Закон о конкуренции - это закон, который поощряет или стремится поддерживать рыночную конкуренцию путем регулирования антиконкурентного поведения компаний. [1] [2] Закон о конкуренции реализуется посредством государственного и частного правоприменения. [3] Он также известен как анти - монопольное законодательство в Китае [1] и России. В предыдущие годы он был известен как закон о торговой практике в Соединенном Королевстве и Австралии. В Европейском союзе это называется антимонопольным [4] и антимонопольным законодательством . [5] [6]
История закона о конкуренции восходит к Римской империи . Деловая практика рыночных торговцев, гильдий и правительств всегда подвергалась тщательной проверке, а иногда и суровым санкциям. С 20 века законодательство о конкуренции стало глобальным. [7] Двумя крупнейшими и наиболее влиятельными системами регулирования конкуренции являются антимонопольное законодательство США и законодательство о конкуренции Европейского союза . Национальные и региональные органы по вопросам конкуренции во всем мире сформировали международные сети поддержки и правоприменения.
Современное законодательство о конкуренции исторически развивалось на национальном уровне для поощрения и поддержания справедливой конкуренции на рынках, главным образом в пределах территориальных границ национальных государств . Национальный закон о конкуренции обычно не распространяется на деятельность за пределами территориальных границ, если она не оказывает значительного воздействия на уровне национального государства. [2] Страны могут разрешить экстерриториальную юрисдикцию в делах о конкуренции на основе так называемой «доктрины последствий». [2] [8] Защита международной конкуренции регулируется международными соглашениями о конкуренции. В 1945 году во время переговоров, предшествовавших принятию Генерального соглашения по тарифам и торговле (ГАТТ) в 1947 году, в Уставе Международной торговой организации были предложены ограниченные международные обязательства по конкуренции . Эти обязательства не были включены в ГАТТ, но в 1994 году, после завершения Уругвайского раунда многосторонних переговоров ГАТТ, была создана Всемирная торговая организация (ВТО). Соглашение об учреждении ВТО включала ряд ограниченных положений по различным вопросам конкуренции трансграничных на конкретном секторе основе. [9]
Принцип
Закон о конкуренции, или антимонопольное законодательство, состоит из трех основных элементов:
- запрещение соглашений или действий, ограничивающих свободную торговлю и конкуренцию между предприятиями. Это включает, в частности, подавление свободной торговли, вызванное картелями .
- запрещение злоупотреблений со стороны фирмы, доминирующей на рынке, или антиконкурентных практик, которые, как правило, приводят к такому доминирующему положению. Практика, контролируемая таким образом, может включать хищническое ценообразование , связывание , взвинчивание цен и отказ от сделки .
- курирование слияний и поглощений крупных корпораций, в том числе совместных предприятий . Сделки, которые считаются угрожающими конкурентному процессу, могут быть полностью запрещены или одобрены с учетом «средств правовой защиты», таких как обязательство отделить часть объединенного бизнеса или предложить лицензии или доступ к объектам, чтобы позволить другим предприятиям продолжать конкурировать.
Сущность и практика законодательства о конкуренции варьируются от юрисдикции к юрисдикции. Защита интересов потребителей ( благосостояние потребителей ) и обеспечение предпринимателям возможности конкурировать в рыночной экономике часто рассматриваются как важные цели. Закон о конкуренции тесно связан с законом о дерегулировании доступа к рынкам, государственной помощи и субсидиях, приватизации государственных активов и учреждении независимых отраслевых регуляторов, среди других ориентированных на рынок политик со стороны предложения. В последние десятилетия закон о конкуренции рассматривался как способ предоставления более качественных государственных услуг . [10] Роберт Борк утверждал, что законы о конкуренции могут иметь неблагоприятные последствия, если они снижают конкуренцию, защищая неэффективных конкурентов, и когда затраты на правовое вмешательство превышают выгоды для потребителей. [11]
История
Римское законодательство
Ранний пример был принят во время Римской республики около 50 г. до н.э. [12] Чтобы защитить торговлю зерном, были наложены крупные штрафы на всех, кто прямо, намеренно и коварно останавливает суда снабжения. [13] При Диоклетиане в 301 году нашей эры указом предусматривалась смертная казнь для любого, кто нарушал тарифную систему, например, скупая, утаивая или создавая нехватку товаров повседневного спроса. [13] В соответствии с конституцией Зенона 483 г. н.э., больше законов было принято во флорентийских муниципальных законах 1322 и 1325 гг. [14] Это предусматривало конфискацию собственности и изгнание за любое торговое объединение или совместные действия частных или частных монополий. предоставлено Императором. Зенон аннулировал все ранее предоставленные исключительные права. [15] Впоследствии Юстиниан I ввел закон о выплате должностным лицам за управление государственными монополиями. [15]
Средний возраст
Законодательство о контроле над монополиями и ограничительной практикой действовало в Англии задолго до норманнского завоевания . [15] В Книге Судного дня записано, что « лесная сталь » (то есть предотвращение, практика скупки товаров до того, как они попадут на рынок, а затем завышение цен) была одной из трех конфискований, которые король Эдуард Исповедник мог осуществить через Англию. [16] Но забота о справедливых ценах также привела к попыткам прямого регулирования рынка. При Генрихе III в 1266 г. [17] был принят закон, устанавливающий цены на хлеб и эль в соответствии с ценами на зерно, установленными ассизами . Штрафы за нарушение включали в себя торговлю , позорный позор и тамбрель . [18] Статут XIV века назвал лесников «угнетателями бедных и общества в целом и врагами всей страны». [19] В соответствии король Эдуард III Положение о работниках в 1349 [20] фиксированной заработной платы ремесленников и рабочих и постановили , что продукты питания должны продаваться по разумным ценам. В дополнение к существующим штрафам в законе говорилось, что продавцы, завышающие цену, должны выплатить потерпевшей стороне двойную сумму, которую он получил, - идея, которая была воспроизведена в штрафных тройных убытках в соответствии с антимонопольным законодательством США . Также при Эдуарде III следующее законодательное положение объявляло торговую комбинацию вне закона. [21]
... мы постановили и установили, что ни один торговец или иное лицо не должно совершать Конфедерацию, Заговор, Монету, Воображение, Ропот или Злое Устройство в любой точке, которая может привести к Импичменту, Нарушению, Разрушению или Разложению упомянутых Скрепок, или всего, что к ним относится или может относиться.
