refusing to abide by family planning policies, or refusing to allow one's children to attend state-run schools were all prohibited.[127] Giving a child a name that would "exaggerate religious fervor," such as Muhammad, was made illegal. Along with this, many mosques were demolished or destroyed.[127]
According to Radio Free Asia, the Chinese government jailed Uyghur Imam Abduheber Ahmet after he took his son to a religious school not sanctioned by the Chinese state. Ahmet had previously been lauded by China as a "five-star" imam but was sentenced in 2018 to over five years in prison for his action.[128]
Also in 2018, over one million Chinese government workers began forcibly living in the homes of Uyghur families to monitor and assess resistance to assimilation, and to watch for frowned-upon religious or cultural practices.[129][130] These government workers were trained to call themselves "relatives" and have been described in Chinese state media as being a key part of enhancing "ethnic unity".[129]
In addition, records of the government indicate that thousands of Uighur children have been separated from their parents.[131] New evidence shows that over 9,500 children in Yarkand county had at least one parent detained – most of them are Uighur children.[131] According to the researcher Adrian Zenz, in 2019, the number of children living in boarding facilities increased by 76%, reaching a total of 880,500 children.[131]
In March 2020, the Chinese government was found to be using the Uyghur minority for forced labor, inside sweat shops. According to a report published then by the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI), no fewer than around 80,000 Uyghurs were forcibly removed from the region of Xinjiang and used for forced labor in at least twenty-seven corporate factories.[132] According to the Business and Human Rights resource center, corporations such as Abercrombie & Fitch, Adidas, Amazon, Apple, BMW, Fila, Gap, H&M, Inditex, Marks & Spencer, Nike, North Face, Puma, PVH, Samsung, and UNIQLO each have each sourced from these factories prior to the publication of the ASPI report.[133]
On 19 July 2020, British Foreign Secretary Dominic Raab accused the PRC of "gross and egregious" human rights abuses against its Uyghur population. He added that while Britain wanted good relations with China, it could not stand by the reports of forced sterilization and mass education camps targeting the Uyghur population in Xinjiang. It is believed that up to a million Uighur people have been detained over the past few years in what the Chinese state defines as "re-education camps".[134]
On 24 July 2020, two Members of the European Parliament, Hilde Vautmans and Katalin Cseh, wrote a letter to Josep Borrell Fontelles, the Vice-President of the European Commission, urging him to punish mainland China for violating the human rights of its Uyghur population and Hong Kong citizens. They also stated to enact EU Magnitsky Act in order to sanction the leaders who committed these human rights violations.[135]
On 28 July 2020, a report documented that the US government and several activist groups mounted pressure on global businesses to reexamine and cut ties with China's Xinjiang region, where allegations of human rights violations have run rampant for years. The Uyghurs and other Muslim minority groups in the region have been imprisoned in internment camps and are forced to work.[136] On 31 August 2020, human rights campaigners requested the US authorities to ban all imports of cotton from the Chinese province of Xinjiang, due to allegations of widespread forced labour. The documents cited substantial evidence that the Uighur community and other minority groups in China were being press-ganged into working in the region's cotton fields.[137]
On 10 October 2020, the UK shadow foreign secretary, Lisa Nandy urged Britain to block China’s seat on the United Nations Human Rights Council over the country’s treatment of Uyghur Muslims.[138]
On January 19 2021, outgoing Secretary of State Mike Pompeo formally declared that China is committing a genocide against the Uighurs and crimes against humanity. In a written letter, Pompeo wrote, “I believe this genocide is ongoing, and that we are witnessing the systematic attempt to destroy Uyghurs by the Chinese party-state.”[139] Pompeo called for “all appropriate multilateral and relevant juridical bodies, to join the United States in our effort to promote accountability for those responsible for these atrocities."[140] China strongly denies that human rights abuses are going on in Xinjiang.[139] Pompeo has previously stated that China is trying to "erase its own citizens."[141]
In 2021, independent sources reported that Uyghur women in China's internment camps have been systematically raped, sexually abused and tortured.[142] Victims said there is a system of organized rape.[142] The Chinese police also electrocute and torture them.[142] There is planned dehumanization, sterilization and torture.[142]
Falun Gong
Following a period of meteoric growth of Falun Gong in the 1990s, the Communist Party led by General Secretary Jiang Zemin banned Falun Gong on 20 July 1999. An extra-constitutional body called the 6-10 Office was created to lead the suppression of Falun Gong.[143] The authorities mobilized the state media apparatus, judiciary, police, army, the education system, families and workplaces against the group.[144] The campaign is driven by large-scale propaganda through television, newspaper, radio and internet.[145] There are reports of systematic torture,[146][147] illegal imprisonment, forced labour, organ harvesting[148] and abusive psychiatric measures, with the apparent aim of forcing practitioners to recant their belief in Falun Gong.[149]
Foreign observers estimate that hundreds of thousands and perhaps millions of Falun Gong practitioners have been detained in "re-education through labor" camps, prisons and other detention facilities for refusing to renounce the spiritual practice.[143][150] Former prisoners have reported that Falun Gong practitioners consistently received "the longest sentences and worst treatment" in labour camps, and in some facilities Falun Gong practitioners formed the substantial majority of detainees.[151][152] As of 2009 at least 2,000 Falun Gong adherents had been tortured to death in the persecution campaign,[153] with some observers putting the number much higher.[154]
Some international observers and judicial authorities have described the campaign against Falun Gong as a genocide.[155][156] In 2009, courts in Spain and Argentina indicted senior Chinese officials for genocide and crimes against humanity for their role in orchestrating the suppression of Falun Gong.[157][158][159]
Organ harvesting
In 2006 allegations emerged that the vital organs of non-consenting Falun Gong practitioners had been used to supply China's organ tourism industry.[148][160] In 2008, two United Nations Special Rapporteurs reiterated their requests for "the Chinese government to fully explain the allegation of taking vital organs from Falun Gong practitioners and the source of organs for the sudden increase in organ transplants that has been going on in China since the year 2000".[161]
