Выдвижение и подтверждение в Верховный суд США

Эта статья является частью серии, посвященной
Верховный суд США
Суд
История Процедуры Выдвижение и подтверждение Демография Идеологические пристрастия судей Списки решений Здание Верховного Суда
Текущее членство
Главный судья Джон Робертс Ассоциированные судьи Кларенс Томас Стивен Брейер Самуэль Алито Соня Сотомайор Елена Каган Нил Горсуч Бретт Кавано Эми Кони Барретт Судьи в отставке Сандра Дэй О'Коннор Энтони Кеннеди Дэвид Сутер
Списки судей
Список всех судей судом по времени в офисе по месту по образованию Список главных судей Список помощников судей Списки специальностей Все номинации Неудачные номинации Судьи, работавшие в Конгрессе Захоронения судей
Судебные чиновники
Клерки Репортер решений Маршал суда Полиция Верховного Суда
Другие страны Юридический портал
v т е

Выдвижение, подтверждение и назначение судей в Верховный суд Соединенных Штатов включает несколько шагов, предусмотренных Конституцией Соединенных Штатов , которые были дополнительно усовершенствованы и развиты десятилетиями традиций. Кандидаты назначены на президенте Соединенных Штатов и должны столкнуться рядом слушаний , в которых как кандидат и другие свидетели делают заявления и ответы на вопросы перед Законодательным комитетом Сената , который может голосовать , чтобы отправить заявку в полном Сенат Соединенных Штатов . ^[1] Утверждение Сенатом позволяет президенту официально назначать кандидата в суд. ^[1]Конституция не устанавливает каких-либо требований для работы в качестве судьи, поэтому президент может назначить любое лицо для работы в суде.

Правила закрытия Сената исторически требовали, чтобы две трети голосов «за» выдвинули кандидатуры на голосование; в 1975 году это было заменено на три пятых подавляющего большинства . В ноябре 2013 года тогдашнее демократическое большинство в Сенате устранило пиратов для кандидатов от исполнительной власти и судей, за исключением кандидатов в Верховный суд, сославшись на так называемый ядерный вариант . В апреле 2017 года республиканское большинство в сенате применило ядерный вариант и к кандидатурам в Верховный суд ^[2], что позволило выдвинуть кандидатуру Трампа Нила Горсача на голосование. ^[3]

Номинация [ править ]

Статья II, раздел 2, пункт 2 Конституции Соединенных Штатов , известная как пункт о назначениях , уполномочивает президента выдвигать и, с одобрения ( совета и согласия ) Сената Соединенных Штатов , назначать государственных должностных лиц , в том числе судей Верховный суд . Это положение является одним из примеров системы сдержек и противовесов, заложенной в Конституции. Президент наделен полномочиями выдвигать и назначать, в то время как Сенат обладает полномочиями отклонять или подтверждать кандидатов до их назначения. ^[4]

После избрания нового президента новые сотрудники Белого дома готовят профили возможных кандидатов в Верховный суд, учитывая не только судей, но также политиков и других лиц, которых они считают подходящими для этой роли. Помимо рассмотрения национальных деятелей, взгляды которых хорошо известны, они рассматривают и других, менее известных. Они просматривают опубликованные постановления, статьи, выступления и другие справочные материалы, чтобы получить представление о ценностях и взглядах кандидатов на конституционные вопросы. При рассмотрении также учитываются возраст, здоровье, раса, пол, образование и вероятность подтверждения. После открытия вакансии в Верховном суде президент обсуждает кандидатов с советниками. Сенаторы также звонят президенту с предложениями, хотя он не обязан прислушиваться к их советам, кого выдвигать.Сенат также не имеет полномочий устанавливать квалификацию или иным образом ограничивать выбор президента.^[4]

После того, как первый выбор сделан, президент связывается с кандидатом и вызывает его в суд высшей инстанции. Сотрудники отправляют кандидату форму проверки. Они посещают кандидата, чтобы просмотреть налоговые отчеты и платежи по дому. ФБР проводит официальную проверку биографических данных. Кандидаты, с которыми президент никогда не встречался, проходят собеседование с представителями Белого дома перед отправкой в ​​Белый дом для личного собеседования с президентом. После принятия окончательного решения президент вызывает кандидата, которому предлагается подготовить заявление для выступления перед национальной прессой для официального объявления президента. Затем кандидат встречается с сенаторами и готовится к слушаниям по утверждению.