В континентальной Европе принципы конкуренции разработаны в lex mercatoria . Примеры принципов конкурентного законодательства , закрепляющих включают в себя Constitutiones Юрис METALLICI по Вацлава II в Чехии между 1283 и 1305, осуждая сочетание руды трейдеров растущих цен; Муниципальные статуты Флоренции 1322 и 1325 гг. следовали законам Зенона против государственных монополий; а при императоре Карле V в Священной Римской империи был принят закон, «предотвращающий убытки в результате монополий и ненадлежащих контрактов, которые многие купцы и ремесленники заключали в Нидерландах». В 1553 году король Англии Генрих VIII вновь ввел тарифы на продукты питания, призванные стабилизировать цены, несмотря на колебания поставок из-за границы. Законодательство гласит, что, тогда как
очень трудно и трудно устанавливать определенные цены на такие вещи ... [это необходимо, потому что] цены на такие продукты питания многократно повышаются и повышаются из-за жадной жадности и аппетитов владельцев таких продуктов, в связи с их распространением. и повторять то же самое, более чем на каком-либо разумном или справедливом основании или причине, к огромному ущербу и обеднению подданных Короля. [22]
Примерно в это время развивались организации, представляющие различных торговцев и ремесленников, известные как гильдии , и пользовались многими уступками и исключениями из законов против монополий. Предоставляемые привилегии не отменялись до принятия Закона о муниципальных корпорациях 1835 года.
Раннее законодательство о конкуренции в Европе
Английское общее право ограничения торговли является прямым предшественником современного закона о конкуренции, позже разработанного в США. [23] Он основан на запрещении соглашений, противоречащих государственной политике, если только разумность соглашения не может быть доказана. Он фактически запрещал соглашения, направленные на ограничение чужой торговли. 1414 Dyer's - первое известное ограничительное торговое соглашение, которое рассматривается в соответствии с английским общим правом. Красильщик дал обязательство не заниматься своей торговлей в том же городе, что и истец, в течение шести месяцев, но истец ничего не обещал взамен. Услышав попытку истца применить это ограничение, Халл J воскликнул: «per Dieu, если бы истец был здесь, он должен был отправиться в тюрьму до тех пор, пока он не заплатит штраф королю». Суд отказал в взыскании залога за нарушение соглашения красильщиком, поскольку соглашение было признано ограничением торговли. [24] Английские суды впоследствии разрешили ряд дел, которые постепенно развили прецедентное право, связанное с конкуренцией, которое в конечном итоге было преобразовано в статутное право . [25]
Европа примерно в 16 веке быстро менялась. Новый мир только что открыли, внешняя торговля и разграбление лил богатства через международную экономику и отношения между бизнесменами были смещаются. В 1561 году в Англии была введена система лицензий промышленных монополий, аналогичная современным патентам . Но во время правления королевы Елизаветы I система, по общему мнению, подверглась многочисленным злоупотреблениям и использовалась только для сохранения привилегий, не поощряя ничего нового в области инноваций или производства. [26] В ответ английские суды разработали прецедентное право по ограничительной деловой практике. Устав после единогласного решения в Darcy v. Allein 1602, также известный как случай Монополий , [27] из скамьи короля объявить недействительное исключительное право , что королева Елизавета I , предоставившая Дарси для импорта игральных карт в Англию. [25] Дарси, служащий королевского двора, потребовал возмещения ущерба за нарушение этого права ответчиком. Суд признал грант недействительным и что тремя характеристиками монополии были (1) рост цен, (2) снижение качества, (3) тенденция к бездействию и разорению ремесленников. Это положило конец монополии выданных до король Джеймс I начал предоставлять их снова. В 1623 году парламент принял Статут о монополиях , который по большей части исключал из запрета патентные права, а также гильдии. От короля Карла I через гражданскую войну до короля Карла II продолжались монополии, особенно полезные для увеличения доходов. [28] Затем в 1684 году в деле Ост-Индская компания против Сэндиса было решено, что исключительные права на торговлю только за пределами страны являются законными на том основании, что только крупные и влиятельные компании могут торговать в условиях, преобладающих за рубежом. [29]
Развитие ранних законов о конкуренции в Англии и Европе продвигалось с распространением таких работ, как «Богатство народов » Адама Смита , который первым сформулировал концепцию рыночной экономики . В то же время индустриализация заменила отдельного ремесленника или группу ремесленников на оплачиваемых рабочих и машинное производство. Коммерческий успех все больше зависит от максимального увеличения производства при минимальных затратах. Таким образом, размер компании становился все более важным, и ряд европейских стран отреагировали на это принятием законов, регулирующих деятельность крупных компаний, ограничивающих торговлю. После Французской революции 1789 года закон от 14–17 июня 1791 года объявил соглашения между представителями одной и той же профессии, которые устанавливали цену отрасли или труда, недействительными, неконституционными и враждебными свободе. Точно так же австрийский Уголовный кодекс 1852 года установил, что «соглашения ... о повышении цен на товар ... в ущерб обществу должны наказываться как проступки». В 1870 году Австрия приняла закон об отмене штрафов, хотя такие соглашения оставались недействительными. Однако в законодательстве Германии четко закреплены соглашения между фирмами о повышении цен. На протяжении XVIII и XIX веков идеи о том, что доминирующие частные компании или легальные монополии могут чрезмерно ограничивать торговлю, получили дальнейшее развитие в Европе. Однако, как и в конце 19 века, в Европе распространилась депрессия, известная как Паника 1873 года , идеи конкуренции потеряли популярность, и возникло ощущение, что компании должны сотрудничать, создавая картели, чтобы противостоять огромному давлению на цены и прибыль. . [30]
Современное конкурентное право
В то время как развитие законодательства о конкуренции в Европе застопорилось в конце 19 века, в 1889 году Канада приняла то, что считается первым законом о конкуренции современности. Закон о предупреждении и пресечении комбинациям в сдерживании торговле был принят один год до того , как Соединенные Штаты приняли самое известное юридическое положение о конкуренции закона, закон Шермана в 1890. Он был назван в честь сенатора Джона Шермана , который утверждал , что закон «не объявляет новый принцип права, но применяет старые и общепризнанные принципы общего права». [31]
Антимонопольное законодательство США