Matas and Kilgour, and Gutmann have, between them, published three books alleging organ harvesting in China.[154][162][163] The Kilgour-Matas report[148][164][165] stated, "the source of 41,500 transplants for the six-year period 2000 to 2005 is unexplained" and "we believe that there has been and continues today to be large scale organ seizures from unwilling Falun Gong practitioners".[148] Ethan Gutmann, who interviewed over 100 individuals as witnesses, estimated that 65,000 Falun Gong prisoners were killed for their organs from 2000 to 2008.[154][166][167][168]
Political freedom
The People's Republic of China is a signatory to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, but has not ratified it. Legally, all citizens of the People's Republic of China who have reached the age of 18 have the right to vote and stand for election, regardless of ethnicity, race, sex, occupation, family background, religious belief, education, property status, or length of residence, except for persons deprived of political rights according to laws imposed by the CCP's Constitution.[169]
In Mao's China, the CCP openly repressed all opposing political groups. This behaviour is now reflected in the judicial system, and has evolved into the selective repression of small groups of people who overtly challenge the CCP's power[170] or its people's democratic dictatorship. The most recent major movement advocating for political freedom was obliterated through the Tiananmen Square Massacre in 1989, the estimated death toll of which ranges from about 200 to 10,000 depending on sources.[171][172] In November 1992, 192 Chinese political activists and democracy advocates submitted a petition to the 16th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party to introduce political reforms. One of the six demands was the ratification of the Covenant. As a reaction to the petition, the Chinese authorities arrested Zhao Changqing, proponent of the petition, and are still holding a number of activists for attempted subversion.
One of the most famous dissidents is Zhang Zhixin, who is known for standing up against the ultra-left.[173]
In October 2008, the government denounced the European Parliament's decision to award the Sakharov Prize for Freedom of Thought to political prisoner Hu Jia, maintaining that it was 'gross interference in China's domestic affairs' to give such an award to a 'jailed criminal.. in disregard of [the Chinese government's] repeated representations.'[174]
Although the Chinese government does not violate its people's privacy as much or as overtly as it used to,[175] it still deems it necessary to keep track of what people say in public. Internet forums are strictly monitored, as are international postal mail (which sometimes is inexplicably delayed, or simply disappears) and e-mail.[176]
Local officials are chosen by election, and even though non-Communist Party candidates are allowed to stand, those with dissident views can face arbitrary exclusion from the ballot, interference with campaigning, and even detention.[177]
Freedom House rates China as a 6 (the second lowest possible rank) in political freedoms. In 2011, the organization said of the Chinese political leadership:
With a sensitive change of leadership approaching in 2012 and popular uprisings against authoritarian regimes occurring across the Middle East, the ruling Chinese Communist Party showed no signs of loosening its grip on power in 2011. Despite minor legal improvements regarding the death penalty and urban property confiscation, the government stalled or even reversed previous reforms related to the rule of law, while security forces resorted to extralegal forms of repression. Growing public frustration over corruption and injustice fueled tens of thousands of protests and several large outbursts of online criticism during the year. The party responded by committing more resources to internal security forces and intelligence agencies, engaging in the systematic enforced disappearance of dozens of human rights lawyers and bloggers, and enhancing controls over online social media.[178]
Independence movements
The independence movements in China are mainly contained within the Inner Mongolian Regions, the Tibetan region, and the Xinjiang region.[179] These regions contain people from ethnic and religious minority groups such as the Mongols, the Tibetans and the Uyghurs.[179]
The Chinese government has had strained relations with these regions since the early 1910s, when the first president of the Chinese Republic, Sun Yat-sen, suggested a plan to move a large number of Han people from Southeast China to Northwest China in an effort to assimilate the ethnic minorities that lived in the area.[179] While Sun Yat-sen lost political power before he could enforce this plan, his sinocentric, assimilationist attitude was adopted by future leader Chiang Kai-shek.[179] Chiang Kai-shek enacted educational policy that encouraged cultural assimilation and discouraged self-determinism until 1945, when Chiang Kai-shek and his Nationalist party became more lenient towards the various ethnic minorities.[179] From this time until the establishment of the People's Republic of China under Mao Zedong, ethnic minorities experienced great independence from the Chinese government, with Mongolia becoming an independent state in 1921 and Xinjiang being named an autonomous region in 1955.[179]
Tibetan, Mongolian, and Xinjiang independence was severely restricted by the Communist Party in the 1950s under Mao Zedong, with the forced annexation of Inner Mongolia, Tibet, and Xinjiang back into mainland China, leading to many protests and riots from the ethnic and religious minorities in the autonomous regions.[179] From this point onwards, there has been a sustained outpouring of secessionist and independence movements from China's autonomous regions.[179]
Currently, the largest independence struggle is being waged by the Muslim-Turkic population of Xinjiang, which shares minimal cultural, lingual, and historical similarities with the Han population in China.[179] While the Chinese government under Deng Xiaoping promised to grant some advantages to the population of Xinjiang such as practising affirmative action in universities, greater liberties with regard to China's one-child policy, and increased government subsidies in the region, the government also discourages and restricts the Muslim-Turkic ethnic population from freely practising its religion, expressing its faith by wearing head scarves, fasting, growing facial hair, and building mosques freely.[180] Furthermore, because of the advantages which the Chinese government grants to the people of Xinjiang, many Han Chinese are prejudiced against them, and their prejudice against the Uyghurs is bolstered by the widespread belief that the government unfairly grants preferential treatment to ethnic minorities in general.[180]