Большинство президентов назначают людей, которые в целом разделяют их идеологические взгляды. ^[5] Однако во многих случаях решения судьи могут противоречить ожиданиям назначающего президента. Известным примером был председатель Верховного суда граф Уоррен ; Президент Дуайт Д. Эйзенхауэр ожидал, что он будет консервативным судьей, но его решения, возможно, являются одними из самых либеральных в истории Суда. Позже Эйзенхауэр назвал это назначение «самой большой глупой ошибкой, которую я когда-либо делал». ^[6] Другим судьей, решения которого противоречили его идеологии, был Дэвид Сутер , которого в 1990 году выдвинул в Верховный суд президент Джордж Буш-старший.. Многие ученые мужи и политики в то время ожидали, что Соутер будет консерватором; однако после того, как он стал судьей, его взгляды в основном были на либеральной стороне политического спектра.

Подтверждение [ править ]

In modern times, the confirmation process has attracted considerable public attention. The Senate Judiciary Committee plays a key role in that process, as each Supreme Court nomination comes before it for review. The committee conducts hearings, examining the background of the nominee, and questioning him or her about their views on a variety of cases and their general judicial philosophy.^[7] At the close of confirmation hearings, the committee votes on whether the nomination should go to the full Senate with a positive, negative or neutral report.^[8]

Практика комитета по личному собеседованию кандидатов появилась сравнительно недавно, начиная с Харлана Фиске Стоуна в 1925 году. Некоторые западные сенаторы были обеспокоены его связями с Уолл-стрит и выразили свое несогласие с выдвижением Стоуна. Стоун предложил, что в то время было новшеством, - предстать перед Судебным комитетом для ответа на вопросы; его показания помогли обеспечить голосование за подтверждение при очень небольшом противодействии. Вторым кандидатом, который предстал перед Судебным комитетом, был Феликс Франкфуртер , который направил (по запросу комитета) только то, что он считал клеветническими обвинениями против него. ^[9]Современная практика проведения комитетом допросов кандидатов на предмет их судебных взглядов началась с выдвижения в 1955 году Джона Маршалла Харлана II ; назначение было выдвинуто вскоре после того, как Верховный суд вынес свое знаменательное решение по делу Браун против Совета по образованию , и несколько южных сенаторов попытались заблокировать подтверждение Харлана, отсюда и решение о даче показаний. ^{[1] [7]}

Как только комитет отчитывается о выдвижении, он выносится на окончательное рассмотрение всего Сената. Для утверждения или отклонения кандидатуры требуется простое большинство голосов. Исторически такие отказы относительно редки. Из 37 неудачных выдвижений в Верховный суд с 1789 года только 11 кандидатов были отклонены поименным голосованием Сената . ^[10] Последний раз отклонение кандидата голосами всего Сената произошло в октябре 1987 года , когда выдвижение Роберта Борка в качестве помощника судьи было отклонено 42–58 голосами. ^{[9] [11]}

Prior to 2017, a successful filibuster threat could add the requirement of a supermajority of 60 needed in favor of cloture, which would allow debate to end and force a final vote on confirmation. Under the old rule, a nominee could be filibustered once debate on the nomination had begun in the full Senate. A filibuster indefinitely prolongs the debate, preventing a final vote on the nominee. President Lyndon Johnson's 1968 nomination of incumbent Associate Justice Abe Fortas to succeed Earl Warren as chief justice, during the final year of his presidency, was subject to a successful filibuster which forced the president to withdraw the nomination.^[A] The effort included both Republican and Democratic senators concerned about Fortas' business ethics. Though prevented from becoming chief justice, Fortas remained on the Court as an associate justice.^[12] More recently, an effort to filibuster President Donald Trump's nomination of Neil Gorsuch to the seat left vacant by Antonin Scalia's death was effective, if not successful. Unlike the Fortas filibuster, however, only Democratic Senators voted against cloture on the Gorsuch nomination, citing his perceived conservative judicial philosophy, and the Republican leadership's prior refusal to take up President Barack Obama's nomination of Merrick Garland to fill the vacancy.^[13][14] The Republican majority responded by changing the rules to allow for filibusters of Supreme Court nominations to be broken with only 51 votes rather than 60. The precedent for this action had been set in November 2013, when the Democrats, who then held the majority, changed the rules, lowering the threshold for advancing nominations to lower court and executive branch positions from 60 votes to a simple majority, but explicitly excluded Supreme Court nominations from the change.^[15][16]

There are others ways that a nomination can be derailed prior to the final vote in the Senate. A president has the prerogative to withdraw a nomination at any point during the process, typically doing so if it becomes clear that the Senate will reject the nominee. This occurred most recently with the nomination of Harriet Miers in 2006 before Committee hearings had begun, citing concerns about Senate requests during her confirmation process for access to internal Executive Branch documents resulting from her position as White House Counsel. In 1987, President Ronald Reagan withdrew the nomination of Douglas H. Ginsburg because of news reports containing marijuana use allegations.