Закон Шермана 1890 г. попытался объявить вне закона ограничение конкуренции со стороны крупных компаний, которые сотрудничали с конкурентами для фиксации объемов производства, цен и рыночных долей, сначала через пулы, а затем через трасты . Трасты впервые появились на железных дорогах США, где потребность в капитале для строительства железных дорог не позволяла оказывать конкурентоспособные услуги на тогда еще малозаселенных территориях. Это доверие позволило железным дорогам различать ставки и услуги, предоставляемые потребителям и предприятиям, а также уничтожать потенциальных конкурентов. В разных отраслях могут доминировать разные трасты. Standard Oil Company траст в 1880 году контролировала несколько рынков, в том числе на рынке в топливной нефти , свинца и виски . [31] Огромное количество граждан стало достаточно осведомлено и публично обеспокоено тем, как трасты негативно повлияли на них, что Закон стал приоритетом для обеих основных сторон. Основная задача этого закона заключается в том, чтобы сами конкурентные рынки обеспечивали основное регулирование цен, объемов производства, интересов и прибыли. Вместо этого Закон объявил вне закона антиконкурентную практику, кодифицируя общеправовые ограничения торговой доктрины. [32] Профессор Рудольф Периц утверждал, что закон о конкуренции в Соединенных Штатах развился вокруг двух иногда противоречащих друг другу концепций конкуренции: во-первых, концепции личной свободы, свободной от вмешательства государства, и, во-вторых, справедливой конкурентной среды, свободной от чрезмерной экономической мощи . С момента принятия Закона Шермана применение закона о конкуренции основывалось на различных экономических теориях, принятых правительством. [33]
Section 1 of the Sherman Act declared illegal "every contract, in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations." Section 2 prohibits monopolies, or attempts and conspiracies to monopolize. Following the enactment in 1890 US court applies these principles to business and markets. Courts applied the Act without consistent economic analysis until 1914, when it was complemented by the Clayton Act which specifically prohibited exclusive dealing agreements, particularly tying agreements and interlocking directorates, and mergers achieved by purchasing stock. From 1915 onwards the rule of reason analysis was frequently applied by courts to competition cases. However, the period was characterized by the lack of competition law enforcement. From 1936 to 1972 courts' application of antitrust law was dominated by the structure-conduct-performance paradigm of the Harvard School. From 1973 to 1991, the enforcement of antitrust law was based on efficiency explanations as the Chicago School became dominant, and through legal writings such as Judge Robert Bork's book The Antitrust Paradox. Since 1992 game theory has frequently been used in antitrust cases.[34]
With the Hart–Scott–Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, mergers and acquisitions came into additional scrutiny from U.S. regulators. Under the act, parties must make a per-merger notification to the U.S. Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission prior to the completion of a transaction. As of February 2nd, 2021, the FTC reduced the Hart-Scott-Rodino reporting threshold to $92 million in combined assets for the transaction.[35]
European Union law
Competition law gained new recognition in Europe in the inter-war years, with Germany enacting its first anti-cartel law in 1923 and Sweden and Norway adopting similar laws in 1925 and 1926 respectively. However, with the Great Depression of 1929 competition law disappeared from Europe and was revived following the Second World War when the United Kingdom and Germany, following pressure from the United States, became the first European countries to adopt fully fledged competition laws. At a regional level EU competition law has its origins in the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) agreement between France, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg and Germany in 1951 following the Second World War. The agreement aimed to prevent Germany from re-establishing dominance in the production of coal and steel as it was felt that this dominance had contributed to the outbreak of the war. Article 65 of the agreement banned cartels and article 66 made provisions for concentrations, or mergers, and the abuse of a dominant position by companies.[36] This was the first time that competition law principles were included in a plurilateral regional agreement and established the trans-European model of competition law. In 1957 competition rules were included in the Treaty of Rome, also known as the EC Treaty, which established the European Economic Community (EEC). The Treaty of Rome established the enactment of competition law as one of the main aims of the EEC through the "institution of a system ensuring that competition in the common market is not distorted". The two central provisions on EU competition law on companies were established in article 85, which prohibited anti-competitive agreements, subject to some exemptions, and article 86 prohibiting the abuse of dominant position. The treaty also established principles on competition law for member states, with article 90 covering public undertakings, and article 92 making provisions on state aid. Regulations on mergers were not included as member states could not establish consensus on the issue at the time.[37]
Today, the Treaty of Lisbon prohibits anti-competitive agreements in Article 101(1), including price fixing. According to Article 101(2) any such agreements are automatically void. Article 101(3) establishes exemptions, if the collusion is for distributional or technological innovation, gives consumers a "fair share" of the benefit and does not include unreasonable restraints that risk eliminating competition anywhere (or compliant with the general principle of European Union law of proportionality). Article 102 prohibits the abuse of dominant position,[38] such as price discrimination and exclusive dealing. Article 102 allows the European Council regulations to govern mergers between firms (the current regulation is the Regulation 139/2004/EC).[39] The general test is whether a concentration (i.e. merger or acquisition) with a community dimension (i.e. affects a number of EU member states) might significantly impede effective competition. Articles 106 and 107 provide that member state's right to deliver public services may not be obstructed, but that otherwise public enterprises must adhere to the same competition principles as companies. Article 107 lays down a general rule that the state may not aid or subsidize private parties in distortion of free competition and provides exemptions for charities, regional development objectives and in the event of a natural disaster.[citation needed]
Leading ECJ cases on competition law include Consten & Grundig v Commission and United Brands v Commission.