One noteworthy event is the Feb 1997 riots in Yining, a county which is located between Kazakhstan and Xinjiang, during which 12 independence movement leaders were executed and 27 others were arrested and incarcerated.[179] Moreover, almost 200 Uyghurs were killed and over 2,000 more Uyghurs were arrested.[179] In 2008 riots broke out within Tibetan regions such as Lhasa, and anti-Han "pogroms" were committed in Ürümqi, Xinjiang in July 2009.[180] In response to these riots, the Chinese government has increased its police presence in these regions[181] and it has also sought to control offshore reporting and intimidate foreign-based reporters by detaining their family members.[182]
Political abuse of psychiatry
Political abuse of psychiatry began to be practised in mainland China during the 1950s, shortly after Mao Zedong established the People's Republic of China, and continues to be practised in different forms up to present day.[183] Initially, under Mao Zedong, the practice of psychiatry in China saw legitimate improvements in the breadth and quality of treatments.[183] However, as time passed under the direction of Mao Zedong and the campaign of ideological reform was implemented, psychiatric diagnoses became used as a way to control and incarcerate Chinese citizens who didn't subscribe to Maoist ideologies such as Marxism–Leninism.[184] The main demographic of Chinese citizens being targeted and placed in mental asylums were academics, intellectuals, students, and religious groups for their capitalist tendencies and bourgeois worldview.[185] The justification for placing those who didn't comply with Maoist principles in mental institutions was the belief that non-Maoist political ideologies such as capitalism caused extreme individualism and selfishness, which contributed to mental disabilities such as schizophrenia and paranoid psychosis.[185] Maoists justified their claim that anti-Communist beliefs caused mental imbalances by making a positive correlation between the wealth and class of a particular group of people and the number of "mentally ill" people within that group.[183]
Political abuse of psychiatry in mainland China peaked from the mid-1960s to the late 1970s.[183] During this time, Chinese counterrevolutionists and political dissidents were placed into mental asylums, where they were treated with psychotherapy (xinli zhiliao) resembling political indoctrination sessions.[185] During this time, statistics indicate that there were more political activists being held in mental institutions than the number of rapists, murderers, arsonists, and other violent mentally ill people combined.[184] The human rights activist Wei Jingsheng was among the first to speak out about the misappropriation of psychiatry for political purposes in the winter of 1978; however, in response to his advocacy, he was imprisoned and subjected to involuntary drugging and beating by the Chinese government.[185]
After the end of the Cultural Revolution in the late 1970s, the abuse of psychiatry for political purposes continually diminished until the 1990s, when there was a resurgence in politically motivated psychiatric diagnoses towards political dissidents and minority religious groups.[183] During this more recent wave of Chinese forensic psychiatry, political dissidents and practicers of non-mainstream religions were sent to Ankang (meaning peace and health) hospitals.[186] These hospitals, built to hold the criminally insane, are managed by Bureau No. 13 of China's Ministry of Public Security.[183] Ankang hospitals have been the target of much scrutiny by human rights activists and organizations both inside and outside of China, and reports indicate inhumane treatment of patients inside these hospitals.[186] Patients in these hospitals are forced to work at least 7 hours a day and are subjected to torture including acupuncture with electric currents, forced injection of drugs that are known to damage the central nervous system, and physical abuse with ropes and electric batons.[186] Furthermore, reports by Chinese surgeons at these hospitals report on the use of psychosurgery on patients who were involuntarily placed in these hospitals to reduce "violent and impulsive behaviors".[186] One of the most targeted groups of Chinese citizens to be placed in Ankang hospitals are the practicers of Falun Gong, who have what is termed "evil cult-induced mental disorder" or "xiejiao suo zhi jingshen zheng'ai" by Chinese psychiatry.[185] Over 1000 practitioners have been incarcerated in mental asylums across 23 provinces, cities, and autonomous regions.[186]
One of the most famous cases of politically motivated psychiatric diagnoses took place in 1992, when Wang Wanxing was arrested for displaying a pro-democracy banner in Tiananmen Square.[186] After Wang's arrest, his wife signed a statement confirming his mental instability, because police told her that doing so would ensure Wang's immediate release.[186] However, Wang was instead placed in the Beijing Ankang hospital.[186] He was exiled to Germany in 2005.[187]
The People's Republic of China is the only country which currently abuses psychiatry for political purposes in a systematic way, and despite international criticism, this abuse seems to be continuing as of 2010.[188] Political abuse of psychiatry in the People's Republic of China is high on the agenda in the international psychiatric community, and has produced recurring disputes.[188] The abuses there appear to be even more widespread than in the Soviet Union in the 1970s and 1980s and involve the incarceration of petitioners, human rights workers, trade union activists, followers of the Falun Gong movement, and people complaining against injustices by local authorities.[188]
In August 2002, the General Assembly of the WPA was held during the WPA World Congress in Yokohama.[189]:247 The issue of Chinese political abuse of psychiatry was placed on the agenda of the General Assembly, and a decision was made to send an investigative mission to China.[189]:252 The visit was projected for the spring of 2003, in order to assure that a representative of the WPA could present a report during the Annual Meeting of the American Psychiatric Association in May 2003, as well as at the annual meeting of the British Royal College of Psychiatrists in June and July of that year.[189]:252 The 2003 investigative mission never took place, and when the WPA did organize a visit to China, it was more a scientific exchange.[189]:252 In the meantime, the political abuse of psychiatry persists unabated.[189]:252
Political prisoners
The Chinese government has a history of imprisoning citizens for political reasons. Article 73 of China's Criminal Procedure Law was adopted in 2012 and allow the authorities to detain people for reasons of "state security" or "terrorism". In this regard, detainees can be held for as long as six months in “designated locations” such as secret prisons.[190]