Similarly, the Senate has the prerogative to table a nomination "indefinitely", effectively eliminating any prospect of the person's confirmation. Senators have voted to postpone a nomination on only three occasions (Crittenden, Taney, and King- all in the 19th century). Even so, the Senate can achieve the same outcome without taking vote to postpone.^[17] It can simply choose to take no action on a nomination, which expires at the end of the session. For example, President Dwight Eisenhower's first nomination of John Marshall Harlan II in November 1954 was not acted on by the Senate; Eisenhower re-nominated Harlan in January 1955, and Harlan was confirmed two months later. Most recently, the Senate refused to consider President Barack Obama's March 2016 nomination of Merrick Garland; the nomination expired in January 2017, and the vacancy was later filled by President Donald Trump's appointment of Neil Gorsuch.^[18]

Before 1981 the approval process of Justices was usually rapid. From the Truman through Nixon administrations, Justices were typically approved within one month. From the Reagan administration to the present, however, the process has taken much longer. According to the Congressional Research Service, the average number of days from nomination to final Senate vote since 1975 is 67 days (2.2 months), while the median is 71 days (or 2.3 months).^[19][20] Some believe this is because Congress sees Justices as playing a more political role than in the past.^[21] The perceived politicization of the process has drawn criticism. For example, columnist George F. Will termed the defeat of Robert Bork's nomination "unjust" and, more generally, that the nomination process does "not delve deeply into the nominee's jurisprudential thinking."^[22] Supreme Court nominations have aroused much media speculation about whether the judge leans to the left, middle, or right.^[23] One indication of the politicized selection process is how much time each nominee spends being questioned under the glare of media coverage; before 1925, nominees were never questioned;^[24] since 1955, every nominee has been required to appear before the Senate Judiciary Committee and answer questions. Also, the hours spent being grilled have lengthened from single digits before 1980 to double digits today.^[25]

Following is a table of the approximate number of hours that media sources estimate were spent on the questioning of Supreme Court nominees since 1925:

Once the Senate confirms the nomination by an affirmative vote, the Secretary of the Senate attests to a resolution of confirmation and transmits it to the president, who then signs a commission officially appointing the nominee to the Court.^[28] The date of commission determines a justice's seniority.^[29] Afterward, a ceremony is held at which the appointee must take the constitutional oath, which is used for every federal and state officeholder below the president, and the judicial oath used for federal judges before entering into the execution of their office.^[30]

It is at this point that a person has taken "the necessary steps toward becoming a member of the Court." Through October 2018, 126 nominees have been confirmed and appointed to the Court. Of these, seven either declined their commission or (in one instance) died before assuming office, and are not considered to have served as a Supreme Court justice.^[31]

Nominations in the last year of a presidency[edit]

Political scientist Michael Nelson wrote in 2012 that the Senate is less likely to approve Supreme Court nominations that are submitted during the final year of a presidency.^[32] Although Supreme Court vacancies rarely arise during the last year of a presidency,^[33][34][35] this type of situation received considerable public attention in 2016 following the death of Antonin Scalia,^[36][37] and again in 2020 upon the death of Ruth Bader Ginsburg.

Law professors Jason Mazzone and Robin Kar published a study in 2016 in which they wrote that a detailed analysis of Senate history does not support a deliberate inter-presidential transfer of nominating power from one president to the next. In their view, an actual vacancy ought to be viewed differently from a vacancy that is announced in advance but never actually vacated ("NV"); an elected president who makes a nomination ought to be viewed differently from a president-by-succession ("S"); and, a nomination made post-election-of-successor ("PE") should be distinguished from a nomination made earlier.^[38][39]

Following is a list of those people who were nominated to the Supreme Court during the last year of a president's last term.^[C] This list does not include presidents who never had an opportunity to serve what would have been their last year, due to resignation or death.

Recess appointments[edit]

Article II, Section 2 of the U.S. Constitution provides that:

The President shall have Power to fill up all Vacancies that may happen during the Recess of the Senate, by granting Commissions which shall expire at the End of their next Session.

Thus, when the Senate is in recess, the President may make a temporary appointment to any office requiring Senate approval, including filling vacancies on the Supreme Court, without the Senate's advice and consent. Such a recess appointee to the Supreme Court holds office only until the end of the next Senate session (always less than two years). To continue to serve thereafter and be compensated for his or her service, the nominee must be formally nominated by the president and confirmed by the Senate. Of the 12 justices who have received recess appointments (two as chief justice and ten as associate justice) only Chief Justice John Rutledge was not subsequently confirmed for a regular appointment. No president since Dwight Eisenhower has made a recess appointment to the Supreme Court and the practice has become highly controversial even when applied to lower federal courts. During the 110th Congress, the Democratic leadership of the Senate specifically blocked President George W. Bush, a Republican, from making any recess appointments with the use of pro forma sessions.