India
India responded positively by opening up its economy by removing controls during the Economic liberalisation. In quest of increasing the efficiency of the nation's economy, the Government of India acknowledged the Liberalization Privatization Globalization era. As a result, Indian market faces competition from within and outside the country.[40] This led to the need of a strong legislation to dispense justice in commercial matters and the Competition Act, 2002 was passed. The history of competition law in India dates back to the 1960s when the first competition law, namely the Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Act (MRTP) was enacted in 1969. But after the economic reforms in 1991, this legislation was found to be obsolete in many aspects and as a result, a new competition law in the form of the Competition Act, 2002 was enacted in 2003. The Competition Commission of India, is the quasi judicial body established for enforcing provisions of the Competition Act.[41]
International expansion
By 2008 111 countries had enacted competition laws, which is more than 50 percent of countries with a population exceeding 80,000 people. 81 of the 111 countries had adopted their competition laws in the past 20 years, signaling the spread of competition law following the collapse of the Soviet Union and the expansion of the European Union.[42] Currently competition authorities of many states closely co-operate, on everyday basis, with foreign counterparts in their enforcement efforts, also in such key area as information / evidence sharing.[43]
In many of Asia's developing countries, including India, Competition law is considered a tool to stimulate economic growth. In Korea and Japan, the competition law prevents certain forms of conglomerates. In addition, competition law has promoted fairness in China and Indonesia as well as international integration in Vietnam.[1] Hong Kong's Competition Ordinance came into force in the year 2015.[44]
ASEAN member states
As part of the creation of the ASEAN Economic Community, the member states of the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) pledged to enact competition laws and policies by the end of 2015.[45] Today, all ten member states have general competition legislation in place. While there remains differences between regimes (for example, over merger control notification rules, or leniency policies for whistle-blowers),[46] and it is unlikely that there will be a supranational competition authority for ASEAN (akin to the European Union),[47] there is a clear trend towards increase in infringement investigations or decisions on cartel enforcement.[48]
Правоприменение
At a national level competition law is enforced through competition authorities, as well as private enforcement. The United States Supreme Court explained:[49]
Every violation of the antitrust laws is a blow to the free-enterprise system envisaged by Congress. This system depends on strong competition for its health and vigor, and strong competition depends, in turn, on compliance with antitrust legislation. In enacting these laws, Congress had many means at its disposal to penalize violators. It could have, for example, required violators to compensate federal, state, and local governments for the estimated damage to their respective economies caused by the violations. But, this remedy was not selected. Instead, Congress chose to permit all persons to sue to recover three times their actual damages every time they were injured in their business or property by an antitrust violation.
In the European Union, the Modernisation Regulation 1/2003[50] means that the European Commission is no longer the only body capable of public enforcement of European Union competition law. This was done to facilitate quicker resolution of competition-related inquiries. In 2005 the Commission issued a Green Paper on Damages actions for the breach of the EC antitrust rules,[51] which suggested ways of making private damages claims against cartels easier.[52]
Some EU Member States enforce their competition laws with criminal sanctions. As analysed by Professor Whelan, these types of sanctions engender a number of significant theoretical, legal and practical challenges.[53]
Antitrust administration and legislation can be seen as a balance between:
- guidelines which are clear and specific to the courts, regulators and business but leave little room for discretion that prevents the application of laws from resulting in unintended consequences.
- guidelines which are broad, hence allowing administrators to sway between improving economic outcomes versus succumbing to political policies to redistribute wealth.[54]
Chapter 5 of the post war Havana Charter contained an Antitrust code[55] but this was never incorporated into the WTO's forerunner, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1947. Office of Fair Trading Director and Professor Richard Whish wrote sceptically that it "seems unlikely at the current stage of its development that the WTO will metamorphose into a global competition authority".[56] Despite that, at the ongoing Doha round of trade talks for the World Trade Organization, discussion includes the prospect of competition law enforcement moving up to a global level. While it is incapable of enforcement itself, the newly established International Competition Network[57] (ICN) is a way for national authorities to coordinate their own enforcement activities.
Теория
Classical perspective
Under the doctrine of laissez-faire, antitrust is seen as unnecessary as competition is viewed as a long-term dynamic process where firms compete against each other for market dominance. In some markets, a firm may successfully dominate, but it is because of superior skill or innovativeness. However, according to laissez-faire theorists, when it tries to raise prices to take advantage of its monopoly position it creates profitable opportunities for others to compete. A process of creative destruction begins which erodes the monopoly. Therefore, government should not try to break up monopoly but should allow the market to work.[58]
The classical perspective on competition was that certain agreements and business practice could be an unreasonable restraint on the individual liberty of tradespeople to carry on their livelihoods. Restraints were judged as permissible or not by courts as new cases appeared and in the light of changing business circumstances. Hence the courts found specific categories of agreement, specific clauses, to fall foul of their doctrine on economic fairness, and they did not contrive an overarching conception of market power. Earlier theorists like Adam Smith rejected any monopoly power on this basis.
A monopoly granted either to an individual or to a trading company has the same effect as a secret in trade or manufactures. The monopolists, by keeping the market constantly under-stocked, by never fully supplying the effectual demand, sell their commodities much above the natural price, and raise their emoluments, whether they consist in wages or profit, greatly above their natural rate.[59]
In The Wealth of Nations (1776) Adam Smith also pointed out the cartel problem, but did not advocate specific legal measures to combat them.
People of the same trade seldom meet together, even for merriment and diversion, but the conversation ends in a conspiracy against the public, or in some contrivance to raise prices. It is impossible indeed to prevent such meetings, by any law which either could be executed, or would be consistent with liberty and justice. But though the law cannot hinder people of the same trade from sometimes assembling together, it ought to do nothing to facilitate such assemblies; much less to render them necessary.[60]
By the latter half of the 19th century, it had become clear that large firms had become a fact of the market economy. John Stuart Mill's approach was laid down in his treatise On Liberty (1859).
Again, trade is a social act. Whoever undertakes to sell any description of goods to the public, does what affects the interest of other persons, and of society in general; and thus his conduct, in principle, comes within the jurisdiction of society... both the cheapness and the good quality of commodities are most effectually provided for by leaving the producers and sellers perfectly free, under the sole check of equal freedom to the buyers for supplying themselves elsewhere. This is the so-called doctrine of Free Trade, which rests on grounds different from, though equally solid with, the principle of individual liberty asserted in this Essay. Restrictions on trade, or on production for purposes of trade, are indeed restraints; and all restraint, qua restraint, is an evil...[61]
Neo-classical synthesis
After Mill, there was a shift in economic theory, which emphasized a more precise and theoretical model of competition. A simple neo-classical model of free markets holds that production and distribution of goods and services in competitive free markets maximizes social welfare. This model assumes that new firms can freely enter markets and compete with existing firms, or to use legal language, there are no barriers to entry. By this term economists mean something very specific, that competitive free markets deliver allocative, productive and dynamic efficiency. Allocative efficiency is also known as Pareto efficiency after the Italian economist Vilfredo Pareto and means that resources in an economy over the long run will go precisely to those who are willing and able to pay for them. Because rational producers will keep producing and selling, and buyers will keep buying up to the last marginal unit of possible output – or alternatively rational producers will be reduce their output to the margin at which buyers will buy the same amount as produced – there is no waste, the greatest number wants of the greatest number of people become satisfied and utility is perfected because resources can no longer be reallocated to make anyone better off without making someone else worse off; society has achieved allocative efficiency. Productive efficiency simply means that society is making as much as it can. Free markets are meant to reward those who work hard, and therefore those who will put society's resources towards the frontier of its possible production.[62] Dynamic efficiency refers to the idea that business which constantly competes must research, create and innovate to keep its share of consumers. This traces to Austrian-American political scientist Joseph Schumpeter's notion that a "perennial gale of creative destruction" is ever sweeping through capitalist economies, driving enterprise at the market's mercy.[63] This led Schumpeter to argue that monopolies did not need to be broken up (as with Standard Oil) because the next gale of economic innovation would do the same.