The number of political prisoners peaked during the Mao era and it has been decreasing ever since.[191] From 1953 to 1975, around 26 to 39 per cent of prisoners were incarcerated for political reasons.[191] By 1980, the percentage of prisoners incarcerated for political reasons was only 13 per cent, and this figure decreased to 0.5 per cent in 1989 and 0.46 per cent in 1997.[191] 1997 is also the year that the Chinese Criminal Law was amended to replace counterrevolutionary crime with crimes endangering national security.[192]
During the Mao era, one notorious labour camp called Xingkaihu which was located in the northeastern Heilongjiang Province was operated from 1955 to 1969.[193] During this time, over 20,000 inmates were forced to work on irrigation, infrastructure construction, and agricultural projects for the government while being subjected to ideological reform; a significant percentage of these inmates were incarcerated for being counterrevolutionaries and political dissidents.[193] The conditions in Xingkaihu were so poor that many inmates eventually died due to malnutrition and disease.[193]
More recently, since the spring of 2008, the Chinese government has detained 831 Tibetans as political prisoners; of these 831 prisoners, 12 are serving life sentences and 9 were sentenced to death.[194]
In 2009 Nobel Laureate Liu Xiaobo was imprisoned for advocating democratic reforms and increased freedom of speech in Charter 08.[195] In 2017 he died in prison from late stage liver cancer at the age of 61.[195]
Other political prisoners include journalist Tan Zuoren, human rights activist Xu Zhiyong, and journalist Shi Tao.[196] Tan Zuoren was arrested in 2010 and sentenced to 5 years in prison after publicly speaking about government corruption as well as the poorly constructed school buildings that collapsed and led to the deaths of thousands of children during the 2008 earthquake in Sichuan.[196] Xu Zhiyong was sentenced to four years in prison in 2014 after gaining a significant social media following and using it as a platform to express his sociopolitical opinions.[196] Shi Tao was sentenced to 8 years after publicizing the list of instructions that the Communist Party sent journalists regarding how to report the 15th anniversary of the Tiananmen Square Massacre.[196]
On 30 June 2020, Sun Qia, a Chinese-born woman who immigrated to Canada and was a Falun Gong practitioner, was sentenced to eight years in jail for belonging to a spiritual movement that Beijing calls a “cult.” Ms. Sun told a lawyer that she was mentally tortured in the prison and pepper-sprayed while restrained.[197]
Cheng Lei, an Australian TV host working at China's state broadcaster, was detained by the Chinese authorities. On 14 August 2020, the Australian Government received a "formal notification" of her detention. Australia's minister for foreign affairs, Marise Payne, said that Lei had been detained without any charges and could be held for months. The arrest came as tensions between both the countries grew over investigation of COVID-19 pandemic in Beijing followed by trade suspension to Australia.[198]
Pro-democracy movements
Some people have campaigned against the one-party Communist rule in China over the years.
Freedom of assembly and association
The freedom of assembly is provided by the Article 35 of the Chinese Constitution. The Article 51, however, restricts its exercise: such right «may not infringe upon the interests of the state».[199][200]
Human rights activists such as Xie Xang fight for the rights of Chinese people by protesting, slandering the governments' names on social media, and by filing lawsuits. Xang has commented on the punishment he received for protesting, claiming that he was interrogated while shackled onto a metal chair, forced to sit in stressful positions for a set amount of time, and tortured physically and mentally. He also quoted his interrogators stating that he was told that "I could torture you to death and no one could help you."[201]
Предыдущая политика одного ребенка
The Chinese government's birth control policy, known widely as the one-child policy, was implemented in 1979 by chairman Deng Xiaoping's government to alleviate the overpopulation problem. Having more than one child was illegal and punishable by fines. This policy has begun to be phased out, beginning in 2015.[202] Voice of America cites critics who argue that the policy contributes to forced abortions, human rights violations, female infanticide, abandonment and sex-selective abortions, which are believed to be relatively commonplace in some areas of the country.[203] Sex-selective abortions are thought to have been a significant contribution to the gender imbalance in mainland China, where there is a 118:100 ratio of male to female children reported.[204][205][206] Forced abortions and sterilizations have also been reported.[207][208]
It has also been argued that the one-child policy is not effective enough to justify its costs, and that external factors caused a dramatic decrease in Chinese fertility rates to begin even before 1979. The policy seems to have had little impact on rural areas (home to about 80% of the population), where birth rates never dropped below 2.5 children per female.[209] Nevertheless, the Chinese government and others estimate that at least 250 million births have been prevented by the policy.[210]
The policy was generally not enforced in rural areas of the country even before this amendment. It has also been relaxed in urban areas, allowing people to have two children.[211]
Chinese state-run media reported on 3 June 2013 that the city of Wuhan is considering legislation to fine women who have children out of wedlock, or with men married to other women. The fine is considered a 'social compensation fee', and has been sharply criticized for potentially exacerbating the problem of abandoned children.[212]
All the families are allowed to have two children since 1 January 2016.[213][214]
Смертная казнь
According to Amnesty International, throughout the 1990s more people were executed or sentenced to death in China than in the rest of the world put together.[20]
Officially, the death penalty in mainland China is only administered to offenders who commit serious and violent crimes, such as aggravated murder, but China retains in law a number of nonviolent death penalty offences such as drug trafficking. The People's Republic of China administers more official death penalties than any other country, though other countries (such as Iran and Singapore) have higher official execution rates.[215] Reliable NGOs such as Amnesty International and Human Rights in China have informed the public that the total execution numbers, with unofficial death penalties included, greatly exceed officially recorded executions; in 2009, the Dui Hua Foundation estimated that 5,000 people were executed in China – far more than all other nations combined.[216] The precise number of executions is regarded as a state secret.