In 1960 the Senate passed a resolution stating that it was the sense of the Senate that recess appointments to the Supreme Court should not be made except under unusual circumstances.^[44] Being a resolution, it has no legally binding effect, but was intended as an expression of the position of the Senate and as a guide to executive actions. The resolution passed by a vote of 48 to 37, mainly along party lines.^[44]

Following is a list of recess appointments that have been made to the Supreme Court:

Tenure and vacancies[edit]

The ability of a president to appoint new justices depends on the occurrence of a vacancy on the Court. In practice, such vacancies normally occur as the result of an incumbent justices' death, resignation, or retirement.

The Constitution provides that justices "shall hold their offices during good behavior", which is understood to mean that confirmed justices may serve for the remainder of their lives, until death. Justices may also resign or retire from their offices, and any of these circumstances results in a vacancy which must be filled. Because justices have indefinite tenure, the timing of future vacancies is unpredictable. Sometimes vacancies arise in quick succession: in September 1971, associate justices Hugo Black and John Marshall Harlan II both retired, producing two vacancies which were filled in January 1972 by Lewis Powell and William Rehnquist, respectively. On the other hand, sometimes several years pass between consecutive vacancies. In August 1994, Harry Blackmun's retirement created a vacancy which was filled by Stephen Breyer. No further vacancy would occur on the Court until September 2005 when Rehnquist, since promoted to chief justice, died. This vacancy was filled by current chief justice John Roberts.

Less commonly, though with historical precedent, vacancies may occur as a result of Congress changing the size of the Court. Because the Constitution does not specify the Court's size, it was left to Congress to determine the matter through law, and a small number of statutes have legally changed the size of the Court throughout its history. Changing the Court's size can have the effect of changing the seats on the Court; a newly created seat brings with it a vacancy which must be filled by an initial officeholder. The original Judiciary Act of 1789 called for six justices, vacancies promptly filled by the appointments of George Washington, resulting in the Court's first complete composition. An 1801 act called for the Court to be reduced to five justices upon its next vacancy, but was swiftly obviated by an 1802 act which restored the Court's legal size to six before any such vacancy occurred. In 1807, the Court's size was increased to seven, creating one new vacancy filled by Thomas Todd. Again in 1837, the Court's size was increased to nine, the two new vacancies being filled by John Catron and John McKinley. An 1863 act increased the Court's size to ten, the vacancy being filled by Stephen Johnson Field. Although an 1866 act provided that the Court's size would be thinned from ten to seven through attrition (and which did result in the elimination of two seats while in effect), a final 1869 act^[45] interrupted the plan set forth in 1866: the Court's size shall be nine, the legally prescribed full strength which has stood ever since. Consequently, one final seat was created and filled by Joseph Bradley.

President Franklin D. Roosevelt attempted to expand the Court in 1937, seeking to appoint an additional justice for each incumbent justice who reached the age of 70 years and 6 months and refused retirement; under Roosevelt's proposal, such appointments would continue until the Court reached a maximum size of 15 justices. Ostensibly, the proposal was made to ease the burdens of the docket on the elderly justices, but Roosevelt's actual purpose was to pack the Court with justices who would support New Deal policies and legislation.^[46] This plan, usually called the "Court-packing Plan", failed in Congress and proved a political disaster for Roosevelt.^[47] The balance of the Court shifted with the retirement of Willis Van Devanter and the confirmation of Hugo Black in August 1937. By the end of 1941, Roosevelt had appointed seven Supreme Court justices and elevated Harlan Fiske Stone to chief justice.^[48]

It is also possible that a vacancy could arise if a justice were removed from office following impeachment. Article I, Section 2, Clause 5 of the Constitution grants to the House of Representatives "the sole power of impeachment", and Article I, Section 3, Clause 6 grants to the Senate "the sole Power to try all Impeachments".^[49][50] The only justice to ever be impeached was Samuel Chase, in 1804; he was found not guilty by the Senate the following year, and remained in office until his death in 1811. Less substantial efforts towards impeachment of a sitting justice, not reaching a House vote, have occurred more recently: William O. Douglas was twice the subject of hearings, first in 1953 and again in 1970. No mechanism presently exists for removing a justice who is permanently incapacitated by illness or injury, both unable to resign and unable to resume service.^[51]

Despite the unpredictability of vacancies, most presidents have successfully appointed at least one justice. The four exceptions are William Henry Harrison, Zachary Taylor, Andrew Johnson, and Jimmy Carter. Harrison died a month after taking office, though his successor John Tyler made an appointment during that presidential term. Taylor likewise died early in his term, although his successor Millard Fillmore also made a Supreme Court nomination before the end of that term. Johnson was denied the opportunity to appoint a justice by the 1866 act which reduced the Court's size, mentioned above.

See also[edit]

• List of positions filled by presidential appointment with Senate confirmation

Notes[edit]

References[edit]