Contrasting with the allocatively, productively and dynamically efficient market model are monopolies, oligopolies, and cartels. When only one or a few firms exist in the market, and there is no credible threat of the entry of competing firms, prices rise above the competitive level, to either a monopolistic or oligopolistic equilibrium price. Production is also decreased, further decreasing social welfare by creating a deadweight loss. Sources of this market power are said[by whom?] to include the existence of externalities, barriers to entry of the market, and the free rider problem. Markets may fail to be efficient for a variety of reasons, so the exception of competition law's intervention to the rule of laissez faire is justified if government failure can be avoided. Orthodox economists fully acknowledge that perfect competition is seldom observed in the real world, and so aim for what is called "workable competition".[64][65] This follows the theory that if one cannot achieve the ideal, then go for the second best option[66] by using the law to tame market operation where it can.
Chicago school
A group of economists and lawyers, who are largely associated with the University of Chicago, advocate an approach to competition law guided by the proposition that some actions that were originally considered to be anticompetitive could actually promote competition.[67] The U.S. Supreme Court has used the Chicago school approach in several recent cases.[68] One view of the Chicago school approach to antitrust is found in United States Circuit Court of Appeals Judge Richard Posner's books Antitrust Law[69] and Economic Analysis of Law.[70]
Robert Bork was highly critical of court decisions on United States antitrust law in a series of law review articles and his book The Antitrust Paradox.[71] Bork argued that both the original intention of antitrust laws and economic efficiency was the pursuit only of consumer welfare, the protection of competition rather than competitors.[72] Furthermore, only a few acts should be prohibited, namely cartels that fix prices and divide markets, mergers that create monopolies, and dominant firms pricing predatorily, while allowing such practices as vertical agreements and price discrimination on the grounds that it did not harm consumers.[73] Running through the different critiques of US antitrust policy is the common theme that government interference in the operation of free markets does more harm than good.[74] "The only cure for bad theory," writes Bork, "is better theory."[72] Harvard Law School professor Philip Areeda, who favours more aggressive antitrust policy, in at least one Supreme Court case challenged Robert Bork's preference for non-intervention.[75]
Упражняться
Collusion and cartels
Dominance and monopoly
When firms hold large market shares, consumers risk paying higher prices and getting lower quality products than compared to competitive markets. However, the existence of a very high market share does not always mean consumers are paying excessive prices since the threat of new entrants to the market can restrain a high-market-share firm's price increases. Competition law does not make merely having a monopoly illegal, but rather abusing the power that a monopoly may confer, for instance through exclusionary practices.
First, it is necessary to determine whether a firm is dominant, or whether it behaves "to an appreciable extent independently of its competitors, customers and ultimately of its consumer".[76] Under EU law, very large market shares raise a presumption that a firm is dominant,[77] which may be rebuttable.[78] If a firm has a dominant position, then there is "a special responsibility not to allow its conduct to impair competition on the common market".[79] Similarly as with collusive conduct, market shares are determined with reference to the particular market in which the firm and product in question is sold. Then although the lists are seldom closed,[80] certain categories of abusive conduct are usually prohibited under the country's legislation. For instance, limiting production at a shipping port by refusing to raise expenditure and update technology could be abusive.[81] Tying one product into the sale of another can be considered abuse too, being restrictive of consumer choice and depriving competitors of outlets. This was the alleged case in Microsoft v. Commission[82] leading to an eventual fine of million for including its Windows Media Player with the Microsoft Windows platform. A refusal to supply a facility which is essential for all businesses attempting to compete to use can constitute an abuse. One example was in a case involving a medical company named Commercial Solvents.[83] When it set up its own rival in the tuberculosis drugs market, Commercial Solvents were forced to continue supplying a company named Zoja with the raw materials for the drug. Zoja was the only market competitor, so without the court forcing supply, all competition would have been eliminated.