PRC authorities have recently been pursuing measures to reduce the official number of crimes punishable by death and limit how much they officially utilize the death penalty. In 2011, the National People's Congress Standing Committee adopted an amendment to reduce the number of capital crimes from 68 to 55.[217] Later the same year, the Supreme People's Court ordered lower courts to suspend death sentences for two years and to 'ensure that it only applies to a very small minority of criminals committing extremely serious crimes.'[218]
The death penalty is one of the classical Five Punishments of the Chinese Dynasties. In Chinese philosophy, the death penalty was supported by the Legalists, but its application was tempered by the Confucianists, who preferred rehabilitation over punishment of any sort, including capital punishment.[219] In Communist philosophy, Vladimir Lenin urged the retention of the death penalty, whilst Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels claimed that the practice was feudal and a symbol of capitalist oppression. Chairman Mao of the CCP and his government retained the death penalty's place in the legal system, whilst advocating that it be used for a limited number of counterrevolutionaries. The market reformer Deng Xiaoping after him stressed that the practice must not be abolished, and advocated its wider use against recidivists and corrupt officials. Leaders of the PRC's minor, non-communist parties have also advocated for greater use of the death penalty. Both Deng and Mao viewed the death penalty as having tremendous popular support, and portrayed the practice as a means to 'assuage the people's anger'.[219]
The death penalty has widespread support in mainland China, especially for violent crimes, and no group in government or civil society vocally advocates for its abolition.[219] Surveys conducted by the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences in 1995, for instance, found that 95 per cent of the Chinese population supported the death penalty, and these results were mirrored in other studies.[220] Polling conducted in 2007 in Beijing, Hunan and Guangdong found a more moderate 58 per cent in favour of the death penalty, and further found that a majority (63.8 per cent) believed that the government should release execution statistics to the public.[216]
A total of 46 crimes are punishable by death, including some non-violent, white-collar crimes such as embezzlement and tax fraud. Execution methods include lethal injections and shooting.[221] The People's Armed Police carries out the executions, usually at 10:00 am.[222]
Death sentences in post-Maoist mainland China can be politically or socially influenced. In 2003, a local court sentenced the leader of a triad society to a death sentence with two years of probation. However, the public opinion was that the sentence was too light. Under public pressure, the supreme court of Communist China took the case and retried the leader, resulting in a death sentence, which was carried out immediately.[223]
Execution protocol
The execution protocol is defined in criminal procedure law, under article 212:[224]
- Before a people's court executes a death sentence, it shall notify the people's procuratorate at the same level to send personnel to supervise the execution.
- Death sentences shall be executed by means of shooting or injection.
- Death sentences may be executed at the execution ground or in designated places of custody.
- The judicial personnel directing the execution shall verify the identity of the criminal offender, ask him if he has any last words or letters, and then deliver him to the executioner for the death sentence. If, before the execution, it is found that there may be an error, the execution shall be suspended and the matter shall be reported to the Supreme People's Court for decision.
- Execution of death sentences shall be announced to the public, but shall not be held in public.
- The attending court clerk shall, after an execution, make a written record thereon. The people's court that caused the death sentence to be executed shall submit a report on the execution to the Supreme People's Court.
- The people's court that caused the death sentence to be executed shall, after the execution, notify the family of the criminal offender.
In some areas of mainland China, there is no specific execution ground. A scout team chooses a place in advance to serve as the execution ground. In such a case, the execution ground normally will have three perimeters: the innermost 50 meters is the responsibility of the execution team; the 200-meter radius from the center is the responsibility of the People's Armed Police; and the 2-kilometer alert line is the responsibility of the local police. The public is generally not allowed to view the execution.
The role of the executioner was fulfilled in the past by the People's Armed Police. In recent times, the legal police force (Chinese: 法警; pinyin: fǎ jǐng) assumed this role.
Since 1949, the most common method of execution has been execution by firing squad. This method has been largely superseded by lethal injection, using the same three-drug cocktail pioneered by the United States, introduced in 1996. Execution vans are unique to mainland China, however. Lethal injection is more commonly used for 'economic crimes' such as corruption, while firing squads are used for more common crimes like murder. In 2010, Chinese authorities moved to have lethal injection become the dominant form of execution; in some provinces and municipalities, it is now the only legal form of capital punishment.[225] The Dui Hua foundation notes that it is impossible to ascertain whether these guidelines are closely followed, as the method of execution is rarely specified in published reports.[216]
Criticism
Human rights groups and foreign governments have heavily criticized the PRC's use of the death penalty for a variety of reasons, including its application for non-violent offences, allegations of the use of torture to extract confessions, legal proceedings that do not meet international standards, and the government's failure to publish statistics on the death penalty.[226] However, as acknowledged by both the Chinese Supreme Court and the United States Department of State, the vast majority of death sentences are given for violent, nonpolitical crimes which would be considered serious in other countries.[219]
The Coalition to Investigate the Persecution of Falun Gong has accused Chinese hospitals of using the organs of executed prisoners for commercial transplantation.[227] Under Chinese law, condemned prisoners must give written consent to become organ donors, but because of this and other legal restrictions on organ donation, an international black market in organs and cadavers from China has developed.[228][229] In 2009, Chinese authorities acknowledged that two-thirds of organ transplants in the country could be traced back to executed prisoners and announced a crackdown on the practice.[230]
United States
Running for president in 1992, Bill Clinton sharply criticized his predecessor George H. W. Bush for prioritizing profitable trade relationships over human rights issues in mainland China. As president, 1993–2001, however, Clinton backed away from his position. He did articulate a desired set of goals for mainland China. They included free emigration, no exportation of goods made with prison labour, release of peaceful protesters, treatment of prisoners in terms of international standards, recognition of the distinct regional culture of Tibet, permitting international television and radio coverage, and observation of human rights specified by United Nations resolutions. China refused to comply, and by summer 1994 Clinton admitted defeat and called for a renewal of normalized trade relations. However congressional pressure, especially from Republicans, forced Clinton to approve arms sales to Taiwan, despite the strong displeasure voiced by Beijing.[231]
Wrongful executions
An estimate of over 1000 people are executed every year in mainland China. Most of these executions are due to crimes that are seen as intolerable to the society within mainland China and the People's Republic of China. There are some cases that have been held wrongly.[232]
At least four people have been considered wrongfully executed by PRC courts.