Forms of abuse relating directly to pricing include price exploitation. It is difficult to prove at what point a dominant firm's prices become "exploitative" and this category of abuse is rarely found. In one case however, a French funeral service was found to have demanded exploitative prices, and this was justified on the basis that prices of funeral services outside the region could be compared.[84] A more tricky issue is predatory pricing. This is the practice of dropping prices of a product so much that one's smaller competitors cannot cover their costs and fall out of business. The Chicago school considers predatory pricing to be unlikely.[85] However, in France Telecom SA v. Commission[86] a broadband internet company was forced to pay $13.9 million for dropping its prices below its own production costs. It had "no interest in applying such prices except that of eliminating competitors"[87] and was being cross-subsidized to capture the lion's share of a booming market. One last category of pricing abuse is price discrimination.[88] An example of this could be a company offering rebates to industrial customers who export their sugar, but not to customers who are selling their goods in the same market.[89]
Example
According to The World Bank's "Republic of Armenia Accumulation, Competition, and Connectivity Global Competition" report which was published in 2013, the Global Competitiveness Index suggests that Armenia ranks lowest among ECA (Europe and Central Asia) countries in the effectiveness of anti-monopoly policy and the intensity of competition. This low ranking somehow explains the low employment and low incomes in Armenia.[90]
Mergers and acquisitions
A merger or acquisition involves, from a competition law perspective, the concentration of economic power in the hands of fewer than before.[91] This usually means that one firm buys out the shares of another. The reasons for oversight of economic concentrations by the state are the same as the reasons to restrict firms who abuse a position of dominance, only that regulation of mergers and acquisitions attempts to deal with the problem before it arises, ex ante prevention of market dominance.[92] In the United States merger regulation began under the Clayton Act, and in the European Union, under the Merger Regulation 139/2004 (known as the "ECMR").[93] Competition law requires that firms proposing to merge gain authorization from the relevant government authority. The theory behind mergers is that transaction costs can be reduced compared to operating on an open market through bilateral contracts.[94] Concentrations can increase economies of scale and scope. However often firms take advantage of their increase in market power, their increased market share and decreased number of competitors, which can adversely affect the deal that consumers get. Merger control is about predicting what the market might be like, not knowing and making a judgment. Hence the central provision under EU law asks whether a concentration would, if it went ahead, "significantly impede effective competition... in particular as a result of the creation or strengthening off a dominant position..."[95] and the corresponding provision under US antitrust states similarly,
No person shall acquire, directly or indirectly, the whole or any part of the stock or other share capital... of the assets of one or more persons engaged in commerce or in any activity affecting commerce, where... the effect of such acquisition, of such stocks or assets, or of the use of such stock by the voting or granting of proxies or otherwise, may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly.[96]
What amounts to a substantial lessening of, or significant impediment to competition is usually answered through empirical study. The market shares of the merging companies can be assessed and added, although this kind of analysis only gives rise to presumptions, not conclusions.[97] The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index is used to calculate the "density" of the market, or what concentration exists. Aside from the maths, it is important to consider the product in question and the rate of technical innovation in the market.[98] A further problem of collective dominance, or oligopoly through "economic links"[99] can arise, whereby the new market becomes more conducive to collusion. It is relevant how transparent a market is, because a more concentrated structure could mean firms can coordinate their behavior more easily, whether firms can deploy deterrents and whether firms are safe from a reaction by their competitors and consumers.[100] The entry of new firms to the market, and any barriers that they might encounter should be considered.[101] If firms are shown to be creating an uncompetitive concentration, in the US they can still argue that they create efficiencies enough to outweigh any detriment, and similar reference to "technical and economic progress" is mentioned in Art. 2 of the ECMR.[102] Another defense might be that a firm which is being taken over is about to fail or go insolvent, and taking it over leaves a no less competitive state than what would happen anyway.[103] Mergers vertically in the market are rarely of concern, although in AOL/Time Warner[104] the European Commission required that a joint venture with a competitor Bertelsmann be ceased beforehand. The EU authorities have also focused lately on the effect of conglomerate mergers, where companies acquire a large portfolio of related products, though without necessarily dominant shares in any individual market.[105]
Intellectual property, innovation and competition
Competition law has become increasingly intertwined with intellectual property, such as copyright, trademarks, patents, industrial design rights and in some jurisdictions trade secrets.[106] It is believed that promotion of innovation through enforcement of intellectual property rights may promote as well as limit competitiveness. The question rests on whether it is legal to acquire monopoly through accumulation of intellectual property rights. In which case, the judgment needs to decide between giving preference to intellectual property rights or to competitiveness:
- Should antitrust laws accord special treatment to intellectual property.
- Should intellectual rights be revoked or not granted when antitrust laws are violated.
Concerns also arise over anti-competitive effects and consequences due to:
- Intellectual properties that are collaboratively designed with consequence of violating antitrust laws (intentionally or otherwise).
- The further effects on competition when such properties are accepted into industry standards.
- Cross-licensing of intellectual property.
- Bundling of intellectual property rights to long-term business transactions or agreements to extend the market exclusiveness of intellectual property rights beyond their statutory duration.
- Trade secrets, if they remain a secret, having an eternal length of life.
Some scholars suggest that a prize instead of patent would solve the problem of deadweight loss, when innovators got their reward from the prize, provided by the government or non-profit organization, rather than directly selling to the market, see Millennium Prize Problems. However, innovators may accept the prize only when it is at least as much as how much they earn from patent, which is a question difficult to determine.[107]
Смотрите также
- Consumer protection
- European Union competition law
- The History of the Standard Oil Company (book)
- Institute for Consumer Antitrust Studies
- Irish Competition law
- List of competition regulators
- List of countries' copyright length
- Relevant market
- Resale price maintenance
- Sherman Antitrust Act
- SSNIP
- United States antitrust law
- Megacorporation
Заметки
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(help) - ^ a b c Taylor, Martyn D. (2006). International competition law: a new dimension for the WTO?. Cambridge University Press. p. 1. ISBN 978-0-521-86389-6.
- ^ Cartel Damage Claims (CDC). "Cartel Damage Claims (CDC)". www.carteldamageclaims.com/. Retrieved 23 June 2014.
- ^ "Antitrust: Overview – Competition – European Commission". ec.europa.eu. Retrieved 27 June 2017.
- ^ "Anti-competitive agreements – European Commission". ec.europa.eu. Retrieved 27 June 2017.
- ^ http://ec.europa.eu/competition/publications/factsheets/antitrust_procedures_101_en.pdf
- ^ Topping, Simon; Tweedale, Patrick. "UAE Competition Law: New Regulations and Potential Effect on M&A Transactions". Transaction Advisors. ISSN 2329-9134.
- ^ JG Castel, 'The Extraterritorial Effects of Antitrust Laws' (1983) 179 Recueil des Cours 9
- ^ Taylor, Martyn D. (2006). International competition law: a new dimension for the WTO?. Cambridge University Press. p. 2. ISBN 978-0-521-86389-6.
- ^ see, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development's Regulation and Sectors page.
- ^ Bork (1993), p. 56
- ^ This is Julius Caesar's time according to Babled in De La Cure Annone chez le Romains.
- ^ a b Wilberforce (1966) p. 20
- ^ Wilberforce (1966) p. 22
- ^ a b c Wilberforce (1966) p. 21
- ^ Pollock and Maitland, History of English Law Vol. II, 453
- ^ 51 & 52 Hen. 3, Stat. 1
- ^ 51 & 52 Hen. 3, Stat. 6
- ^ Wilberforce (1966) p. 23
- ^ 23 Edw. 3.
- ^ 27 Edw. 3, Stat. 2, c. 25
- ^ 25 Hen. 8, c. 2.
- ^ "... the modern common law of England [has] passed directly into the legislation and thereafter into the judge-made law of the United States." Wilberforce (1966) p. 7
- ^ (1414) 2 Hen. 5, 5 Pl. 26
- ^ a b Papadopoulos, Anestis S (2010). The International Dimension of EU Competition Law and Policy. Cambridge University Press. p. 7. ISBN 978-0-521-19646-8.
- ^ according to William Searle Holdsworth, 4 Holdsworth, 3rd ed., Chap. 4 p. 346
- ^ (1602) 11 Co. Rep. 84b
- ^ For example one John Manley paid p.a. from 1654 to the Crown for a tender on the "postage of letters both inland and foreign" Wilberforce (1966) p. 18
- ^ (1685) 10 St. Tr. 371
- ^ Papadopoulos, Anestis S (2010). The International Dimension of EU Competition Law and Policy. Cambridge University Press. pp. 8–9. ISBN 978-0-521-19646-8.
- ^ a b Papadopoulos, Anestis S (2010). The International Dimension of EU Competition Law and Policy. Cambridge University Press. pp. 9–10. ISBN 978-0-521-19646-8.
- ^ Papadopoulos, Anestis S (2010). The International Dimension of EU Competition Law and Policy. Cambridge University Press. p. 11. ISBN 978-0-521-19646-8.
- ^ Papadopoulos, Anestis S (2010). The International Dimension of EU Competition Law and Policy. Cambridge University Press. p. 12. ISBN 978-0-521-19646-8.
- ^ Papadopoulos, Anestis S (2010). The International Dimension of EU Competition Law and Policy. Cambridge University Press. pp. 11–12. ISBN 978-0-521-19646-8.
- ^ "FTC Announces Reduced Hart-Scott-Rodino Act Thresholds For 2021". Seyfarth Shaw - FTC Announces Reduced Hart-Scott-Rodino Act Thresholds For 2021. Retrieved 12 April 2021.
- ^ Papadopoulos, Anestis S (2010). The International Dimension of EU Competition Law and Policy. Cambridge University Press. pp. 12–13. ISBN 978-0-521-19646-8.
- ^ Papadopoulos, Anestis S (2010). The International Dimension of EU Competition Law and Policy. Cambridge University Press. p. 14. ISBN 978-0-521-19646-8.
- ^ Vandenborre, Ingrid; Goetz, Thorsten; Dionnet, Stephane. "EU Nonmerger Antitrust Enforcement Gets Stricter". Transaction Advisors. ISSN 2329-9134.
- ^ "EUR-Lex – 32004R0139 – EN – EUR-Lex". eur-lex.europa.eu. Retrieved 27 June 2017.
- ^ Warrier VS, Conflict between Competition Law and Intellectual Property Rights Citation: 2010 (1) LW 2 The Lex-Warrier: Online Law Journal, ISSN 2319-8338
- ^ "CCI formation". CCI. Retrieved 4 January 2013.
- ^ Papadopoulos, Anestis S (2010). The International Dimension of EU Competition Law and Policy. Cambridge University Press. p. 15. ISBN 978-0-521-19646-8.
- ^ Marek Martyniszyn, Inter-Agency Evidence Sharing in Competition Law Enforcement, 19(1) International Journal of Evidence and Proof 11 (2015)
- ^ "Competition Commission – The Competition Ordinance (Cap 619)". www.compcomm.hk. Retrieved 27 June 2017.
- ^ "Overview – ASEAN | ONE VISION ONE IDENTITY ONE COMMUNITY". ASEAN | ONE VISION ONE IDENTITY ONE COMMUNITY. Retrieved 28 February 2018.
- ^ "Competition Law in ASEAN: Where Are We Now, And Where Are We Headed? | Conventus Law". www.conventuslaw.com. Retrieved 28 February 2018.
- ^ "EU Competition Law: A Roadmap for ASEAN?" | EU Centre in Singapore". www.eucentre.sg. Retrieved 28 February 2018.
- ^ "Expert Guides – A new era for competition law in the ASEAN region". Expert Guides. Retrieved 28 February 2018.
- ^ Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co. of California, 405 U.S. 251 (1972), 262.
- ^ "EUR-Lex – 32003R0001 – EN – EUR-Lex". eur-lex.europa.eu. Retrieved 27 June 2017.
- ^ "EUR-Lex – 52005DC0672 – EN – EUR-Lex". eur-lex.europa.eu. Retrieved 27 June 2017.
- ^ "European Commission – PRESS RELEASES – Press release – European Commission Green Paper on damages actions for breach of EC Treaty antitrust rules – frequently asked questions". europa.eu. Retrieved 27 June 2017.
- ^ Dr Peter Whelan, The Criminalization of European Cartel Enforcement: Theoretical, Legal and Practical Challenges, Oxford University Press, 2014
- ^ McEwin, R Ian (2003). "COMPETITION LAW IN A SMALL OPEN ECONOMY". University of New South Wales Law Journal. 15: 246.
- ^ see a speech by Wood, The Internationalisation of Antitrust Law: Options for the Future 3 February 1995, at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/future.txt
- ^ Whish (2003) p. 448
- ^ see, http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/
- ^ Campbell R. McConnell, Stanley L. Brue. Economics: Principles, Problems, and Policies. McGraw-Hill Professional, 2005. pp. 601–02
- ^ Smith (1776) Book I, Chapter 7, para 26
- ^ Smith (1776) Book I, Chapter 10, para 82
- ^ Mill (1859) Chapter V, para 4
- ^ for one of the opposite views, see Kenneth Galbraith, The New Industrial State (1967)
- ^ Joseph Schumpeter, The Process of Creative Destruction (1942)
- ^ Whish (2003), p. 14.
- ^ Clark, John M. (1940). "Towards a Concept of Workable Competition". American Economic Review. 30 (2): 241–56. JSTOR 1807048.
- ^ c.f. Lipsey, R. G.; Lancaster, Kelvin (1956). "The General Theory of Second Best". Review of Economic Studies. 24 (1): 11–32. doi:10.2307/2296233. JSTOR 2296233.
- ^ Hovenkamp, Herbert (1985). "Antitrust Policy after Chicago". Michigan Law Review. The Michigan Law Review Association. 84 (2): 213–84. doi:10.2307/1289065. JSTOR 1289065. S2CID 153691408.
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- ^ Posner, R. (2001). Antitrust Law (2nd ed.). Chicago: University of Chicago Press. ISBN 978-0-226-67576-3.
- ^ Posner, R. (2007). Economic Analysis of Law (7th ed.). Austin, TX: Wolters Kluwer Law & Business. ISBN 978-0-7355-6354-4.