Wei Qing'an (魏清安, circa 1951 – 1984) was a Chinese citizen who was executed for the rape of Liu, a woman who had disappeared. The execution was carried out on 3 May 1984 by the Intermediate People's Court. In the next month, Tian Yuxiu (田玉修) was arrested and admitted that he had committed the rape. Three years later, Wei was officially declared innocent.[233] Teng Xingshan (滕兴善, ? – 1989) was a Chinese citizen who was executed for having raped, robbed and murdered Shi Xiaorong (石小荣), a woman who had disappeared. An old man found a dismembered body, and police forensics claimed to have matched the body to the photo of the missing Shi Xiaorong. The execution was carried out on 28 January 1989 by the Huaihua Intermediate People's Court. In 1993, the missing woman returned to the village, saying she had been kidnapped to Shandong. The absolute innocence of the executed Teng was not admitted until 2005.[234] Nie Shubin (聂树斌, 1974 – 1995) was a Chinese citizen who was executed for the rape and murder of Kang Juhua (康菊花), a woman in her thirties. The execution was carried out on 27 April 1995 by the Shijiazhuang Intermediate People's Court. In 2005, ten years after the execution, Wang Shujin (王书金) admitted to the police that he had committed the murder. Therefore, it has been indicated that Nie Shubin had been innocent all along.[235][232]
Пытка
Although the People's Republic of China outlawed torture in 1996, human rights groups say brutality and degradation are common in Chinese arbitrary detention centers, Laojiao prisons and black jails. People who are imprisoned for their political views, human rights activities or religious beliefs have a high risk of being tortured.[236] Strategies of torture inside black jail include deprivation of sleep, food, and medication. The strategies are all quite inhumane conditions. In a specific case, a woman named Huang Yan was imprisoned for her political views and included the deprivation of medication. She had diabetes and ovarian cancer which required her to take medication in order to maintain order. Tests have shown that the ovarian cancer have spread throughout her body.[237] While the existence of black jails is acknowledged by at least part of the government,[238] the CCP strongly denies facilitating the operation of such jails and officially cracks down on them, leading to at least one trial.[239]
In May 2010, the PRC authorities officially passed new regulations in an attempt to nullify evidence gathered through violence or intimidation in their official judicial procedures, and to reduce the level of torture administered to prisoners already in jails. Little is known, however, about whether or how procedures were modified in black jails, which are not officially part of the judicial system. The move came after a public outcry following the revelation that a farmer, convicted for murder based on his confession under torture, was in fact innocent. The case came to light only when his alleged victim was found alive, after the defendant had spent ten years in prison.[240] International human rights groups gave the change a cautious welcome.[241]
Torture is reportedly used as part of the indoctrination process at the Xinjiang internment camps.[242][243] The torture is alleged to include waterboarding and sexual violence.[244][245]
Этнические меньшинства
There are 55 officially recognized native ethnic minorities in China. Article 4 of the Chinese constitution states 'All nationalities in the People's Republic of China are equal', and the government argues that it has made efforts to improve ethnic education and increased ethnic representation in local government. Some groups are still fighting for recognition as minorities. In the 1964 Census, there were 183 nationalities registered, of which the government recognized 54.[247]
Some policies cause reverse racism, in which Han Chinese or even ethnic minorities from other regions are treated as second-class citizens in the ethnic region.[248][249] Similarly, there are wide-ranging preferential policies (affirmative action programs) in place to promote social and economic development for ethnic minorities, including preferential employment, political appointments, and business loans.[250] Universities typically have quotas reserved for ethnic minorities, even if they have lower admission test scores.[251] Ethnic minorities are also more often exempt from the one-child policy, which targets the Han Chinese.
Stern punishments of independence-seeking demonstrators, rioters, or terrorists[252] have led to mistreatment of the Tibetan and Uyghur minorities in Western China. The United States in 2007 refused to help repatriate five Chinese Uyghur Guantanamo Bay detainees because of 'past treatment of the Uigur minority'.[253] In its 2007 annual report to the U.S. Congress, the Congressional-Executive Commission on China said the Chinese government "provides incentives for migration to the region from elsewhere in China."[254] Xi Jinping, the General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party (paramount leader), said in April 2014 that China faces increasing threats to national security and the government could impose tougher controls on its ethnic minorities due to terrorist attacks like the 2014 Kunming attack.[255] In Xinjiang, the Ürümqi Motorized Vehicle Licensing and Testing Department has begun requiring all ethnic Uyghur and Kazakh individuals to undergo a background check before registering a vehicle.[256]
In March 2019, the United States Department of State criticized mainland China for its human rights violations, saying the sort of abuses it had inflicted on its Muslim minorities had not been witnessed “since the 1930s”.[257] The department's annual Country Reports on Human Rights Practices stated that the PRC was “in a league of its own when it comes to human rights violations”.[258]
Reportedly, the People's Republic of China is holding one million ethnic Uyghurs in internment camps in Xinjiang. In July 2019, ambassadors of 22 countries wrote a letter to the United Nations human rights officials condemning China's treatment towards the minority groups. Various human rights groups and former inmates have described the camps as “concentration camps”, where Muslim Uyghurs and other minorities have been forcibly assimilated into China's majority ethnic Han society.[259] The letter urged China to “refrain from the arbitrary detention and restrictions on freedom of movement of Uighurs, and other Muslim and minority communities in Xinjiang.”[260]
A leaked document known as "The China Cables" details the conditions in the aforementioned internment camps.[261][262][263] These documents describe guidelines on a variety of things: preventing escapes, monitoring the Uyghurs, disciplining the Uyghurs, and much more. They are taught Mandarin and about Chinese culture. However, some claim this is renouncing their culture to conform to the communist party.[264] Many Chinese officials have already dismissed the claims of breaching human rights and the contents of these documents. They refer to these camps as voluntary education centers where the Uyghurs are reeducated. The goal of these camps, according to Chinese ambassador, Lieu Xiaoming, is to prevent terrorism.[265]
Принудительный сбор биометрических данных
PRC authorities in western Xinjiang province are collecting DNA samples, fingerprints, eye scans and blood types of millions of people aged 12 to 65.[266][267][268] Sophie Richardson, Human Rights Watch's China director, said "the mandatory databanking of a whole population’s biodata, including DNA, is a gross violation of international human rights norms, and it’s even more disturbing if it is done surreptitiously, under the guise of a free health care program."[269] For the ethnic minority Uyghur people, it is mandatory to undergo the biometrics collection, disguised under physical examination. Coercion to give blood sample is gross violation of the human rights and individual privacy.[269]
Тибетцы
Tibetans who opposed the diversion of irrigation water by Chinese authorities to the China Gold International Resources mining operations were detained, tortured and murdered.[270] Allegations of what the PRC officially labelled 'judicial mutilation' against Tibetans by the Dalai Lama's government, and the serfdom controversy, have been cited by the PRC as reasons to interfere for what they claim was the welfare of Tibetans,[271] although their claims of 'judicial mutilation' are controversial and subject to scepticism and dispute by foreign countries and international organizations. Conflicting reports about Tibetan human rights have been produced since then. The PRC claims that Tibet has been enjoying a cultural revival since the 1950s, whereas the Dalai Lama says 'whether intentionally or unintentionally, somewhere cultural genocide is taking place'.[272][273]
Following the Chinese economic reform, businesspeople from other parts of China have made many business trips to Tibet, although most do not stay in region. The New York Times has cited this ethnic diversity in Tibet as a cause of "ethnic tensions". It has also disagreed significantly with the promotion by PRC authorities of home ownership in nomadic Tibetan societies.[274] Western politicians often level the charge that the Tibetan languages are at risk of extinction in Tibet.[275] Others, however, both inside and outside China and Tibet, claim that for a vast majority of Tibetans, who live in rural areas, the Chinese language is merely introduced as a second language in secondary school.[276]
Хозяйственные и имущественные права
The National People's Congress enacted a law in 2007 to protect private property, with the exception of land. Nevertheless, according to Der Spiegel magazine, local Chinese authorities have used brutal means to expropriate property, in a bid to profit from the construction boom.[277]
In 2001, homosexuality was removed from the official list of mental illnesses in China.[278] China recognizes neither same-sex marriage nor civil unions.[279]
According to the criminal law of the PRC, only females can be victims of rape, a man who has been raped cannot accuse the rapists (who can be men or women) of rape. However, the criminal law of the PRC's constitution in mainland China had been amended in August 2015. Thus, males can be victims of indecency, but the articles on the criminal law which are related to rape still remain unrevised, so male rape victims can only accuse the rapists of indecency.[280][281]
Права интерсексуалов
Intersex people in China suffer discrimination, lack of access to health care and coercive genital surgeries.[282][283]
Другие вопросы прав человека
Workers' rights and privacy are contentious human rights issues in China. There have been several reports of core International Labour Organization conventions being denied to workers. One such report was released by the International Labor Rights Fund in October 2006; it documented minimum wage violations, long work hours, and inappropriate actions towards workers by management.[284][citation not found] Workers cannot form their own unions in the workplace; they may only join state-sanctioned ones. The extent to which these organizations can fight for the rights of Chinese workers is disputed.[176][citation not found]
The policy toward refugees from North Korea is a recurring human rights issue. It is official policy to repatriate these refugees to North Korea, but the policy is not evenly enforced and a considerable number of them stay in the People's Republic. Though it is in contravention of international law to deport political refugees, as illegal immigrants their situation is precarious. Their rights are not always protected,[285] and some are tricked into marriage, forced to engage in cybersex or prostitution, allegedly linked to criminal networks generating an estimated annual revenue of $105,000,000 US.[286][287]
African students in China have complained about their treatment in China.