- ^ Bork, Robert H. (1978). The Antitrust Paradox. New York: Free Press. ISBN 978-0-465-00369-3.
- ^ a b Bork (1978), p. 405.
- ^ Bork (1978), p. 406.
- ^ Easterbrook, Frank (1984). "The Limits of Antitrust". Texas Law Review. 63: 1. ISSN 0040-4411.
- ^ Brooke Group v. Williamson, 509 U.S. 209 (1993).
- ^ C-27/76 United Brands Continental BV v. Commission [1978] ECR 207
- ^ C-85/76 Hoffmann-La Roche & Co AG v. Commission [1979] ECR 461
- ^ AKZO [1991]
- ^ Michelin [1983]
- ^ Continental Can [1973]
- ^ Art. 82 (b) Porto di Genova [1991]
- ^ Case T-201/04 Microsoft v. Commission Order, 22 December 2004
- ^ Commercial Solvents [1974]
- ^ C-30/87 Corinne Bodson v. SA Pompes funèbres des régions libérées [1987] ECR 2479
- ^ see, e.g. Posner (1998) p. 332; "While it is possible to imagine cases in which predatory pricing would be a rational stragy, it should be apparent by now why confirmed cases of it are rare."
- ^ Case T-340/03 France Telecom SA v. Commission
- ^ AKZO [1991] para 71
- ^ in the EU under Article 82(2)c)
- ^ Irish Sugar [1999]
- ^ The World Bank. Republic of Armenia Accumulation, Competition, and Connectivity Global Competition (PDF). The World Bank.
- ^ Under EC law, a concentration is where a "change of control on a lasting basis results from (a) the merger of two or more previously independent undertakings... (b) the acquisition... if direct or indirect control of the whole or parts of one or more other undertakings". Art. 3(1), Regulation 139/2004, the European Community Merger Regulation
- ^ In the case of [T-102/96] Gencor Ltd v. Commission [1999] ECR II-753 the EU Court of First Instance wrote merger control is there "to avoid the establishment of market structures which may create or strengthen a dominant position and not need to control directly possible abuses of dominant positions"
- ^ The authority for the Commission to pass this regulation is found under Art. 83 TEC
- ^ Coase, Ronald H. (November 1937). "The Nature of the Firm" (PDF). Economica. 4 (16): 386–405. doi:10.1111/j.1468-0335.1937.tb00002.x. Archived from the original (PDF) on 13 January 2007. Retrieved 10 February 2007.
- ^ Art. 2(3) Reg. 129/2005
- ^ Clayton Act Section 7, codified at 15 U.S.C. § 18
- ^ see, for instance para 17, Guidelines on the assessment of horizontal mergers (2004/C 31/03)
- ^ C-68/94 France v. Commission [1998] ECR I-1375, para. 219
- ^ Italian Flat Glass [1992] ECR ii-1403
- ^ T-342/99 Airtours plc v. Commission [2002] ECR II-2585, para 62
- ^ Mannesmann, Vallourec and Ilva [1994] CMLR 529, OJ L102 21 April 1994
- ^ see the argument put forth in Hovenkamp H (1999) Federal Antitrust Policy: The Law of Competition and Its Practice, 2nd Ed, West Group, St. Paul, Minnesota. Unlike the authorities however, the courts take a dim view of the efficiencies defense.
- ^ Kali und Salz AG v. Commission [1975] ECR 499
- ^ Time Warner/AOL [2002] 4 CMLR 454, OJ L268
- ^ e.g. Guinness/Grand Metropolitan [1997] 5 CMLR 760, OJ L288; Many in the US disapprove of this approach, see W. J. Kolasky, Conglomerate Mergers and Range Effects: It's a long way from Chicago to Brussels 9 November 2001, Address before George Mason University Symposium Washington, DC.
- ^ Antitrust Enforcement and Intellectual Property Rights: Promoting Innovation and Competition (PDF) (Report). U.S. Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission. April 2007.
- ^ Suzanne Scotchmer: "Innovation and Incentives" the MIT press, 2004 (Chapter 2).
Рекомендации
- Bork, Robert H. (1978) The Antitrust Paradox, New York Free Press ISBN 0-465-00369-9
- _____ (1993). The Antitrust Paradox (second edition). New York: Free Press. ISBN 0-02-904456-1.
- Friedman, Milton (1999) "The Business Community's Suicidal Impulse", Cato Policy Report, 21(2), pp. 6–7 (scroll down & press +).
- Galbraith Kenneth (1967) The New Industrial State
- Harrington, Joseph E. (2008). "antitrust enforcement," The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, 2nd Edition. Abstract.
- Mill, John Stuart (1859) On Liberty
- Posner, Richard (2001) Antitrust Law, 2nd ed., ISBN 978-0-226-67576-3 Preview.
- _____ (2007) Economic Analysis of Law 7th ed., ISBN 978-0-7355-6354-4
- Prosser, Tony (2005) The Limits of Competition Law, ch.1
- Rubinfeld, D.L. (2001), "Antitrust Policy", International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences, pp. 553–560, doi:10.1016/B0-08-043076-7/02299-3, ISBN 9780080430768
- Schumpeter, Joseph (1942) The Process of Creative Destruction
- Smith, Adam (1776) An Enquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations online from the Adam Smith Institute
- Wilberforce, Richard, Alan Campbell and Neil Elles (1966) The Law of Restrictive Practices and Monopolies, 2nd edition, London: Sweet and Maxwell LCCN 66-70116
- Whish, Richard (2003) Competition Law, 5th Ed. Lexis Nexis Butterworths
дальнейшее чтение
- Competition Policy International, ISSN 1554-6853, available at https://web.archive.org/web/20071127034131/http://www.globalcompetitionpolicy.org/
- Elhauge, Einer, Geradin, Damien (2007) Global Competition Law and Economics, ISBN 1-84113-465-1
- Faull, Jonathan, Nikpay, Ali (eds) (2007) "Faull & Nikpay : The EC Law of Competition," ISBN 978-0-19-926929-7
- Georg Erber, Georg, Kooths, Stefan, '"Windows Vista: Securing Itself against Competition?'," in: DIW Weekly Report, 2/2007, Vol.3, 7–14.
- Hylton, Keith N., et al., "Antitrust World Reports'," available at https://web.archive.org/web/20080724022203/http://www.antitrustworldwiki.com/