Their complaints largely ignored until 1988–9, when 'students rose up in protest against what they called "Chinese apartheid'".[288] African officials took notice of the issue, and the Organization of African Unity issued an official protest. The organization's chairman, President Moussa Traoré of Mali, went on a fact-finding mission to China.[288] A 1989 report in Guardian stated: 'these practices could threaten Peking's entire relationship with the continent.'[289]
The United Nations reports that it has had difficulty in arranging official visits to China by UN Special Rapporteurs on various human rights issues.[290]
On 29 June 2020, HRW urged the United Nation member countries to act upon the call by UN human rights experts to examine the Chinese government's human rights record.[291]
On 3 July 2020, a 13-ton shipment of beauty products made out of human hair was seized by the U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP). The shipment, originating in Xinjiang, China, was seized at the Port of New York, signalling potential human rights abuses of forced labour and imprisonment.[292]
On 9 September 2020, a global coalition of 321 civil society groups, including Amnesty International, urged United Nations to urgently create an independent international mechanism to address the Chinese government's human rights violations. In an open letter, the organizations highlighted China's rights violations worldwide, including the targeting of human rights defenders, global censorship and surveillance, and rights-free development that caused environmental degradation.[293]
On 6 October 2020, 39 United Nations member countries expressed deep concerns over China's human rights violations in Xinjiang, Hong Kong, and Tibet. The call was made by Germany, supported by Britain, Canada, the United States, many European Union member states, Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Haiti, Honduras, Palau, and the Marshall Islands.[294]
Позиция правительства
The Government of the People's Republic of China has argued that its concept of 'Asian values'[295] requires that the welfare of the collective should always be put ahead of the rights of any individual whenever conflicts between these arise. Its position is that the government has the responsibility to design, implement and enforce a 'harmonious socialist society'.[296]
The People's Republic of China emphasizes state sovereignty, which at times conflicts with the international norms or standards of human rights. However, its concept of human rights has developed radically over the years. From 1949 to the late 1970s, the CCP focused on promoting the rights of the masses: collective rights rather than individual human rights. Deng Xiaoping say that the right of a nation, or sovereignty (guoquan) is more important than human rights (renquan), and right of subsistence (shengcun quan) is more fundamental than political freedom.[297] However, from the beginning of economic reforms in 1978 to the 1989 Tiananmen incident and democratic movement, the CCP raised concerns for human rights in their domestic and international policies. In 1991, China officially accepted the idea that human rights were compatible with Chinese socialism, and in 1993 the state created the China Society for Human Rights Studies, which has represented Chinese positions on human rights in international forums, conferences, and media. China went on to sign two treaties – the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) in 1997 and 1998, respectively. The ICESCR was ratified by the National People's Congress in 2001, but as of 2016, the ICCPR has not yet been ratified.[298] As of 2013[update], the PRC had signed more than 20 international treaties on human rights.[299]
Western human rights
Those who agree with the Chinese Communist Party point towards what they call rapid deterioration in Western societies, claiming that there has been an increase in geographic, religious and racial segregation, rising crime rates, family breakdown, industrial action, vandalism, and political extremism within Western societies. The European Union and the United Nations claim to be stopping these types of human rights violations, save for a few violations committed by some Western governments (e.g. the CIA's extraordinary rendition programme). The PRC holds the opinion, though, that many alleged negatives about democratic society are a direct result of an excess of individual freedom, saying that too much freedom is dangerous.[300] The PRC holds that these actions in Western nations are all violations of human rights. They say that these should be taken into account when assessing a country's human rights record. On occasion they have criticized the United States policies, especially the human rights reports published by its State Department. They cite the opinion that the United States, as well as the United Kingdom, has also violated human rights laws, for example during the invasion of Iraq.[301]
Chinese definition
China believes that human rights should encompass what its officials have labelled as "economic standards of living and measures of health and economic prosperity".[3] It insists that as economic, cultural, historical and political situations differ substantially between countries, and for that reason international definition of human rights cannot apply to China.[citation needed]
Measures taken
In March 2003, an amendment was officially made to the Constitution of the People's Republic of China, officially stating that 'The State respects and preserves human rights.'[302] In addition, China was dropped from a list of top ten human rights violators in the annual human rights report released by the U.S. State Department in 2008, though the report indicated that there were still widespread human rights-related issues in the PRC.[303]
In 1988, the People's Republic of China began direct village elections to help maintain social and political order whilst facing rapid economic change. Elections now occur in about 650,000 villages across China, reaching 75% of the nation's 1.3 billion people, according to the Carter Center.[304] In 2008, Shenzhen, which enjoys the highest per capita GDP in mainland China, was selected for experimentation, and over 70% of the government officials on the district level are to be directly elected (as of 2008).[305] However, in keeping with Communist Party philosophy, candidates must be selected from a pre-approved list.[306]
Смотрите также
- Human rights in Hong Kong
- Human rights in Macau
- Human rights in Tibet
- Human rights in Taiwan
- 1989 Tiananmen Square protests
- Concerning the Situation in the Ideological Sphere
- Ecological migration
- Empowerment and Rights Institute
- Hong Kong Alliance in Support of Patriotic Democratic Movements of China
- Internet censorship in the People's Republic of China
- Human Rights in China (organization)
- Tangshan protest
- Dongzhou protests
- Penal system in China
- Laogai, "reform through [forced] labor"
- Re-education through labour
- List of re-education through labour camps in China
- List of prisons in the Tibet Autonomous Region
- Xinjiang re-education camps
- List of concentration and internment camps
- Beijing Municipal Prison
- Qincheng Prison
- Black jails
- Xinfang
- Open Constitution Initiative
- Yan Xiaoling - Fan Yanqiong Case
- Cultural Revolution
- Sinocentrism
- Han chauvinism
- Sinicization
- Sinicization of Tibet
- Boycotts of Chinese products may use some of the arguments in this article as their basis
- Ethnic issues in China
- Lop Nur Nuclear Weapons Test Base
- List of Chinese nuclear tests
- 1987–1989 Tibetan unrest
- 2008 Lhasa violence
- 2010 Tibetan language protest
- Drapchi Prison
- International reactions to 2008 Tibetan protests
- Protests and uprisings in Tibet since 1950
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дальнейшее чтение
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Внешние ссылки
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